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Abstract
The impact of voice on trust attributions
Ilaria Torre
Trust and speech are both essential aspects of human interaction. On the one hand, trust
is necessary for vocal communication to be meaningful. On the other hand, humans have
developed a way to infer someone’s trustworthiness from their voice, as well as to signal their
own. Yet, research on trustworthiness attributions to speakers is scarce and contradictory,
and very often uses explicit data, which do not predict actual trusting behaviour. However,
measuring behaviour is very important to have an actual representation of trust. This thesis
contains 5 experiments aimed at examining the influence of various voice characteristics —
including accent, prosody, emotional expression and naturalness — on trusting behaviours
towards virtual players and robots. The experiments have the "investment game" — a method
derived from game theory, which allows to measure implicit trustworthiness attributions over
time — as their main methodology. Results show that standard accents, high pitch, slow
articulation rate and smiling voice generally increase trusting behaviours towards a virtual
agent, and a synthetic voice generally elicits higher trustworthiness judgments towards
a robot. The findings also suggest that different voice characteristics influence trusting
behaviours with different temporal dynamics. Furthermore, the actual behaviour of the
various speaking agents was modified to be more or less trustworthy, and results show
that people’s trusting behaviours develop over time accordingly. Also, people reinforce
their trust towards speakers that they deem particularly trustworthy when these speakers
are indeed trustworthy, but punish them when they are not. This suggests that people’s
trusting behaviours might also be influenced by the congruency of their first impressions
with the actual experience of the speaker’s trustworthiness — a "congruency effect". This
has important implications in the context of Human–Machine Interaction, for example for
assessing users’ reactions to speaking machines which might not always function properly.
Taken together, the results suggest that voice influences trusting behaviour, and that first
impressions of a speaker’s trustworthiness based on vocal cues might not be indicative of
future trusting behaviours, and that trust should be measured dynamically.
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1 Introduction
Trust is a fundamental aspect of human communication. In fact, the mere existence of
communication is granted by a mutual trust between interlocutors. Such a natural tendency
to trust speech is mediated by heuristics that give us indicators about when the speaker might
not be trustworthy. For example, not being able to tell a speaker’s background, prosodic
indicators of aggression or dominance, or vocal identifiers of a particular social group, can all
contribute to this impression. Empirical evidence indeed suggests that we make immediate
trust judgements based on such vocal features. However, these findings generally rely
on explicit measures, and questioning listeners about their attitudes to a voice might also
affect their attitude, or cause them to express an attitude that they did not have or would
not normally act on. Implicit measures, on the other hand, allow to determine attitudes to
voices through actual behaviour, which should be a more reliable indicator of trust. They also
allow us to examine whether voice-based prejudices survive experience of actual behaviour,
which might not be expected, since these prejudices are presumably overwritten as soon as
other evidence is available. All these issues are empirically examined in this dissertation,
with experiments collecting implicit measures of trust towards different voices as it develops
with behavioural experience. How do initial judgments change with exposure to a speaker’s
behaviour? Are some voices more trustworthy in certain contexts, and other voices in other
contexts?
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1.1 The importance of trust for speech and of speech for trust
Human communication, including vocal communication, needs trust to function. When we
ask a stranger for directions, we trust that they will give us the correct information, to the
best of their knowledge. The supermaxim of quality in Grice’s Cooperative principle also
highlights this norm, stating: “Try to make your contribution one that is true” (Grice, 1975).
Trust is important even without using lexical verbal communication. For example, when
we hear someone crying, we trust that something must be wrong, and we go in their aid.
Evolutionarily speaking, such an environment, where everyone is expected to be trusting and
trustworthy, facilitates the emergence of deceptors (e.g. Doebeli, Hauert & Killingback, 2004).
However, as will be later discussed in greater detail (Section 2.1.2), deceptors are only at
an advantage if there are few of them in a community. And even then, once a deceptor
is unmasked, its advantage will vanish, just like the “boy who cried wolf”. Thus, trust is
essential for spoken communication.
The spoken channel is also the main mode of communication for people, so we must have
developed a way to accurately signal our trustworthiness to others, and to detect theirs.
Indeed, evidence shows that people are able to make fast and accurate trustworthiness
judgments upon hearing someone’s voice for the first time (McAleer, Todorov & Belin,
2014). Trustworthiness can be inferred from many vocal features, such as accent (Lev-Ari &
Keysar, 2010), prosodic cues (N. Miller, Maruyama, Beaber & Valone, 1976) or emotional
expressions (Schug, Matsumoto, Horita, Yamagishi & Bonnet, 2010). What is less clear is
how initial impressions based on these cues will change upon repeated interaction with this
voice, and with the behaviour of its owner.
1.2 Explicit vs. implicit measures
Work on trust attributions is generally based on data gathered through surveys or question-
naires, which typically involve participants rating someone’s trustworthiness on a Likert-type
scale. This type of data is called “explicit”, because it requires the respondent to make an
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overt statement about trust in response to a direct question (Greenwald, 1990). However,
such explicit data do not always directly correlate with behavioural data (De Houwer, 2006;
Greenwald, 1990; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wicker, 1969). This means that people who
rate a voice as sounding “100% trustworthy” are not actually going to trust its advice 100% of
the time. Talking specifically about trust, Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000)
argue that explicit survey questions about trusting behaviours do not predict behaviours in
economic games such as the investment game. This lack of correlation has been reported
also for measures taken from the same subjects (De Houwer & Bruycker, 2007; Franck,
De Raedt & De Houwer, 2007; Glaeser et al., 2000; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998;
Schimmack & Diener, 2003). In a review of studies that measured attitudes and behaviours
at separate times, Wicker (1969) also found that the two are not related. From this review, it
appears that this non correspondence between behaviour and attitudes has been known in
the social psychology literature for a long time, yet researchers have been mostly using expli-
cit data, rather than behavioural data. How to define and examine the implicitness of implicit
measures Implicit measures, instead, estimate attitudes towards objects indirectly, through
processes that are “uncontrolled, unintentional, goal-independent, purely-stimulus-driven,
autonomous, unconscious, efficient, or fast” (De Houwer & Moors, 2007, p. 192). Implicit
measures can evoke attitudes through actual behaviour, where attention is not directly drawn
to the particular object of interest to the experimenter (see Schwarz, 1999). Examples of
implicit measures are interpersonal distance, which can be used to study openness and
positive attitudes towards an attitude object (e.g. Haring, Matsumoto & Watanabe, 2013),
emotional expressions, which can reveal how a participant is feeling towards something else
(Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard & Tetlock, 2013), or economic games, which provide
implicit measures of trusting behaviours and perceived trustworthiness (Berg, Dickhaut &
McCabe, 1995). These will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Arguably, the most known
implicit measure is the IAT, ideated by Greenwald et al. (1998). This test uses reaction times
to measure automatic evaluations of a class of attitude objects, by matching a target concept
(for example, “young”) with a description (for example, “pleasant”). The IAT is believed to not
be influenced by factors such as social desirability bias – where people might tweak their
11
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responses in order to appear in a certain way (Banse, Seise & Zerbes, 2001). However,
even the IAT is not exempt from flaws. For example, it has been shown that it might also not
always correlate with behaviour (for a review, see Oswald et al., 2013), and that participants
often realise that they are being primed towards a certain attitude object (De Houwer, 2006).
1.3 First impressions
First impressions, such as those that questionnaires or the IAT typically measure, are very
important, because they contribute to determining future attributions, but they do not reveal
anything about any subsequent attitude development. As Solomon Asch put it, “We look at a
person and immediately a certain impression of his character forms itself in us. A glance,
a few spoken words are sufficient to tell us a story about a highly complex matter. We
know that such impressions form with remarkable rapidity and with great ease. Subsequent
observations may enrich or upset our view, but we can no more prevent its rapid growth than
we can avoid perceiving a given visual object or hearing a melody” (Asch, 1946, p. 258).
Thus, even a definition of first impressions contains some information about “subsequent
observations”. Attitude development ought, for maximum utility, to reflect actual experience
rather than remain based on initial prejudices, which might later prove unfounded. Yet, most
studies on personality traits limit their investigation to first impressions, without taking into
account how the attributions might evolve over time.
A study looking at the trustworthiness of Embodied Conversational Agents (ECA) partially
addressed the question of trustworthiness attributions over time (Elkins & Derrick, 2013).
They hypothesised that trust is temporally variant, so they collected trustworthiness ratings at
different points during the interaction with the agent. However, the agent randomly changed
its appearance (female or male, smiling or neutral) after each rating, so it is possible that
participants simply rated what they perceived to be a new agent from scratch, rather than
the same one over time. Elkins and Derrick (2013)’s approach still used explicit measures,
but it is a starting point to address the temporal aspects of trust formation.
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Explicit measures such as questionnaires are often administered once, and therefore only
provide data about first impressions, not the dynamics of the perceiver-attitude object relation
over time. In real life however, personality attributions such as trust evolve continuously,
based on the behaviour of the interacting parties. In fact, one of the characteristics that
seem to be common to definitions of trusting behaviour is that it increases incrementally via
repeated positive interactions (Weber, Malhotra & Murnighan, 2004; Jonker & Treur, 1999;
Castelfranchi & Falcone, 1998; G. R. Jones & George, 1998). For example, according to
Gambetta (1988), trust “is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action”. Thus, at
each interaction, a perceiver will give a value to the trustworthiness of the interaction partner
at that particular point in time. Then, the perceiver’s subjective probability of the partner’s
trustworthiness will change according to this value at the next interaction. Time, then, is likely
to play a role in the shaping of trustworthiness attributions, but we still have to understand
whether first impressions will gradually fade out as the object becomes more familiar or, on
the contrary, will reinforce themselves due to a perceived negative behaviour (Asch, 1946).
1.4 Context dynamics
Very little research has been dedicated to experimentally manipulating the behavioural
characteristics of an agent in order to examine their effect on the trust development process,
despite the general agreement that attitudes are formed in time and can change based on
a person’s behaviour (Weber et al., 2004; King-Casas et al., 2005; Asch, 1946; Lewicki,
Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006). In particular, the effect of experience of the other party’s
behaviour remains unclear. Recent work in Human-Machine Interaction aimed at automat-
ically predicting personality traits from multimodal cues partially addressed this question.
Celiktutan and Gunes (2016) and Joshi, Gunes and Goecke (2014) asked participants to
judge pre-recorded conversations between a human and an avatar which exhibited different
emotional and personality characteristics, like sadness or happiness. They found that this
situational context affected people’s perception and ratings, although the authors did not
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mention how the judgments changed over time. Batrinca, Lepri, Mana and Pianesi (2012)
also specifically manipulated behaviour: participants played a map task with a virtual agent
which was programmed to have different levels of cooperativeness, in order to elicit different
reactions from the participants. Surprisingly, they found that the different cooperativeness
levels did not elicit different personality attributions, nor did they help to better predict them.
However, the way the cooperativeness levels were chosen in this experiment is not clear,
and their conclusion remains dubious.
Other temporal dynamics are likely to affect personality judgments as well. While it has been
shown that very little time is necessary to form first impressions (Zebrowitz & Collins, 1997;
McAleer et al., 2014; Willis & Todorov, 2006; Bar, Neta & Linz, 2006), it is also true that
exposure time increases accuracy and confidence in personality judgements (Blackman &
Funder, 1998; Ambady, Hallahan & Conner, 1999; Carney, Colvin & Hall, 2007; Willis &
Todorov, 2006). Furthermore, it is also well established that interactants will adapt to each
other’s behaviour, gesture, and speech over time (Burgoon, Stern & Dillman, 2007; Giles
& Powesland, 1997). With this continuous adaptation, behaviours dynamically change in
response to affect, speaking partner, and environment (Elkins & Derrick, 2013). Evidence of
attitude change also comes from Contact Theory: intergroup interactions, real or imagined,
have been found to reduce initial prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Crisp & Turner, 2009;
Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe & Ropp, 1997; Blair, Ma & Lenton, 2001), both in adults and
in children (Cameron, Rutland, Brown & Douch, 2006). Similar trends have been found for
accent prejudice (Adank, Stewart, Connell & Wood, 2013). Length of relationship has also
been found to affect trust and trusting behaviour (Engle-Warnick & Slonim, 2006), as well as
strength of relationship (Burt & Knez, 1995). Thus, while it is clear that personality attributions
change with experience, more evidence is needed from experimentally manipulating the
behaviour of the attitude object.
First impressions, particularly of trustworthiness, might also be remnants of a “fight or flight”
instinct, as pointed out by Bzdok et al. (2011). This would suggest that initial trustworthiness
impressions should be quite accurate and remain relatively unchanged. The fact that
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trustworthiness judgments are made very quickly (Todorov, Pakrashi & Oosterhof, 2009;
McAleer et al., 2014; Willis & Todorov, 2006) suggests that, at least in evolutionary terms,
there was a need for such a rapid assessment of a newly encountered individual. In fact,
people seem to be very good at recognising untrustworthy individuals, since this ability was
necessary for survival (Carney et al., 2007). However, societal change in the history of
humankind means that we most likely do not need to activate such a “fight or flight” response
every time we hear a new speaker (Riedl & Javor, 2012). On the contrary, we have learned
to observe other people’s behaviour and build our impressions based on that: cooperation
and trust are concepts built in time. Supporting this argument, several scholars have argued
that a context-based measure of accuracy of personality perception is needed (e.g. McAleer
et al., 2014; Salem, Ziadee & Sakr, 2013; Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn, Te Boekhorst
& Koay, 2008). Whether first impressions are actual vestigial remnants of our ancestral
heritage, or cultural biases, or a combination of the two, we do not know.
1.5 Contribution
According to Lewicki et al. (2006), two approaches have emerged in research on trust, one
based on behavioural economics, and one on personality psychology. While these two have
provided experimental methods and results on trust in many different settings independently
of each other, only recently have the two started to join forces. Scholars in behavioural
economics theorise about trust as a rational agent’s behaviour, which calculates gains and
losses of each potential action before making a decision. Such theories would often lack
discussion about individual differences or normative social conventions, as will be discussed
later (see Chapter 9.5). Conversely, psychology scholars studying trust would often rely on
data from personality questionnaires (Riedl & Javor, 2012). These results have been shown
to not predict actual behaviour, though (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000), and as such they might
not be appropriate if one is interested in behavioural measures.
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Recently, a trend has emerged in the cognitive sciences to gamify psychological experiments,
in an attempt at engaging participants more, so that they will be more intrinsically motivated
to complete the task (Lumsden, Edwards, Lawrence, Coyle & Munafò, 2016; Sailer, Hense,
Mayr & Mandl, 2017). Economic games such as the ones often used in behavioural
economics, like variations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Section 3.1), have then been
used to study actual trusting behaviours of participants in a standard, controlled laboratory
environment (Cochard, Van & Willinger, 2004). Evidence has since shown that this type
of data, when paired with other types of data (such as explicit evaluations or biological
correlates) does indeed provide a bigger picture of the cognitive processes behind trusting
behaviours (Glaeser et al., 2000; Riedl & Javor, 2012). The contribution of the gamified data
is that it represents actual participants’ decisions on a dilemma, rather than speculations
about a decision-making process. Rather than asking participants to give a numerical
evaluation on a question such as: “How trustworthy do you think people wearing hoods are?”,
their trust can be directly measured from behavioural choices, for example in economic
games played with a hooded person. Similar attempts of measuring behaviour and increasing
immersion is being used in moral decision-making, for example Francis et al. (2016). The
distinction being made is between an individual’s conscious attitudes, or propensity to trust,
and actual decisions, which the individual might be only partially aware of (De Houwer, 2006;
Uleman, Saribay & Gonzalez, 2008).
In this thesis, I add a third element to the economical-psychological study of trust, that of
speech. Human interactions are generally based on verbal communication, which requires
trust to function. Thus, we should be able to quickly asses another person’s trustworthiness
from the sound of their voice. As reviewed in Section 2.1.5, there is a substantial body of
work on attitudes and explicit evaluations of different voices. However, often the emphasis
of such studies has been on certain indexical information that someone’s voice conveys
(for example gender or place of origin), but rarely has the effect of vocal characteristics
on trust been studied per se. The information conveyed in the voice, taken all together,
might be a good measure of person perception, where a person’s voice interacts with all
sorts of other features, such as physical appearance or attire. However, not all interactions
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which require trust happen face-to-face, and this phenomenon can only increase with the
advent of powerful and inexpensive voice-based technologies (see Riedl & Javor, 2012).
Also, speaking machines are becoming a reality for an increasing number of people, and
scholars have been also studying agent perception (e.g. Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves & Dryer,
1995). As technological advances are not likely to stop anytime soon, studying the effect
that different agent characteristics, including voice, have on human decision-making, is
paramount to ensure a smooth transition to a world where humans and machines cooperate
in society. With this thesis, I hope to contribute to this transition.
1.6 Problem definition
To give a practical example of the issues addressed in this thesis, consider the following
simplistic, hypothetical situation: Carmen is driving to her friend’s graduation party; she has
only a vague idea of how to get to the party, so she set the location address in her navigator
system and is now following its directions. At an intersection, the navigator tells Carmen to
go right, but she spots a street sign pointing to her destination on the left. What to do? It
appears that she has two choices: either follow the navigator, trusting that it will have more
information about current traffic conditions and driving times, or she can follow the sign,
trusting that it will lead to her destination eventually. Now let’s assume that the navigator
system has a voice, for example a female, high-pitched voice with a Queen’s English accent.
This voice sounds competent and reliable to Carmen, so she quickly chooses to follow its
advice, and turns right. It turns out that the street on the right is a dead-end, and Carmen has
to go back, slightly annoyed at the navigator about the lost time. When the same situation
presents itself again, with road signs and navigator pointing to different directions, Carmen
decidedly follows the road sign. Let’s now go back to the first intersection and assume,
this time, that the navigator has a female, low-pitched Liverpool-accented voice instead.
Carmen chose it to be her navigator voice because it makes her smile. When the intersection
with contradicting directions appears, Carmen immediately follows the sign, almost without
thinking. The different navigator systems’ voices elicit different reactions from Carmen.
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Assuming that people do indeed have attitudes towards machine agents such as navigation
systems, or that they even treat them as agents – empirical evidence shows that they do
(Large, Clark, Quandt, Burnett & Skrypchuk, 2017) – we might also venture to say that
the same mistake, made by two navigators with different voices, might also elicit different
reactions from Carmen. While a mistake from the first voice might have evoked particularly
strong negative reactions, a mistake from the second, less competent-sounding voice might
have evoked a milder reaction.
Thus, as has been pointed out a few times in this introduction, it seems that there are two
outstanding questions in the study of voice-based trust attributions:
• Are actual trusting behaviours, rather than explicit trustworthiness judgments, influ-
enced by voice cues?
• How does initial trust in a voice change with experience of a speaker’s behaviour?
A methodology derived from game theory, called the “investment game”, can be used to
study trusting behaviours over time. This method is described in detail in Section 3.3. This
will be used to address these questions in the following chapters.
1.7 Summary of chapters
In Chapter 2, literature on trust is reviewed with particular emphasis on the evolutionary
importance of being able to accurately detect and signal trustworthiness. Studies on
vocal indicators of trustworthiness judgments, particularly accent and prosodic cues, are
also discussed, and inconsistencies in the literature are highlighted. In Chapter 3, the
methodology used in the current experiments is described, with reference to its origin,
game theory. Chapter 4 is the first experiment using the investment game as a method
to gather implicit trust attributions to different accented speakers. Chapter 5 expands the
preliminary results from the previous Chapter to an experiment where more accents and
more speakers of the same accent are used, in order to examine individual prosodic cues
that might implicitly influence trust. In Chapter 6, pitch and articulation rate of male and
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female speakers are artificially manipulated to directly examine the effect of prosodic cues
on trust. Chapter 7 presents an experiment using smiling voice as a cue to trust. Chapter 8
presents an experiment using the investment game in Human-Robot Interaction, where a
robot has either a synthetic or a natural voice. Finally, general conclusions on the vocal
indicators of trust are drawn in Chapter 9, together with theoretical implications and potential
practical applications.
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2 Literature review
This chapter starts with a general introduction to the concept of trust, then describes where
trust lies in the social psychology literature and the attribution of trustworthiness to voices.
In the second part of this chapter, theories and experimental evidence for accent and
voice attitudes are discussed. Finally, the study of trust in Human-Machine Interaction is
introduced.
2.1 Trust
2.1.1 Definitions
Trust makes someone, the trustor, knowingly accept vulnerability to a trustee. More formally,
it is defined as a “psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based
upon positive expectations of the intentions or the behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin,
Burt & Camerer, 1998). Another definition by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995, p. 712)
emphasises the reason behind the trustor’s decision and the independence of the involved
people: “[trust is] the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. From these definitions,
it emerges that trust is interpersonal: there must be someone/something who trusts (a so
called “trustor”) and someone/something who is trusted (a so called “trustee”). The trustor
has no control over whether their trust has been well-placed or not, so they are exposed
to some uncertainty. Nevertheless, the trustor supposedly has some mental model of how
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trustworthy the trustee is (Gambetta, 1988), and this will influence his/her decision to trust or
not. This is what Mayer et al. (1995) call the “willingness” to take a risk.
Other definitions of trust mention the importance of cooperation. For example, Burt and
Knez (1995, p. 257) say that “Trust is anticipated cooperation”, and Gambetta (1988, p. 217)
says that someone is trustworthy when “the probability that he will perform an action that
is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in
some form of cooperation with him”. However, trust can happen without cooperation, for
example in the case of children’s unconditional trust. Also, cooperation does not always
need trust, for example when cooperating does not put any of the involved parties at risk
(Mayer et al., 1995). In these situations, trust is more marginal to the interaction. Still, in the
cases in which cooperating is a risky decision for someone, cooperation can be used as an
accurate measure of trust, since they are deeply intertwined. Thus, just like for risk, trust
includes a willingness to cooperate, even though cooperation does not need to happen.
From these definitions, we can imply that trust is a behaviour (Boone & Buck, 2003; Fehr,
2009a; Mayer et al., 1995): the trustor’s decision to trust makes him/her vulnerable to the
trustee’s behaviour. Thus, to make a clear connection between some key terms in the trust
literature, the trustor can be trusting, and the trustee can be trustworthy. If the trustee is
untrustworthy, but still tries to elicit the trustor’s trust, he/she is deceptive. Deception can
be achieved by telling lies, which is the opposite of telling the truth. If the trustor trusts the
trustee, it means that he/she believes the trustee to be trustworthy. The trustworthiness of
the trustee is both a real trait that the trustee possesses, and an attribution that the trustor
makes, which can be well-placed or not. In this thesis, the term trustworthiness denotes the
latter, unless otherwise specified.
2.1.2 Evolutionary theories of trust
Trust is a fundamental aspect of social interactions, to the extent that, without trust, human
societies would not exist (Baier, 1986; Yamamoto, 1990; Luhmann, 1979; Lagenspetz,
1992), and indeed scholars have consistently found that low income countries generally have
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low trust (Zak & Fakhar, 2006; Zak & Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk, De Groot & Van Schaik,
2004; Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silane, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In
fact, we make trusting decisions every day, and many times per day (Luhmann, 1979). At a
macro-societal level, we trust our country’s institutions to provide for our needs, for example
to stock our markets with food, to provide accessible education, and to defend us against
discrimination. At a micro-societal level, we trust drivers to adhere to traffic laws, restaurants
to not serve us spoiled food, and other parents to vaccinate their children. We also trust at
individual levels, for example when we trust a friend to look after our pets, our partner to not
cheat on us, and our children to not crash the car when they go out. These different levels
of trust are all related to each other, and all contribute to a functioning society (Rothstein &
Uslaner, 2005).
But is trust a uniquely human behaviour? Some evidence suggests that animals display
some forms of trust as well (Bateson, 2000). For example, male baboons might help another
male to win over a female, trusting that the favour will be returned one day (Packer, 1977).
Also, bats will share their food with non-kin individuals who have not fed enough, knowing
that a small sacrifice today might result in a gain tomorrow, when they are the malnourished
ones (G. S. Wilkinson, Carter, Bohn & Adams, 2016). Such kind of reciprocal altruism
has been described as a form of trust in the animal world, and as an evolutionary strength
(Harcourt, 1991).
Thus, in both the animal and the human world, the society as a whole is better off if there
is trust between individuals. However, individuals who do not cooperate, while everyone
else does, are even better off, because they exploit everyone’s labour without paying its cost
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971). Evolutionarily speaking, cooperative contexts
have been demonstrated to favour the emergence of these defectors, or “free riders” (Doebeli
et al., 2004). Free-riding is only beneficial to the individual if there are few individuals who
do it, though. For example, classmates who do nothing on the group project, knowing that
the other people in the group will do the work for them, can benefit from the final grade
without putting any work into it. If everyone does that, however, the teacher will fail all
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the students in the group, and everyone will be worse off. Thus, there must be a balance
between cooperative and uncooperative individuals (Doebeli et al., 2004), and being able to
recognise uncooperative individuals is an advantage for everyone. In fact, everyone wants to
interact with cooperative individuals, either to cooperate with them, or to exploit them (Boone
& Buck, 2003).
Recognising potential deceivers is thus a strategy that allows the individuals, and by exten-
sion the whole society, to survive. Experimental evidence confirms that people are able to
distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy individuals very rapidly. For example, Willis and
Todorov (2006) showed that very little exposure time (100 ms) is enough for people to form
first impressions, including of trustworthiness, competence, likeability, attractiveness and
aggressiveness. They also showed that people’s impressions become more confident if the
exposure time increases. Of all these traits, trustworthiness was the impression that had the
highest correlation between judgements made after 100 ms and judgements made without
time constraints. The authors’ conclusion is that this might be because, in evolutionary terms,
immediate trustworthiness detection is essential for survival. On the other hand, Carney
et al. (2007) found that exposure time increased accuracy especially in the detection of
positive traits, including extraversion and agreeableness — which is a major trait that includes
trustworthiness, as discussed below. Instead, exposure time did not improve accuracy for
negative affect, neuroticism, openness, and intelligence. They suggested that the former
traits might be linked to social interactions, which might take more time to be unravelled,
whereas the latter might be linked to threat and competence, for which a quick decision
might be needed. In general, they found that accuracy was better for negative traits, perhaps
because, in evolutionary terms, being accurate in these kinds of situation is necessary for
survival. Thus, it is possible that people might need to be more quick and accurate about a
person’s untrustworthiness, rather than trustworthiness.
In support to the argument that people might be more accurate in recognising untrustworthy
individuals, several studies found that people remember untrustworthy individuals better
than trustworthy ones. For example, Yamagishi, Tanida, Mashima, Shimoma and Kanazawa
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(2003) found that participants remembered the faces of players who defected in a prisoner’s
dilemma game better than the faces of cooperative players. Rule, Slepian and Ambady (2012)
found that participants remembered faces that had been previously rated as untrustworthy
better than trustworthy ones, even though nothing about trustworthiness was mentioned
to them. Also, Suzuki and Suga (2010) found that, rather than faces, people remembered
untrustworthy behaviour in an economic game better than trustworthy behaviour. This
consistent evidence suggests that people spend more cognitive effort into remembering
untrustworthy individuals, in order to avoid them in the future. Following a parsimonious
principle, this suggests that the default in human interaction is to be cooperative, and that it’s
uncooperative individuals who “stand out” and need to be marked as different (cf G. R. Jones
& George, 1998). In fact, in artificial societies where deceivers outnumbered cooperators,
people remembered the cooperators better (Barclay, 2008). So, given its importance,
humans must have developed a way to signal, and decode, trustworthiness.
2.1.3 Biological aspects of trust
Trust also has biological and neurological components. In fact, it has been suggested that
trusting behaviours are to some extent genetically predetermined (Riedl & Javor, 2012), for
example through the oxytocin receptor gene (Reuter et al., 2009). Oxytocin is a hormone
that has been shown to influence prosocial behaviour in humans, like maternal attachment
and pair bonding (Donaldson & Young, 2008). Oxytocin levels were found to be higher
when participants in a trust game were trusted by their partners, and when they trusted their
partners (Zak, Kurzban & Matzner, 2005). Nasally administered oxytocin has also been
found to increase trusting behaviours in a trust game (Kosfeld, 2007). Serotonin also seems
to be linked to trust, as deficiencies in this neurotransmitter resulted in reduced cooperation
in ultimatum games (Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, Lieberman & Robbins, 2008) and iterated
trust games (Wood, Rilling, Sanfey, Bhagwagar & Rogers, 2006).
Studies on patients with brain lesions found that participants with damage in the amygdala
tended to trust untrustworthy partners in a repeated trust game (Koscik & Tranel, 2011),
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and to explicitly rate faces as more trustworthy than unimpaired participants (Adolphs,
Tranel & Damasio, 1998), suggesting that the amygdala might play an important role in
trustworthiness detection. A meta-analysis of 16 fMRI studies by Bzdok et al. (2011) also
highlighted the special function that the amygdala seems to play in trust. The authors further
speculate that the amygdala might be the determinant for “fight-or-flight” decisions as well
as social behaviours with long-term ends, such as trustworthiness. A review by Riedl and
Javor (2012) determined that literature on the neural correlates of trust is quite consistent
in its findings across different experimental paradigms. In particular, they distinguish five
classes of mental processes that are crucial in trust situations, and map them to different
brain regions: reward processing (striatum and thalamus); risk (amygdala, insular cortex,
hippocampus and parahippocampus gyrus); memory (necessary for weighing trust at each
interaction based on previous experience — amygdala, hippocampus and parahippocampus
gyrus); processing of cognitive conflict (cingulate cortex); mentalising (frontal cortex).
Mentalising, also known as Theory of Mind (ToM), plays an important role in trust situations,
since it is one of the ways that help trustors decide whether to trust or not: by thinking about
the trustee’s mental processes, trustors can derive his/her intentions to be trustworthy or not
(Fehr, 2009b; Riedl & Javor, 2012). Upon meeting a new person, many people will assume
that he/she can be trusted, simply because it is easier and more statistically accurate than
to distrust them from the beginning (G. R. Jones & George, 1998; Barclay, 2008), before
their relative trustworthiness is quickly assessed (Todorov et al., 2009). However, individual
differences play an important role in someone’s propensity to trust (Glaeser et al., 2000).
For example, an individual’s moods or attitudes will affect their trust towards certain other
individuals (G. R. Jones & George, 1998). Also, certain people start from the opposite
assumption that no-one can be trusted, and for this reason they themselves are very often
untrustworthy. These people are sometimes called Machiavellians (Repacholi, Slaughter,
Pritchard & Gibbs, 2003; D. N. Jones & Paulhus, 2009), from the Italian Renaissance writer
Machiavelli, who argued that deceptive behaviour is an effective political tool. Apart from
generally faring better than non-Machiavellian people in economic games based on trust
(Czibor & Bereczkei, 2012), it seems that Machiavellians activate different brain structures
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during the trusting decision process. In particular, Machiavellian individuals show less
activity in regions linked with social empathy, such as the medial and ventromedial prefrontal
cortices, the inferior parietal cortex, and the superior temporal sulcus. Instead, they activate
regions linked with inference making and reward-related decision making, such as the inferior
and middle frontal gyrus, the anterior insula, the thalamus and the anterior cingulate cortex
(Bereczkei, Deak, Papp, Perlaki & Orsi, 2013).
The existence of genetic and neural factors linked to trust, and the presence of some forms of
trust in animal societies suggest that trust has been an essential aspect of human interactions
for a very long time. Thus, humans must have evolved some way of quickly decoding the
trustworthiness of a newly encountered individual, as well as a way of signalling their own
trustworthiness. In fact, some theories even hypothesise that it was the need for a cooperative
society that started the process of language in our simian ancestors (Knight, 1998), and
indeed language is an extremely cooperative process by itself (Tomasello, 2008). Regardless
of the controversial theories on the origin of language, given that spoken language is our
main mean of communication, we must be able to signal and detect trustworthiness from
voices. This thesis is an investigation on what characteristics of the human voice might elicit
trust or distrust in different contexts.
2.1.4 Trust and personality traits
In personality psychology, trusting and trustworthiness have been studied as personality traits.
In the classical 5-Factor Model, trust is located in the agreeableness domain, which, together
with openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism constitutes
the “Big 5” (McCrae, 2009; Pervin, 2001). The agreeableness domain is associated with
interpersonal traits such as warmth, friendliness, altruism and compliance to the needs of
others (Digman, 1990; Graziano & Tobin, 2002; Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997).
Agreeableness is also related to Theory of Mind, in particular to social perceptual ToM (Nettle
& Liddle, 2008). This refers to the process of inferring someone’s mental state from primary
information such as eye gaze and facial and vocal expression, as opposed to social-cognitive
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ToM, which is the process of using the reasoning about someone’s mental state to predict
their behaviour (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000; Amodio & Frith, 2006). People who
are better mentalisers often behave as they would like other people to behave with them
(Baron-Cohen, 2009; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Attributing some personality traits to others,
or having attitudes towards others, is then also informed by perceptual ToM (for example
through physical appearance, attire, indexical information from the voice, etc.). Thus, we
can argue that trusting behaviour will be modulated by a social perceptual/attitudinal stage
first, when first impressions are formed, and by a social cognitive stage second, when first
impressions drive the speculation about the trustee’s future behaviour.
Assessing someone’s trustworthiness might be done by broadly categorising that someone
is a “good guy” or a “bad guy” (Todorov & Duchaine, 2008), which informs the perceiver
about whether the best strategy is approach or avoidance (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Cosmides
& Tooby, 2000; McAleer et al., 2014). Thus, people showing some positive traits are
often attributed other positive traits, and people showing negative traits are attributed more
negative traits, in a sort of “halo” effect (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wetzel, Wilson & Kort,
1981). Notably, physical attractiveness is particularly strongly associated with other positive
traits, so much that Dion, Berscheid and Walster (1972) coined a “what is beautiful is good”
stereotype (e.g. Jackson, Hunter & Hodge, 1995; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Patzer, 1983;
Langlois et al., 2000; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). Attractiveness and trustworthiness
seem to be deeply connected (Todorov, Said, Engell & Oosterhof, 2008), even at the neural
level (Bzdok et al., 2011). Bzdok et al. (2011) concluded that specific brain regions, such as
the amygdala, might act as a filter for sensory information with big evolutionary importance,
such as long-term social information (e.g.: “Is this person attractive? I might date them in
the future” and “is this person trustworthy? I might collaborate with them in the future”).
2.1.5 Trust in the voice
A “halo” effect might also apply to attractiveness perceived from the voice. In fact, Zuckerman
and Driver (1989) found that vocal attractiveness elicited higher judgments of dominance,
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achievement and likeability, and proposed a “what sounds beautiful is good” stereotype.
This is corroborated by other studies. For example, in a study on impression formation of
politicians, Surawski and Ossoff (2006) found that vocal attractiveness elicited other positive
judgments, including of trustworthiness. Attractive voices were also more persuasive, in both
explicit and implicit measurements (Chaiken, 1979). Vocally attractive individuals were rated
higher in job interviews and were reported as having better job performances (DeGroot &
Kluemper, 2007), and were more persuasive leaders (DeGroot, Aime, Johnson & Kluemper,
2011). Additionally, speakers were rated as more persuasive, competent and sociable if they
had an attractive voice (Burgoon, Birk & Pfau, 1990).
But what does it mean for a voice to be attractive? In most of the research on vocal
attractiveness, people were asked to rate a range of voices on an attractiveness scale,
and then the most and least attractive voices were used for a personality rating test. Very
few studies actually tried to map attractiveness onto an acoustic space. According to a
preliminary study by Zuckerman and Miyake (1993), an attractive voice is “intermediate in its
loudness and more resonant” [p. 128]. DeGroot and Motowidlo (1999) argued that attractive
voices for managers had faster speech rate, fewer pauses, lower variability in loudness,
lower pitch and higher pitch variability. The attractive voices in Burgoon et al. (1990) were
fluent and exhibited greater pitch variability. Also, Bruckert et al. (2010) found that morphing
several voices into one makes the voice thus obtained more attractive, perhaps because it
eliminates small audible differences that deviate from the mean. The only in-depth study
on the acoustics of vocal attractiveness is Babel, McGuire and King (2014), who found that
several features affected the attractiveness of male and female voices. In particular, male
voices were rated as more attractive when they had lower first formant frequencies for the /i/
and /u/ vowels, and when they exhibited shorter duration. By contrast, the most attractive
female voices were breathy and showed u-fronting, which is typical of young Californian
women, suggesting that group-membership might play a role in attractiveness perception as
well.
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Babel et al. (2014)’s finding on u-fronting raises the issue of the vocal attractiveness of
accents. However, most of the research on accent evaluation includes a “social attractiveness”
trait (e.g. Bishop, Coupland & Garrett, 2005), which is arguably different from a “physical
attractiveness” one. While the latter has been described as “sounding good” (e.g. Zuckerman
& Driver, 1989), the former is more linked to prestige (e.g. Bishop et al., 2005). Stemming
from the “halo” effect described above, it seems likely that these two attractiveness traits
will be correlated. Thus, vocal attractiveness and social attractiveness (and trustworthiness,
as discussed above) might be related. A more detailed discussion on the accent literature
follows, in Section 2.2.1.
Given that the main purpose of attractiveness is to find mates (Grammer, Fink, Møller &
Thornhill, 2003; Rhodes, 2006; Hughes, Dispenza & Gallup, 2004), vocal attractiveness
is strongly related to sexual orientation, and appears to be mostly gender-specific. In fact,
females consistently rate low-pitched male voices as more attractive, while males rate high-
pitched female voices as more attractive (Re, O’Connor, Bennett & Feinberg, 2012; Saxton,
Caryl & Roberts, 2006; Hodges-Simeon, Gaulin & Puts, 2010; O’Connor & Barclay, 2017;
Riding, Lonsdale & Brown, 2006; Borkowska & Pawlowski, 2011; Feinberg, DeBruine,
Jones & Perrett, 2008; B. C. Jones, Feinberg, DeBruine, Little & Vukovic, 2010). From
the same evolutionary argument, it can be evinced that very raucous or creaky voices
might not be perceived as very attractive, since they can be a sign of poor physical health
(Blood, Mahan & Hyman, 1979; Laver, 1968). On the other hand, breathy voices in women
are linked to desirability (Henton & Bladon, 1985), and are often rated as attractive (Xu,
Lee, Wu, Liu & Birkholz, 2013; Liu & Xu, 2011; Babel et al., 2014). More on the vocal
attractiveness/trustworthiness will be discussed in Section 2.2.2.
Thus, the literature on the effects of voice on personality attributions seems to be limited to
work contexts — e.g. the managers in DeGroot and Motowidlo (1999), the job interviews in
DeGroot and Kluemper (2007) and the leaders in DeGroot et al. (2011) — and mating context
— e.g. all the findings on sex-mediated preferences for high and low pitch mentioned above. In
these contexts, it suggests that certain vocal features, in particular those related to attractive
30
2.2 Voices
voices, are also correlated with trustworthiness. However, these studies were mostly focused
on the effect of certain voice types, and only looked at the voices post-hoc. What is
lacking is a systematic analysis of different voice types, differing in a few carefully balanced
characteristics, and their effect on personality attributions. This was partially achieved by
some of the studies on partner selection on the basis of voice, which manipulated the pitch of
male and female voices and collected various ratings of trustworthiness and attractiveness,
among other traits (e.g. O’Connor & Barclay, 2017; Re et al., 2012). However, these studies
only focus on partner selection procedure, and thus they typically only manipulate one vocal
characteristic (pitch). But the human voice is much more than pitch. Features such as
accent, pitch range, and voice quality, just to name a few, contribute to an individual’s voice
at a particular moment in time. Different combinations of these features carry a range of
subtle information and are likely to result in distinctive personality perceptions. This is what I
contribute to unravelling in the experiments presented in this thesis.
2.2 Voices
2.2.1 Accents
Accents can be defined as any systematic differences in pronouncing the sounds of a
language, that people belonging to a certain group (geographic or social) have in common
(Lippi-Green, 1997). Accents are distinct from dialects, which are systematic differences
in terms of morphology, syntax, lexicon and pronunciation of a language (Trudgill, 2000).
They are also different from idiolects, which are an individual’s specific use of language —
as opposed to a group’s (Bloch, 1948). From this point of view, every speaker has an accent,
although some accents might be less marked and more desirable than others, for a variety
of reasons (Lippi-Green, 1997; Niedzielski & Preston, 2000).
A distinction also needs to be made between native accents — for example, Cockney,
Received Pronunciation (RP) and Scottish are accents of English — and non-native accents
— such as those of mother-tongue Indian or Japanese people speaking in English as their
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second language. Native accents of a certain language can have allophonic contrasts
that are realised differently in other accents. For example, some accents in the South
West of England, Scotland and Ireland are rhotic, i.e. they pronounce a certain realisation
of /r/ when it occurs post-vocalically, while others, such as RP, do not. Also, intervocalic
/t/ can be pronounced as an alveolar stop (e.g. in RP), as a glottal stop (e.g. in some
Northern English varieties), or as an alveolar tap (e.g. in some North American varieties).
Pronunciation differences are also present in vowels, with phenomena such as u-fronting
in Southern English accents or monophthongisation in Southern American English. On
the other hand, non-native accents (L2) result from merging the phonological system of
one’s native language into the target language (Lippi-Green, 1997). Thus, Italian native
speakers, who have 7 vowels in their phonological system of origin, will tend to approximate
the numerous English vowels to their closest neighbour in the Italian phonological space.
This results, for example, in the words “cheap” and “chip” being pronounced in the same, or
in a very similar, way. Accents are part of people’s identity, and they contribute to shaping
our relationship with the rest of the world with whom we communicate (Fuertes, Gottdiener,
Martin, Gilbert & Giles, 2012). Given that every speaker has an accent, and that accents
affect the way we communicate with each other, a question arises: should speaking machines
have human accents?
2.2.2 Perceptual evaluations of accents
With increased means for travelling and living away from one’s home town, people are finding
themselves surrounded by an increased variety of accents. As a consequence, people might
be more aware of the fact that the same language can be spoken in different ways. Hearing
someone’s accent is unavoidable: when we hear someone speaking, we can immediately tell
if he/she speaks like us or not. Unconsciously, this places the speaker either inside the group
where we believe we belong, or outside of it. This in-group vs. out-group localisation then
brings forward a series of attitudinal responses towards that speaker (e.g. Kinzler, Shutts,
DeJesus & Spelke, 2009). As previously mentioned (Section 1.4), these initial impressions
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will most likely be shaped by subsequent behavioural experience with the speaker, although
the first impression might not be easily abandoned.
Accents are often linked with personality stereotypes (Preston, 1999). To give some popular
examples, American films and children cartoons often give their villains a British English
accent (Dobrow & Gidney, 1998), and comedies will often emphasise native and non-native
accents for humorous purposes (Dave, 2013). Past studies have also concluded that native
accents may be perceived as more trustworthy than non-native accents (Lev-Ari & Keysar,
2010). Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010) tested whether statements uttered by non-native speakers
of English with mild to heavy foreign accents would be perceived as less truthful than
statements uttered by native English speakers, and found that non-native accents negatively
influenced truth judgments. A preference to listening to one’s native language emerges from
the very beginning of someone’s life (Nazzi, Bertoncini & Mehler, 1998; Moon, Cooper
& Fifer, 1993), and it has been hypothesised that this preference might serve to acquire
culture-specific knowledge (Marno et al., 2016). A native accent preference emerges around
4-5 years of age (Kinzler & DeJesus, 2013; Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011). Later on,
this implicit preference shifts to an in-group or familiarity preference for the accent of one’s
social group (Abrams & Hogg, 1987; Cargile & Giles, 1997; Dragojevic & Giles, 2014). For
example, Californian English was evaluated more positively by American Southern English
speakers than Punjabi English (Dragojevic & Giles, 2014). Similarly, participants from
Dundee evaluated Dundee speakers more positively than Glasgow speakers, and Glasgow
speakers more positively than RP speakers (Abrams & Hogg, 1987). While the Dundee
speakers had an overall preference for speakers of their own accent, they also preferred
Glasgow to RP, perhaps because they felt that a Glasgow accent was more similar (both
socially and geographically) to their own, rather than an RP accent. This seems to suggest
that the concept of “in-groupness” might be concentric (cf. Clarke & Garrett, 2004, who
proposed that accents can be ranked on a perceptual scale according to their distance from
one’s own accent). Similarly, speakers of South Welsh and Somerset varieties of English
showed a tendency to “accent loyalty” for “informal” traits related to good looks and humour,
while they rated the RP accent higher in “formal” traits such as competence (Giles, 1971).
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A lot of research has been conducted on attitudinal evaluations of accents within the context
of the British Isles (P. Garrett, Coupland & Williams, 1999; Giles, 1970; Hiraga, 2005).
In particular, from such studies it has emerged that standard accents such as Standard
Southern British English (SSBE) tend to be rated as more pleasant and prestigious than
regional accents in general (Bishop et al., 2005; Dixon, Mahoney & Cocks, 2002; Fuertes
et al., 2012; Giles, 1970; A. M. Wilkinson, 1965). For example, in a meta-analysis of
20 studies on accent evaluations, Fuertes et al. (2012) found that speakers of a standard
accent are rated more positively than speakers of a non standard accent. Furthermore,
standard-accented speakers generally are rated higher in terms of solidarity, a personality
dimension that includes trustworthiness (e.g. Giles & Billings, 2004). Within the regional
accents, countryside accents like Yorkshire or Devon are often rated as more friendly and
trustworthy than city accents like London, Liverpool or Birmingham (Bishop et al., 2005;
Giles, 1970; Hiraga, 2005; Kristiansen, Eiser, Harding & O’Looney, 1983; A. M. Wilkinson,
1965; Strongman & Woosley, 1967). In the biggest study so far on the topic, Bishop et al.
(2005) examined the responses of more than 5000 British people to a questionnaire on the
attractiveness and prestige of 34 English accents, 30 years after Giles (1970)’s seminal
study. In general, they found that Received Pronunciation (RP) was still considered highly
prestigious and attractive, while accents such as Liverpool and Birmingham were located at
the low end of the prestigious and attractiveness scales. However, most of these studies
are so called “conceptual studies” — that is, participants are given an accent label and
asked to rate this label on an attribute scale. Since accents usually index geographical
locations (with the exception of accents associated with social class, such as SSBE), such
conceptual evaluations of accent labels are likely to be influenced by stereotypes based on
general socio-economic perceptions of particular regions, rather than directly deriving from
acoustic-phonetic features of the accent (Bishop et al., 2005; P. Garrett, Williams & Evans,
2005; Giles, 1970). Thus, the conclusions of previous studies based on accent labels might
be more explicative of these socio-economic perceptions (Giles, 1970; Ladegaard, 1998;
Omdal, 1995). However, there is evidence that people might not be very effective at localising
accents upon hearing them (Bayard, Weatherall, Gallois & Pittam, 2001; Goggin, Thompson,
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Strube & Simental, 1991; Gooskens, 2005; Clopper & Bradlow, 2008). Thus, the question
of whether people have the same attitudinal responses when hearing an accented speaker,
without knowing the accent label, remains.
Context also seems to play a role in accent attitudes. For example, Wang, Arndt, Singh,
Biernat and Liu (2013) found that, in a favourable context (for example, a satisfactory
customer/employee call centre interaction), American interactants tended to suppress their
negative prejudices of Indian-accented employees. On the other hand, in an unfavourable
context (when the interaction was not satisfactory for the costumer), customers tended not
to suppress their accent prejudices. Bresnahan, Ohashi, Nebashi, Liu and Shearman (2002)
examined accent perception as a function of the message that the accented speaker was
delivering. They recorded two non-native speakers of American English (one very intelligible
and one not very intelligible) and one native speaker, reading passages in a “friend” and
“teaching assistant” condition. They found that the “friend” context was judged as more
attractive and dynamic than the “teaching assistant” context, in all accent conditions; and
that strong and weak national identity played a role in evaluating the native and non-native
accents.
There is evidence that even non-native speakers have accent attitudes. For example, in a
study carried out in Denmark (Ladegaard, 1998), Danish participants rated British, American
and Australian English differently, with Australian being rated as the most reliable, American
as the most humorous, and British as the most prestigious. Furthermore, participants
exhibited a pattern of evaluations to different British English accents similar to that found
in British English participants: RP was rated higher (in terms of status and competence)
than Scottish and Cockney English. Similarly, Spanish and Basque native speakers rated
themselves as having more positive attitudes towards several varieties of British English
(including RP) over American and Irish English (Cenoz & Lecumberri, 1999). Certain accents
or idiolects seem to evoke attitudes of “prestige” because they are associated with certain
social classes (Giles, 1970), and there is evidence that this type of information might be
processed from specific, language-independent voice characteristics as well. For example,
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Brown, Strong and Rencher (1975) recorded speakers representative of various French
Canadian social class levels, and listeners who did not speak French, nor did they have
any knowledge of the French Canadian culture, were still able to accurately recognise
the speakers’ social class. This evidence contributes to suggesting that accents might
be inherently coloured with phonetic-prosodic characteristics that evoke certain attitudinal
responses, even to people who are not aware of the indexical information carried by accents.
Many of the seminal works on accent attitudes which did not use conceptual evaluations
used the “matched-guise” technique (Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner & Fillenbaum, 1960),
which consists of a bidialectal speaker reading passages in both accents, so that listeners’
evaluations will not be affected by individual voice cues. However, in everyday encounters,
people constantly and implicitly judge speakers by their voice, which is made of many
indexical and other characteristics combined. Likely, such implicit judgments are not the
sum of the judgments of each individual voice characteristic, but rather various aspects
of the voice interact with each other and with listeners’ individual differences, to result in
what will be the listener’s attitude (Kriengwatana, Terry, Chládková & Escudero, 2016).
For example, a high-pitched Birmingham speaker might elicit different attitudes than a
low-pitched Birmingham speaker, or a high-pitched Liverpool speaker. Thus, it becomes
important to consider these and other variables when trying to determine, for example, what
makes a voice sound trustworthy.
2.2.3 Personality attributions to voices
Apart from accent, other segmental and suprasegmental characteristics contribute to an
individual’s unique voice. While accent, as discussed above, carries information about
someone’s nationality or social status, other features can convey information about someone’s
physical appearance, age, gender, personality, emotional state, and even sexual orientation
(e.g. Mack & Munson, 2012). As our primary means of communication, it seems logical that
we are “tuned” to convey and decode all this information in the speech stream. Still, it is
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rather remarkable that we can do all this with relatively small articulators, and with a limited
set of phonemes.
The fact that we are able to convey all this information in our speech suggests that we
must be able to understand it as well. And in fact, evidence shows that people are able to
successfully decode this information from speech, even after a very short exposure time
(McAleer et al., 2014). For example, McAleer et al. (2014) administered a questionnaire
on-line, in which they asked to rate the word “hello”, pronounced by 64 Scottish speakers,
in terms of various personality traits, and found that listeners were consistent with their
evaluations. Nonetheless, it is also believed that exposure time increases accuracy in
personality judgements (Blackman & Funder, 1998; Ambady et al., 1999; Carney et al.,
2007; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Thus, vocal characteristics can convey information about
personality traits as well. The following section provides a review of studies dealing with traits
that can be ascribed as similar to trustworthiness, such as charisma, persuasion, deception,
leadership, etc., in the absence of a conclusive set of studies on trustworthiness itself.
One characteristic that has been examined in the past is speech or articulation rate, which is
a measure of how fast someone speaks. While the term “speech rate” is generally used to
indicate the number of speech units in a certain length of time, including pauses, “articulation
rate” denotes the number of speech units articulated over a total speaking time, thus not
including pauses (Jacewicz, Fox, O’Neill & Salmons, 2009; De Jong & Wempe, 2009).
For example, B. L. Smith, Brown, Strong and Rencher (1975) found that speakers with
a slow speech rate were rated as less competent. Similarly, Apple, Streeter and Krauss
(1979) found that speakers with slow speech rate were rated as “less truthful” and “more
passive”. N. Miller et al. (1976) also found that faster speech rate increased persuasion. Fast
speech rate also elicited judgments of competence (Street, 1984; Street & Brady, 1982)
and credibility (Buller, LePoire, Aune & Eloy, 1992), although this effect decreased for very
fast rates of speech (Buller et al., 1992). Similarly, others found that a fast speaking rate is a
feature of charismatic (Jiang & Pell, 2017), confident (Rosenberg & Hirschberg, 2005) and
persuasive (Chaiken, 1979) speakers. On the other hand, Niebuhr, Brem, Novák-Tót and
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Voße (2016) argued that fast speaking rate hinders charismatic speech, possibly because
phenomena such as vowel reduction and deletion become more likely.
Pitch has also received considerable attention in the past. A perceptual correlate of the
acoustic fundamental frequency (f0), the rate of vibration of the vocal chords in the larynx.
Thus, this feature is at least partially determined by physiology: people who have bigger
larynges will generally have a lower pitch, and vice versa. The relation between pitch
and trustworthiness is rather controversial, also because of the different technologies and
methodologies used in previous studies. For example, Hughes, Pastizzo and Gallup (2008)
found a positive correlation between pitch and perceived honesty of male speakers. On
the contrary, in the context of male political trustworthiness, participants typically voted
for male candidates with lower-pitched voices in a mock election scenario (Tigue, Borak,
O’Connor, Schandl & Feinberg, 2012), and it was found that low pitch predicted actual
election results (Banai, Banai & Bovan, 2017). Similarly, in a questionnaire study, Apple
et al. (1979) showed that speakers with a high f0 were rated as “less truthful”. Elkins and
Derrick (2013) also found that participants gave low trust attributions when interviewed by
embodied agents that had a high-pitched voice. Regarding female political trustworthiness,
female candidates with high pitch voices were more successful than those with low pitch
(Klofstad, 2015). Rosenberg and Hirschberg (2009), instead, found that pitch was positively
correlated with ratings of speaker’s charisma. Furthermore, in an imagined version of the
investment game, where participants selected which of two possible vocal partners they
would hypothetically trust more, O’Connor and Barclay (2017) found that they consistently
selected the higher-pitched one. Conversely, a few studies have found that participants raise
their vocal pitch (f0) when lying (Anolli & Ciceri, 1997; Streeter, Krauss, Geller, Olson &
Apple, 1977; Villar, Arciuli & Paterson, 2013), while Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance
and Rosenthal (1979) found that participants perceived a lower pitch in deceptive messages,
and Kirchhübel and Howard (2013) failed to find any acoustic differences — including in f0 —
in the production of deceptive and truthful messages. From a slightly different perspective,
Cheang and Pell (2008) and Rao (2013) found that actors generally had a lower f0 and
slower speech rate when acting sarcastic voices than when they were acting sincere voices.
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Similarly, sincerity in a synthetic voice was associated with greater pitch range and faster
articulation rate (Trouvain, Schmidt, Schröder, Schmitz & Barry, 2006). Higher f0 was also
associated with higher agreeableness (Imhof, 2010), one of the “Big Five” personality traits
(McCrae, 2009; Pervin, 2001; Trouvain et al., 2006), and elicited higher cooperativeness
ratings (Knowles & Little, 2016).
It should also be noted that although there is a confound between pitch and gender, with
females typically having a smaller larynx and thus a higher pitch, there are no consistent
differences in trustworthiness judgments to males and females (e.g. Nass & Brave, 2005;
Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2007; Boenin & Serra, 2009; Slonim & Guillen, 2010).
For example, in Elkins and Derrick (2013)’s study, there were no differences in perceived
trustworthiness of female or male agents. Inconsistencies were also corroborated in a series
of studies using economic games. For example, Chaudhuri, Paichayontvijit and Shen (2013)
found that individual females were more trustworthy than individual males, but there were
no significant differences in the trusting behaviours of males and females. Also, gender
differences tended to be eliminated over time and if groups (same sex or mixed), rather
than individuals, played the game. Also, Bonein and Serra (2009) found that, when the
gender of the other player was not known, there were no gender differences in trusting and
trustworthiness, while when the gender was known, there were no differences in trusting,
but there were significant differences in trustworthiness — specifically, participants returned
more money to same-sex partners, suggesting a gender pairing bias in trustworthiness. On
the contrary, in Slonim and Guillen (2010), participants trusted game partners of the opposite
sex more. Furthermore, Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007) found that males trust more
than females in trust games and dictator games, but they found no gender differences in
reciprocal behaviour. Taken together, these results suggest that any effects of voice pitch on
trustworthiness attributions are due to relative differences within each of the sexes, rather
than a single continuum that crosses gender.
Finally, voice quality — variations of which distinguish, for example, breathy, creaky and
modal phonation (Klatt & Klatt, 1990) — might convey information about personality char-
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acteristics as well. For example, Laver (1968) suggests that harsh voices are correlated
with more aggressive and dominant characteristics, while breathy voices are related to more
submissive personalities, and Blood et al. (1979) found that both hypernasal and breathy
voices — which can be symptoms of voice disorders — were rated more negatively than
modal voices. A breathy phonation mode in female voices can also related to perceived
femininity and attractiveness, in what has been called the “Sirenic Code” (Gussenhoven,
2016). Breathy male voices were also rated positively by female speakers (Xu et al., 2013),
perhaps because breathiness in male voices can signal a reduction in aggressiveness.
These vocal characteristics, along with many others, can also be used to convey emotions
in the voice. However, there seems to be no direct mapping between individual vocal
features and individual emotions. For instance, f0 has been reported to increase for joy, but
also for anger and fear, and to decrease for sadness and boredom; or, f0 range has also
been reported to increase for joy, anger and fear (see review in Kappas, Hess & Scherer,
1991). In general, previous studies come to very different conclusions as to which vocal
feature is a correlate of which emotion (for a review, see Table 23.2 in Scherer, Johnstone
& Klasmeyer, 2003). Nevertheless, it is clear that people can recognise emotions from
the voice alone (e.g. Banse & Scherer, 1996; Frick, 1985). In fact, there is consistency in
vocal emotion recognition across very different cultures (e.g. Bryant & Barrett, 2008; Sauter,
Eisner, Ekman & Scott, 2010), suggesting that vocal emotion expression might be universal
(Cosmides, 1983). There are also links between emotional expression and trustworthiness
(Boone & Buck, 2003). For example, trustworthy faces who expressed happiness were
perceived as happier than untrustworthy faces, and untrustworthy faces who expressed
anger were perceived as angrier than trustworthy faces (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009). Also,
happiness and gratitude were found to increase trust, while anger decreased trust (Dunn
& Schweitzer, 2005). Since both emotions and trustworthiness are recognisable from the
voice, it is reasonable to think that a similar interaction will be found in the auditory domain as
well. Furthermore, because of the “halo effect” outlined earlier, vocal emotional expressivity
is likely to influence personality judgments. Thus, we might expect that people exhibiting
positive emotions will be attributed other positive traits, such as trustworthiness, too.
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2.2.4 Personality attributions to machines
With an increased number of artificial agents operating within our social space, we might
need to consider how to interact with them. As previously discussed, societies need trust to
function, so it is likely that human-machine societies will need trust to function as well. In
particular, what is needed is a way of inferring a machine’s trustworthiness. But, in order to
be perceived as trustworthy, a machine needs to be perceived as a social entity first, since
trust is built in interaction.
Interacting with machines as if they were social agents does not seem to be a problem,
though. In their seminal paper, Nass, Steuer and Tauber (1994) demonstrated that people
unconsciously apply to human-machine interaction the same social rules that they apply in
human-human interactions. This phenomenon has been referred to as CASA (Computers
As Social Actors). In their first experiment, they showed that participants applied norms
of politeness to their interaction with a computer, because they evaluated a computer’s
performance better when asked directly by that computer, than when asked by another
computer. In the second and third experiments, participants distinguished different agents
based on their voice alone, even though the voices were played on the same computer. In
the fourth experiment, participants applied gender stereotypes to computers: praises from
computers with a female voice were judged less convincing that praises from computers with
a male voice. Finally, in their fifth experiment, they showed that participants believed they
were interacting with a computer agent, rather than a human programmer. Importantly, all
the participants in these experiments were experienced computer users, and, when asked
directly, they stated that computers should not be treated as social agents. Corroborating
evidence comes from studies of interactions with navigator systems (Large et al., 2017) or
robots (Lee, Peng, Jin & Yan, 2006). Thus, people might unknowingly treat each type of
interaction, including with computers, as essentially social, and will behave accordingly.
There is also evidence that personality traits are attributed to artificial agents. For example,
Nass et al. (1995) showed that even approximate representations of personality traits in
computer agents were recognised, and acted accordingly upon, by participants. In a following
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experiment, Nass and Lee (2001) added that the same holds for personality cues represented
in a synthetic computer voice. Participants accurately recognised personality traits from the
voices, and showed a preference towards a computer personality that matched their own in
their behaviour and explicit evaluation of the agents. Several studies have also shown that
personality traits are ascribed to robots as well (e.g. Syrdal, Dautenhahn, Woods, Walters &
Koay, 2007; Hwang, Park & Hwang, 2013; Salem & Dautenhahn, 2015). Going back to
the example opening this chapter, there is indeed evidence that navigator systems are also
treated as social agents (Large et al., 2017). For example, participants in a simulated driving
system interacted with their navigator system, applying the same conversational and social
norms they would use in human interaction: politeness, turn-taking, back-channelling, fillers
and hesitation, were all used by participants when conversing with the navigator system
(Large et al., 2017).
While people perceive other people as trustworthy by default (G. R. Jones & George, 1998;
Barclay, 2008), the same cannot be said for agents, especially in high-risk contexts such
as factory work, where a misplaced trust in a robotic arm could cost a human worker’s life.
Thus, it is up to the manufacturers to make sure that the machines are safe to work with,
but it is also up to the designers to design trustworthy-seeming machines. Since many of
the machines that collaborate with us are disembodied (e.g. a navigator system or a mobile
personal assistant), their voice should also be designed as to elicit trust. In the case of
robots, which do have a body, the voice design should be an integrative part of the body
design. For example, should big robots have deeper voices than small robots? Should
human-like robots have natural human voices? Should machine voices in general have
accents? Preliminary research from Andrist, Ziadee, Boukaram, Mutlu and Sakr (2015) on
the Arabic language shows that accent and context interact in robots as well: participants
believed that robots with a regional accent were more credible when they showed they were
knowledgeable, whereas robots with a standard accent were more credible when they had
little knowledge. A similar interaction is likely in other languages as well, although so far
there is no data to prove it.
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2.3 Summary
Trust is an essential aspect of social interactions, and it can be considered as two strongly
related processes: the trusting behaviour of an agent, the trustor, and the trustworthiness
of another agent, the trustee. Both these aspects are generally measured attitudinally, for
example through personality questionnaires. However, as mentioned in the introduction
(Section 1.2), such measures are not indicative of actual behaviour, and do not inform us
about the development of trust.
Impressions of trustworthiness can also be evinced from the voice, and several studies
looking at different aspects of voices have been examined. However, there is no conclusive
argument as to which vocal features are perceived as trustworthy. One reason for this
confusion is that different studies have used different methodologies, and many have looked
at different expressions of trust, for example charisma, persuasion, deception, etc.
Furthermore, studies on trustworthiness attributions generally do not take context into
account. However, this aspect is particularly important for Human-Machine Interaction:
machines do not always work properly or as expected, so it is necessary to examine users’
reactions both when the interaction goes smoothly and when it does not. In particular, the
role that the machine’s voice has in different contexts has not been investigated.
Framed in the literature discussed above, this thesis contributes to research on trust and
speech science in several ways:
• It contributes to knowledge on characteristics of the trustee that elicit trusting beha-
viours. In particular, it concentrates on the trustee’s voice;
• By modifying the trustee’s behaviour, it provides new insights into trust development
towards trustworthy and untrustworthy trustees;
• By using an implicit measure, it provides an actual representation of people’s behaviour
with different agents, and in different contexts.
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3 Methodology
All the experiments presented in this thesis share the “repeated investment game” as part of
their methodology. This method allows to implicitly measure trust in the form of monetary
investments, and was originally devised by Berg et al. (1995).
There are two different ways to collect personality attributions: implicit or explicit measures.
As previously seen (Section 1.2), some implicit measures are actual representations of
behaviour (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le & Schmitt, 2005); typical examples of
implicit measures are response time, interpersonal distance, results obtained from games,
etc. Implicit measures can provide evidence of cognition, inclination or attitudes which
participants are not aware of. In fact, the outcome of implicit measures can become an index
of the attitudes and cognition participants have no control or conscious access to. On the
other hand, explicit measures are representations of someone’s subjective beliefs about a
situation which can be retrieved from qualitative or quantitative verbal data, such as opinions,
ratings, questionnaires, etc. (Schwarz, 1999). Also, they are generally self-reflections on a
past situation, but they do not usually measure current states (Greenwald, 1990). To give
an example of the difference between these two types of data in a previously mentioned
study, in Nass et al. (1994)‘s experiments on the “Computers As Social Actors” paradigm,
the participants explicitly stated that people should not behave socially with computers, yet
they implicitly behaved so themselves. To give an example with trust, an explicit method
would be asking participants to rate “How trustworthy does this voice sound” on a certain
Likert scale. However, as previously mentioned (Section 1.2), subjective beliefs do not
correlate with actual behaviour (De Houwer, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wicker,
1969), and they only collect impressions at a certain time. Implicit measures are also
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influenced by preferences (Fehr, 2009a). If participants are given a questionnaire to fill in
about the perceived trustworthiness of a certain agent, the response will generally reflect
the participants’ beliefs about what their first impressions are. Such first impressions are
important, because they form the basis upon which the perceived impression is going to
be developed, but they do not inform us about the attribution development process, which
takes additional information such as behaviour, experience and attitudes into account. The
investment game allows to account for this dynamic process as well.
3.1 Game theory
The investment game, as devised by Berg et al. (1995), is derived from game theory, a
very influential economic theory that postulates how agents behave in interaction (Sanfey,
2007). A very famous example of game theory is the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” paradigm. In the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, two criminals are arrested and imprisoned, in two separate cells, so
that they cannot communicate with each other. The police does not have enough evidence
to convict them, so they offer a deal to each criminal, individually: they can either testify
that the other committed the crime, or they can remain silent. Thus, if criminal A testifies
against criminal B, and criminal B remains silent, A will be set free and B will be sentenced
to 3 years (or vice versa). If A and B both testify against each other, they will both be
sentenced to 2 years. Finally, if both A and B remain silent, they will both be sentenced to
1 year (Poundstone, 1992). Testifying against the other player is an act of defection, while
remaining silent is an act of cooperation. The best outcome for each player is when both
cooperate, but no matter what the other player chooses, a player always earns more by
defecting than by cooperating. Thus, assuming that the other player reasons in the same
way, one player can be certain that the other player will defect, so the only rational choice
is to defect as well. This theorem has greatly influenced the international political actions
during the Cold War. The postulation of the perfect Nash equilibrium, i.e. the situation in
which no player has anything to gain by changing his strategy, awarded Nash, Harsanyi and
Selten the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994.
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The original Prisoner’s Dilemma is one-shot, which it to say, each agent makes one action,
and after that the game is finished. However, more relevant examples for this thesis are
iterated games, where the agents have to make several actions. In the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, players make the simultaneous choice of whether to cooperate or defect over an
indefinite number of rounds. While the best strategy in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma is to
defect, the best strategy in the iterated version is the so called “tit-for-tat”: defect if the other
player defected in the previous round, cooperate if the other player cooperated (Poundstone,
1992). Of course, in case the number of rounds is known to the players, the optimal strategy
is tit-for-tat until the last round, at which point both players should defect.
Another well-known example from game theory is the “dictator game”. Player A, the dictator,
is given an amount of money and can offer a share of it to player B. If player B accepts the
offer, both players keep what they have. If player B refuses however, no-one keeps any
money. Thus, the best strategy for player B is to accept any offer, since it will still be more
than his/her initial endowment (which is 0). Assuming this, the best strategy for player A is
to offer the minimum amount offerable. In this game, player B’s decision is a punishment
decision, not a cooperation one, and, by punishing, both players are worse off (Rand, 2016).
In a repeated ultimatum game, Rand (2016) proposes that the best strategy for player B is
to reject unfair offers, in order to induce Player A to make fairer offers in the next rounds.
Again, in case the number of rounds is known to the players, the optimal strategy is this
threat-bargain until the last round, where Player A should offer the minimum amount and
Player B should accept it.
Generally speaking, game theory is the study of interactions between agents striving to
achieve an optimal solution. Its applications span the disciplines of Economics and Political
Science, and have been widely researched in Philosophy, Psychology, Biology, Anthropology,
Zoology, Sociology, etc. Agents can be two countries at war, but also two children deciding
how to split a cake or two romantic partners deciding what to do in the evening. While the
first two examples are so called “zero-sum” games, where the total of gains and losses
equals to zero, the last example represents a non-zero-sum game, where the winnings and
47
(Chapter 3) Methodology
losses of all players do not add up to zero. The wife might want to go to the cinema and the
husband to the football match, but each of them would rather spend the evening with the
other, than alone. Non-zero-sum games model cooperation, rather than conflict, because
in this type of game individuals have more incentives to cooperate. Thus, while zero-sum
games need to have a winner and a loser, non-zero-sum games are not so clear-cut, and
there is space for cooperation and mutual benefit, if all the parties are trustworthy: this is
were trust comes into play.
The investment game, as devised by Berg et al. (1995), is a non-zero-sum game. Participants
in the role of player A are given $10, and can decide how much of this money to send to
player B. This amount is tripled, so that player B can now decide how much of this tripled
amount to send to player A. If A decides to send any money at all, B will have earned
something, since he/she started with $0. If player B returns more than what A sent, player A
will have earned something. If player B returns less, player A will have lost something.
However, the sum of the winnings and losses does not equal to zero: even in the case in
which player A sends nothing, player B will have earned $0, but player A will still have $10.
The amount of money that player A sends is an implicit measure of his/her trust (Berg et al.,
1995; Wout & Sanfey, 2008; Camerer, 2011); the amount of money that player B returns
is an implicit measure of his/her trustworthiness. The investment game has been used to
measure trusting behaviours in several studies since its formulation. A summary of such
studies is given in the next section.
3.2 Uses of the investment game
Researchers have used the investment game to study trusting behaviours towards a range
of characteristics. For example, several studies have used it to examine trustworthiness
attributions and trusting behaviours for different genders (e.g. Boenin & Serra, 2009; Buchan,
Croson & Solnick, 2008; Chaudhuri et al., 2013; Charness & Gneezy, 2012). Also, the
trustworthiness of facial expressions, such as smiles, has been studied using the investment
48
3.2 Uses of the investment game
game (Krumhuber et al., 2007; Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik & Wilson, 2001; Tortosa,
Lupiáñez & Ruz, 2013). Past studies have also used the investment game to look at trusting
differences in various countries (Willinger, Keser, Lohmann & Usunier, 2003; Croson &
Buchan, 1999). There are no studies, however, that used the investment game to study
trusting behaviours to voices. The only two studies to go in this direction are O’Connor and
Barclay (2017) and Montano, Tigue, Isenstein, Barclay and Feinberg (2017), who looked at
trust attributions to voices with different pitch. However, they used a one-shot game, which
means they could not draw any conclusion about attitude development. Also, they asked
participants to imagine the game, rather than actually play it, thus effectively nullifying the
benefits of implicit measures.
Berg et al. (1995)‘s investment game has also been modified to suit experimenters’ needs.
For example, Krumhuber et al. (2007) used a version of the game in which the players
cannot decide exactly how much money they want to send or return, but they have a binary
choice: the trustor has £5 and can either keep it or invest all of it; the invested amount is
then doubled and the trustee can either keep it all or return £7.5 and keep £2.5. Similarly, in
Tortosa et al. (2013), trustors start with e1, and can either keep it or invest it; if they invest it,
it is quintupled, and the other player can either keep the entire amount or return half of it. Or,
in Stanley et al. (2012), trustors could only invest in increments of $2 of their endowment,
and in Slonim and Guillen (2010) they could invest in increments of $3. In most studies,
however, trustors can decide the amount of money they want to invest in a continuous way
(e.g. Bereczkei et al., 2013; Chaudhuri et al., 2013; Bonein & Serra, 2009; Chaudhuri &
Gangadharan, 2007; King-Casas et al., 2005). Also, in experimental procedures, generally
participants play the role of the trustor, although occasional studies ask participants to play
the trustee (e.g. Bereczkei et al., 2013; Jordan, Hoffman, Nowak & Rand, 2016).
The vast majority of studies on implicit measures of trust used one-shot investment games.
Thus, the collected data from these studies provides an implicit measure of trust as a first
impression, but no inference can be drawn about the impression development process. A
notable exception is Samson and Kostyszyn (2015), where participants played 10 rounds,
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and the behaviour of the trustee was controlled so that it returned 150% ( 10%) in the first
3 rounds, 0% in the 4th round and 150% ( 10%) again in rounds 5–10. Their intention
was to examine whether people are impulsive (i.e., they react on what they were returned in
the immediately preceding round) or follow a strategy (i.e., they have a consistent pattern
of investments which considers the full history of the game), so they did not focus on the
process of trust development. Nevertheless, this is the only study that explicitly manipulated
the behaviour of the trustee over time.
From this review, it seems that variants of the investment game generally differ on a few
aspects from the original: whether the investment choice is dichotomous or continuous;
the percentage of multiplication of the invested amount; the variable of choice (trustor or
trustee); the number of iterations. Although the investment game has been used to study
trust towards a variety of trustees, no studies so far have used it to measure trust towards
voices. The questions, then, remain: do voice characteristics influence trustworthiness
attributions? And, is this influence constant over time, or does the effect of voices fade as
participants gain experience of the trustor’s behaviour? To answer these questions, the
experiments presented in this thesis use an iterated investment game, where the participants
play the role of the trustor, and the behaviour of the trustee, which is an agent speaking with
different voices, is altered and controlled for.
3.3 Description of the investment game used here
In the experiments presented here, participants are given an amount of virtual money to start
with. Before they make the first investment decision, they interact with the trustee, by hearing
its voice. The participant then makes the first investment decision. This first investment is
a representation of his/her first impression on the trustworthiness of the speaker at zero
acquaintance. The money the participant invested is then multiplied, so that the trustee
receives 3 times the invested amount. The trustee then returns an amount between 0 and
the tripled investment, and the full transaction is shown to the participant on a screen. This
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sequence of actions is one round of the game. The participant receives a new endowment
at the beginning of each round, and a game consists of 20 rounds. Participants do not know
how many rounds they will play.
The interaction between the participant and the trustee, happening just before the parti-
cipant’s investment, consists of a pre-recorded sentence from a speaker, that is played to the
participant. The voice used reflects the focus of the specific experiment. In Experiment 1,
they hear either an SSBE- or a Liverpool-accented voice, in Experiment 2, either an SSBE-,
London-, Plymouth- or Birmingham-accented voice, and so on. The trustee, in these experi-
ments, is presented to the participants as a virtual agent in Experiments 1-4. Essentially, the
trustee is a computer, whose behaviour is pre-programmed. In Experiment 5, the trustee is
a Nao robot, whose behaviour is also pre-programmed, as described below.
The monetary returns of the trustee are pre-defined, so that the trustee simulates either a
trustworthy behaviour (generous condition) or an untrustworthy behaviour (mean condition).
In the generous condition, the trustee returns more money than the participants invested; in
the mean condition, it returns less. Specifically, it returns 40% to 80% of the tripled amount
in the generous condition in Experiments 1-4, and 0% to 40% of the invested amount in the
mean condition in Experiments 1-4. A visual representation of one round of the investment
game is shown in Figure 1.
The exact amount returned at each round is fixed between games, as shown in Table 1. As
it is possible to see, there are a few rounds in the mean condition in which the trustee is
actually returning more money than the participant invested (these are the rounds with 120%
returns of investments). There is a reason behind this. First, if the trustees were always
returning the same percentage of investments (e.g. always 70% in the generous condition
and 30% in the mean condition), participants might have become aware of this manipulation
after a few rounds, and might have started investing the same amount at each round. Thus,
a range of returns, rather than a dichotomous behaviour, was needed. This range also
needed to be wide enough to keep participants engaged in the game, so a range spanning
50% was chosen. Since the range needed to be the same in both behaviour conditions,
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Figure 1: Scheme of one round of the investment game. The “nice guy” is the generous
trustee, the “bad guy” is the mean one. Image credits: c© Zach Bellissimo 2008 and Frank
Loesche.
this is how the two behaviours came to be. Of course, it is possible that the few rounds in
which the virtual agent trustees were returning slightly more to the participants did not go
unnoticed, and that participants’ reactions were affected by this. Thus, in order to examine a
fully untrustworthy behaviour as well, the behaviours were slightly modified in Experiment 5,
where the percentages of return were 50% to 80% in the generous condition, and 0% to 30%
in the mean condition. In this way, it was possible to examine the patterns of investments in
a condition where the trustee always returned less than the participant invested, while still
keeping a fixed, albeit narrowed, range. The return patterns for Experiment 5 are reported in
Appendix B.
Round Generous Mean Sentence block ’YZ’
1 150% 30% Welcome to the investment game. I hope we will enjoy
playing it
2 150% 30% In my opinion, we should always invest in one another
3 180% 60% I think we can do better. I promise that I will not let you
down
52
3.3 Description of the investment game used here
Round Generous Mean Sentence block ’YZ’
4 120% 0% If we both invest in each other, we will surely raise our
earnings
5 180% 60% We could finish the game better off than this, if only we
tried harder
6 210% 90% You have to trust that I’m going to cooperate until the
last round
7 120% 0% We can both win the game, but we have to keep sharing
our money
8 120% 0% I trust you, and I am sure that we can both benefit from
each other
9 210% 90% I am not a greedy person, and I believe we should share
these earnings
10 210% 90% I am not a greedy person, and I believe we should share
these earnings
11 120% 0% I will return more of your investments, you have to trust
me in this
12 150% 30% When the game ends, I promise that we will both be
satisfied with the outcome
13 240% 120% Remember this: it’s not convenient for me to keep all
your investments
14 180% 60% No matter the number of rounds, we should trust each
other until the end
15 240% 120% There is no better tactic than to keep investing and
returning
16 210% 90% I will show you that co-operation is the best option for
us
17 240% 120% Let’s keep sharing, and our earnings will grow much
bigger than they are now
18 180% 60% I promise that I am going to return more money from
now on
19 240% 120% I will always return, because there’s no point in me
doing otherwise
20 150% 30% If we want to see our funds growing, we have to share
until the end
Table 1: Returns of investments in Experiments 1–4, and samples from one block of sen-
tences. Note: the investment is tripled, so the return percentage is tripled to show the
return from the original investment.
Table 1 also shows one of the blocks of sentences that were devised for the game. Par-
ticipants played either 2 games (in Experiments 1, 3, 4, 5), or 4 (in Experiment 2). Each
of the speakers who were recorded to provide the stimuli for each experiment read a 20-
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sentence “block” for each game that the participants would play; thus, there were 2 blocks
of 20 sentences in Experiments 1, 3, 4, 5 and 4 blocks in Experiment 2. Thus, 80 different
sentences were devised, so that even participants playing 4 games would always hear
different sentences. Each of the 4 resulting blocks of 20 sentences was given a code: “AB”,
“CD”, “WX”, “YZ”. While the first sentence of each block was semantically neutral (e.g. “Hello,
let’s get started with the investment game”), all the others were about strategies to follow in
the game (e.g. “We have to help each other out, it’s the only way to win the game”). The full
set of sentences that all the speakers recorded for the experiments presented here read can
be found in Appendix A. While it could be argued that such invitations to be trusting might
have influenced participants’ behaviour, specifically to be more trusting than they would
have been otherwise, there are a few reasons to believe that this was not the case. First,
the content of the sentences was completely unrelated to what was actually happening in
the game, and results from all the experiments consistently show that participants trusted
trustworthy virtual partners and did not trust untrustworthy virtual partners. Also, theoretical
work on trust states that trust cannot be forced (Gambetta, 1988; Zak, 2003), and that
imperatives like “trust me” do not work unless trust is present in the first place (Boon &
Holmes, 1991). All the sentences, apart from the first one of each block, were encouraging
trusting behaviours. For this reason, it could also be argued that this could have caused
participants to trust more when the virtual partner was actually trustworthy, and to trust
less when the virtual partner was untrustworthy, because of the incongruity between the
virtual partner’s behaviour and its words. In real life encounters, however, untrustworthy
individuals will not openly assert their untrustworthiness, since it is this deception that makes
it advantageous to be untrustworthy in the first place (Boone & Buck, 2003). Thus, these
sentences constitute an ecologically valid contribution to the simulation of trustworthy and
untrustworthy partners.
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3.4 Critiques of the investment game
There have been some critiques to the use of the investment game as a measure of trust.
Some researchers have raised the concern that participants’ investments might be influenced
by their individual risk attitudes and behaviour, and that trusting might be confounded with
risk-taking (Fehr, 2009a; Karlan, 2005). Contrasting this, several studies found that risk
attitudes did not predict decisions in the investment game, and concluded that risk attitudes
affect risky decisions but not trusting decisions (Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010; Ashraf,
Bohnet & Piankov, 2003; Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2012). The
difference between trusting decisions and risky decision is that the success of the former
is attributed to another agent, while the success of the latter is attributed to a statistical
percentage, which is known or at least assumed by the person who takes the risk. Thus, for
example, trust games are played between two agents, while risk games are played between
an agent and a computer which returns a random amount of money based on a certain
distribution, but it is not given agency (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher & Fehr, 2005).
Also, in their survey of trust measures Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) mentions that risk
attitudes are not related to trusting or trustworthiness. From the point of view of the trustor,
people felt “betrayal aversion” only when they were deceived in a trust game, but not when
they lost in a gamble (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2012). People who lose on a gamble just
feel they had bad luck, while people who trusted a game partner, who then defected them,
feel they had been exploited (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). Thus, people might be more
willing to take a risk with a certain probability of losing than to trust when facing the same
probability of being deceived (Fehr, 2009a). These conclusions are also supported by a
study by Kosfeld et al. (2005), who found that oxytocin, a hormone that influences prosocial
behaviour, affects trust decisions in an investment game, but not risky decisions in a risk
game. Additionally, Reuter et al. (2009) found that people who have a variant of the oxytocin
receptor gene, which is believed to increase trust, trusted more in a trust game, but did not
risk more in a risk game. McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith and Trouard (2001) also found that
regions of prefrontal cortex were more active when participants in a trust game were playing
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with another human than with a computer known to be following an algorithmic behaviour.
This suggests that decisions in the game go beyond reinforcement learning to encompass
social relationships. Thus, behavioural and biological data suggest that trusting and risky
decisions might be different phenomena which only partially overlap; as such, the investment
game can be used as an accurate representation of trusting behaviour.
3.5 Statistical and experimental procedures
The main statistical tool used in the experiments presented here is the mixed-effects linear
model, which is sometimes also referred to as multilevel analysis. This technique adds to
linear regression techniques by allowing to specify random effects, as opposed to fixed
effects in the models. The latter are supposed to represent systematic changes to the
dependent variables, while the former represent random variability which is unaffected
by the independent variables. For example, if one wishes to study what affects athletes’
performance in a running competition, elements such as body weight and height, age, type
of clothing and shoes, amount of sugars ingested prior to the competition, etc. would all be
fixed effects, because they are all assumed to affect the runners in a linear fashion. On the
other hand, some of the runners might have had a troubled sleep due to agitation before
the performance; others might have had a fight with their partner which might distract them
during the event; and so on. All these factors are thought to be random, because they
typically are not controlled for. By specifying that the speed of each runner is a random factor,
the model will allow for idiosyncratic differences in the intercept or slope of each individual
runner, which would otherwise result in inflated variability in the data. Mixed-effects models
are sometimes preferred to ANOVAs, for example, because they allow to discard the by-item,
by-subject problem (Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008).
The models built in the experiments presented in this thesis are rather complicated, because
all have several predictors. For this reason, the models were built using forward stepwise
selection: models containing one predictor each are compared to a null model with a
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likelihood ratio test (anova() function in R). The model with the lowest AIC (Akaike Information
Criterion, see Aho, Derryberry & Peterson, 2014) is then selected as the next null model
to which new models with new predictors are compared. This is repeated until all possible
combinations of predictors and interactions of predictors (up to 3-way) have been tested.
The effect structure in the models is as follows: participant id is a random effect, for the
reasons specified above; sentence blocks are also random effects, since they can be thought
of as a random sample of all sentences that players in an investment game could use to
prompt their partners to trust them. Participants’ monetary investments are the dependent
measure. All the manipulations of the game, such as behaviour of the trustee, trial of the
game (referred to as “game turn”), accent, pitch, etc. are fixed effects.
All statistical analyses were carried out with the R software (R-v3.1 to R-v3.3, see R Core
Team, 2016) in the RStudio GUI. Mixed-effects models were fitted using the lme4 package
(Bates, Mächler, Bolker & Walker, 2015); data were plotted using the ggplot2 package
(Wickham, 2009); tables were created using the stargazer and kable functions. Regarding
experimental procedures, unless otherwise stated, experiments were scripted and presented
to participants with E-Prime~2.0. Data were logged in E-Prime, opened in E-Merge and
exported to .csv in a post-processing step. All resulting .csv files were then prepared and
analysed in R.
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4 Experiment 1 — Accents
4.1 Introduction
We make initial judgements about personality based on very limited evidence, such as
seeing a face for 100ms, or hearing the word “hello” (Willis & Todorov, 2006; McAleer
et al., 2014). Many physical and behavioural characteristics (e.g., facial appearance and
expression, dress, voice quality, accent) contribute to the formation of these impressions,
as was previously discussed. It is still unclear, however, what specific vocal characteristics
contribute to attributions of personality traits.
In particular, accent differences can suggest personality stereotypes, even to non-native
speakers (Ladegaard, 1998; Bayard et al., 2001), and native accents may be perceived as
more trustworthy than non-native accents (Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010). Accents, though, are
often intrinsically related to geographic regions (with the exception of accents associated with
social class, such as Standard Southern British English – SSBE), and stereotypes based
on general socio-economic perceptions of particular regions may impact on personality
attributions. Some studies have shown that standard accents such as SSBE are rated as
more pleasant and attractive than, for example, city accents such as Liverpool or Birmingham
(Bishop et al., 2005; Dixon et al., 2002; Fuertes et al., 2012). People may not actually
be very effective at localising accents however (Bayard et al., 2001), and it is possible that
some vocal characteristics of accents may mediate trust judgements independent of regional
stereotypes. Furthermore, most research on accent attributions focuses on immediate
impressions, without taking into account how the attribution might evolve over time according
to the speaker’s behaviour.
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The focus of the first experiment presented here is on trust attributions to different accents.
Since data on implicit trustworthiness attributions to accents is scarce, this experiment
was also meant as a baseline comparison with explicit data from previous sociolinguistics
studies. Thus, two accents that have often been placed at opposite ends in trustworthiness
questionnaires, SSBE and Liverpool English (Bishop et al., 2005; Dixon et al., 2002;
Fuertes et al., 2012), were chosen as experimental manipulations. Plus, the experiment was
designed so that each participant would play one game with an untrustworthy partner and
another game with a trustworthy partner. As previously mentioned, a trustworthy partner
was one who overall returned more money to the participant than the participant invested,
while an untrustworthy partner overall returned less than the participant invested.
Apart from examining the contribution of accent as a main effect — i.e., do people implicitly
trust an SSBE speaker more? — the focus of this experiment was also to study the interaction
between the accent and the behaviour of the virtual players. In other words: given that the
virtual player always returns either a generous amount of money or a poor amount of money,
would there be any differences in the relative monetary investments to the SSBE-accented
virtual player and the Liverpool-accented virtual player? Very little research has examined
the effect of behaviour on accent attitudes, or voice in general. For example, in a study in
Human-Robot Interaction, Andrist et al. (2015) manipulated the knowledge and rhetorical
ability of robots acting as tour guides, as well as their accent (Modern Standard Arabic and
Lebanese), and examined how much Lebanese participants accepted their suggestions.
They found that participants complied more with the Modern Standard Arabic-accented
robot when the robots had low knowledge, but preferred the Lebanese-accented robot
when the robots expressed high knowledge and high rhetorical ability. Also, Giles, Williams,
Mackie and Rosselli (1995), examining the “English only Movement” in California, found that
Anglo-American speakers arguing against this movement were more persuasive than those
in favour, and that Hispanic-American speakers speaking in favour of this movement were
more persuasive than those against it. Also, Cargile (1997) found that attitudes towards
Mandarin Chinese-accented speakers were different in the context of a job interview and of
a college classroom. However, Cargile (1997)’s final argument that more studies on accent
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attitudes in context are needed, seems to have gone amiss, since not much more research
on the topic had been conducted since then.
This chapter deals with the effect of accent on implicit judgments of trustworthiness, and
with their interaction with behavioural cues. It presents results of an investment game where
participants played with virtual agents which were associated with different accents and
behaviour conditions. In particular, participants played with virtual agents which had either
a Standard Southern British English or a Liverpool accent, which were behaving either
generously or meanly. A summary of the experimental conditions can be found in Table 2.
Accent Behaviour
SSBE Generous
SSBE Mean
Liverpool Generous
Liverpool Mean
Table 2: Experimental conditions of the investment game. Participants played one game
with one accent and one behaviour condition, and one game with the other accent and
behaviour condition, which were counterbalanced within participants.
Explicit trustworthiness data were also collected. At the end of the games that participants
played, they were also asked to explicitly rate the speakers they heard for trustworthiness.
The goal of these ratings was twofold: firstly, to verify to what extent the accented player’s
behaviour in the game would influence a subsequent explicit trustworthiness rating of the
same voice; secondly, to understand how explicit ratings compare to actual behaviour in an
investment game, and to previously reported explicit ratings in the existing literature.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
There were 44 native British English participants (35 females, 9 males) aged 18–45 (median
= 19, SD = 6.8). They were university undergraduate students who received course credit
61
(Chapter 4) Experiment 1 — Accents
for participation. The participants reported their places of origin, which were then clustered
according to 5 of the 6 regions of the U.K. mentioned in Bishop et al. (2005): southwest
England (n = 31), southeast England (n = 9), Midlands (n = 2), Scotland (n = 1) and Wales
(n = 1).
4.2.2 Stimuli
Two male native British English speakers of SSBE and Liverpool accents were recorded
in a sound-attenuated booth. Their voices were used as identifiers for the trustees in the
investment game. In addition, 5 male native English speakers from Edinburgh, Birmingham,
South London, Huddersfield and Bournemouth, and five male foreign English speakers
from Germany (Saxony), France (Normandy), Italy (Tuscany), Greece (Macedonia) and
India (National Capital Region) were also recorded. Utterances from all these 12 speakers
were used in the questionnaire that was administered to the participants at the end of the
game. Each speaker read two blocks of 20 sentences, each of which would be played at the
beginning of each round of the game, described below. All the sentences had approximately
the same length (mean number of syllables per sentence = 16.6, SD = 1.08), in order
to ensure that participants were exposed to both speakers an equal amount of time. As
previously described, apart from the first utterance of each block, which served for the virtual
player to introduce himself, all other utterances were about strategies to follow in the game,
e.g.: “I’m going to return more money now, if you invest more as well”; “Remember, there is
potential for earning, if we both trust each other”; “The goal of the game is to earn as much
money as possible”. Participants heard one block of utterances from one virtual player, and
the other block from the other virtual player, in a random order. All recorded utterances were
amplitude-normalized, and a noise-removal filter was applied.
4.2.3 Procedure
Participants played a repeated investment game, as explained in Section 3.3. Participants
sat in a computer booth, wore over-ear headphones and carried out the whole experiment
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on a computer. They were told that the goal of the game was to earn as much money as
possible, and that mutual co-operation with the other game partner would lead to greater
profit. They were informed that they could not verbally interact with the other player, but that
they would hear an utterance spoken by him at the beginning of each round. The participant
played the role of the trustor, while the trustee was a computer program. The participant
started with a notional sum of £8 at the beginning of each of the 20 rounds of a game.
He/she then decided whether to invest all, part, or none of it with a virtual player, by pressing
the corresponding number key. The trustee then received three times the amount that the
participant invested. The trustee was programmed to have one of two behaviours, either
returning 120% to 240% of the invested money to the participant (generous condition) or
0% to 120% (mean condition). The exact return pattern was fixed: the generous virtual
players always returned 150% in the first round, 150% again in the second round, 180%
in the third round, and so on, as explained in detail in Section 3.3. Thus, in the generous
condition, if the participants invested any fraction of the money they were given, they would
end the round with more money than they started with. The money that participants earned
at each round was safely stored in a “bank”. This was visible on the computer screen, as a
reminder of how much money they were making in total, and how well they were faring in
the game. Participants could not subsequently withdraw money from this “bank” however,
but they could only make an investment out of the £8 they received at the beginning of each
round. Participants heard an utterance at the beginning of each round, before they could
make an investment decision.
Altogether, there were four accent-return conditions (Liverpool-generous, Liverpool-mean,
SSBE-generous, SSBE-mean). Each participant engaged in two games, one for each accent,
and one for each behaviour (generous/mean), with a different set of 20 sentences heard for
each of the two games played. Each round of the game proceeded as follows: participants
heard the utterance from the virtual player; they indicated how much of their £8 they wished
to invest, in integers from 0 to 8 (by pressing a digit key); they saw a summary screen with
all the monetary transactions to and from the virtual player that had happened during the
round, including the return on their investment. After the end of the last round of the game, a
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screen transitioned the participants to a new game, with 20 more rounds. The virtual agent
they played with in each game corresponded to one of the two accented speakers, SSBE or
Liverpool.
After the participants finished the two games, they completed a questionnaire on the same
computer display. Firstly, they were played two utterances from the first person they had
played with, and were asked to rate how much they liked his voice, and to state why. Then,
they were asked if they could recognise his accent. Then, they were asked to rate how
much they agreed or disagreed with the following questions on the perceived honesty and
sincerity of the virtual player (taken from Rau, Li & Li, 2009): “This person was sincere”“;”this
person was interested in talking with me“”; “this person wanted me to trust him”“;”this person
was honest in communicating with me“. The same four questions were then repeated after
having played two utterances from the second virtual player. Then, they heard two utterances
from each of the 12 speakers (including the ones whose first language was not English)
in random order, and were asked to rate the speaker’s voice on a 7-point Likert scale (1 =
very untrustworthy, 7 = very trustworthy). Finally, participants completed a short background
questionnaire, where they were asked their age, gender, city of origin, and what accent they
spoke. As a final question, participants were also asked what accent they would like a robot
to have; this is discussed in full later, in Section 8.5. This data was kept anonymous, and
was used to group participants into the 5 regions described above. The total duration of the
experiment was approximately 15 minutes.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Investment game
The overall investment pattern was dictated by the virtual player’s behaviour, with participants
investing consistently more with the generous virtual player (Figure 2), regardless of his
accent (Figure 3). A linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data using forward stepwise
selection, selecting each successive predictor according to the lowest AIC (Akaike Informa-
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tion Criterion, Aho et al., 2014), with investment as dependent variable, accent, behaviour
(generous/mean) and game turn (the 20 rounds of the game) as independent variables, and
participants and sentence block as a random factors.
Figure 2: Average investments in the generous and mean conditions.
The model showed a main effect of behaviour (2(1) = 984:25; p < :001), with higher
investments to the generous virtual players (average = £5.8) than to the mean virtual players
(average = £2.6). There was also a main effect of game turn (2(1) = 65:52; p < :001), with
higher investments in the second half of the game. There was also a significant interaction
between behaviour and game turn (2(1) = 40:80; p < :001): as shown in Figure 2,
investments increase almost linearly in the generous condition, while they decrease in the
first half of the game, and increase in the second half of the game, in the mean condition.
There was no main effect of accent (2(1) = 0:51; p = :47), but there was a significant
interaction between accent and behaviour (2(1) = 7:36; p = :007), and a significant three-
way interaction between accent, behaviour and game turn (2(1) = 12:41; p < :001). There
was also A significant interaction between accent and game turn (2(1) = 22:14; p < :001):
as can be seen from Figure 3, the difference of the overall investments between SSBE and
Liverpool is positive in the first half of the game and negative in the second half of the game.
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Figure 3: Average investments to the SSBE and Liverpool speakers
In order to examine the interactions, a post-hoc mixed-effects model with game turn and
accent as predictors, and participant and sentence block as random factor was fitted to the
data divided in the two behaviour conditions. In the generous condition, there was a main
effect of accent (2(1) = 4:93; p = :026): as can be seen from Figure 4, participants overall
invested more money with the SSBE-accented virtual players (average = £6.34) than the
Liverpool-accented ones (average = £5.30). There was also a main effect of game turn
(2(1) = 151:77; p < 0:001), with an overall increase in investment as the game proceeded,
but no significant interaction between accent and game turn. In the mean condition, there
was also a main effect of accent (2(1) = 4:94; p = :026), with higher overall investments
with the Liverpool-accented virtual players (average = £3.06) than the SSBE-accented ones
(average = £2.14). There was no effect of game turn, but there was a significant interaction
between accent and game turn (2(1) = 36:44; p < :001): as can be seen from Figure 5,
investments to the SSBE-accented virtual players decreased at the beginning of the game
and then remained somewhat constant in the second half of the game, while investments to
the Liverpool-accented virtual players increased in the second half of the game.
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Figure 4: Average investments to the SSBE and Liverpool speakers in the generous
condition.
Figure 5: Average investments to the SSBE and Liverpool speakers in the mean condition.
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Thus, differences between the responses to the accents emerge when considering the
two behaviour conditions separately. When the virtual player was generous, participants
consistently invested more with the SSBE-accented player throughout the game (Figure 4),
supporting findings of relative trustworthiness of SSBE (Bishop et al., 2005; Fuertes et al.,
2012). When the virtual player was mean, participants initially invested more with SSBE,
but after three rounds the pattern reversed, and they subsequently invested more with the
Liverpool-accented player (Figure 5), even though the pattern of investment return between
accents was the same.
4.3.2 Questionnaires
Voice liking
Participants reported liking a voice more when it was associated with a generous behaviour
(average = 4.93) than a mean behaviour (average = 2.97), independent of its accent. A
one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of behaviour (F (1; 85) = 84:05; p < :001), but
no effect of accent (F (1; 85) = 3:07; p = :083), and no interaction. Thus, speaker behaviour
influenced liking ratings of that voice, but not accent.
Explicit honesty and sincerity evaluations
The 4 questions about the perceived honesty and sincerity of the speaker, taken from
Rau et al. (2009), were the dependent measure in a mixed-effects model with behaviour
and accent as predictors and participant as random factor. There was a main effect of
behaviour (2(1) = 156:82; p < :001): participants overall gave higher ratings to the
speakers in the generous condition than in the mean condition (average ratings = 5.65 and
3.19, respectively). This, together with the result that participants invested more money with
the generous virtual players than the mean players, confirms that they understood how the
virtual player was behaving and reacted accordingly. There was no effect of accent, and no
interaction between behaviour and accent.
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Trustworthiness questionnaire
A one-way ANOVA was performed on the trustworthiness ratings to the Liverpool and SSBE
speakers. These speakers were the same that participants heard during the game. The
ANOVA revealed that participants rated the speakers that had been associated with a
generous behaviour as more trustworthy than the speakers that had been associated with a
mean behaviour (average = 5.05 and 4.00, respectively, F (1; 85) = 84:05; p < :001). There
was no effect of accent, and no interaction.
Regarding the trustworthiness rating of all the speakers, Figure 6 shows the mean trust-
worthiness ratings of the 12 sampled speakers. A one-way ANOVA on the trustworthiness
rating of all speakers, apart from the Liverpool and SSBE ones heard in the game, revealed
a main effect of accent (F (9; 430) = 5:52; p < :001). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey
HSD test showed the following pairs to be significantly different: Birmingham was rated
significantly more trustworthy than Huddersfield, French and Greek (p < :001; p < :001 and
p = :022, respectively), Edinburgh was rated significantly more trustworthy than Hudder-
sfield, French and Greek (p < :005; p < :001 and p = :028, respectively) and Indian was
rated significantly more trustworthy than Huddersfield and French (p = :022 and p < :005,
respectively). This pattern of ratings differed somewhat from previous trust attributions to
accents of English (e.g. (Bishop et al., 2005; Fuertes et al., 2012)), where, for example,
Birmingham accents scored relatively low and Yorkshire accents scored much higher. In this
study, however, there was only a single speaker representing each region, and idiolectal
characteristics clearly affected ratings in addition to any regional associations. Furthermore,
in general speakers of English as a second language received lower ratings than native
English speakers (average trustworthiness rating of L1 speakers = 4.22, of L2 speakers =
3.86, t(437:99) = 2:61; p = :0095), supporting previous findings (Frumkin, 2007; Fuertes
et al., 2012; Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010).
The ratings for the SSBE and Liverpool voices are likely to be influenced by participants’
foregoing experiences in the investment game, and for this reason a direct comparison with
the other speakers would be meaningless. Figure 7 shows the trustworthiness ratings of
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Figure 6: Trustworthiness rating of all speakers.
SSBE and Liverpool, grouped by the two behaviour conditions. Ratings in the Liverpool-
generous were higher than in the Liverpool-mean condition (t(42) = 2:51; p < :05), whilst the
difference between the SSBE-generous and SSBE-mean condition approached significance
(t(40) = 1:87; p = 0:07). Thus, it appears that overall the explicit trust ratings are in line with
participants’ investment behaviour.
Accent identification
Of the 44~participants in the experiment, only~4 correctly identified the provenance of the
Liverpool accent, and~11 the SSBE accent. Such a poor performance might be due to the
fact participants were given a blank space to fill in with an accent label. It is possible that,
had they been given a list of options to choose from, their performance might have been
higher. Still, this poor performance indicates that regional stereotypes may play a minor
role in trust attributions, compared to idiolectal characteristics. Furthermore, a post-hoc
mixed-effects model adding participants’ own accent of origin as a predictor of investments
was not significant (2(1) = 1:34; p = :25). This result might not be particularly meaningful
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Figure 7: Boxplot showing the trustworthiness ratings of SSBE and Liverpool in the two
behaviour conditions.
though, since the participant sample is not balanced in terms of their own accent. Thus,
explicit social stereotypes and accent familiarity seem to play a minor role in implicit trust
attributions, compared to idiolectal characteristics or stable phonetic differences between
accents.
4.4 Discussion
Results from Experiment 1 clearly show that participants learn the behaviour of the virtual
player fairly quickly, as indicated by the pattern of investments shown in Figure 2: participants
invest more money with the generous virtual player and less with the mean virtual player.
Furthermore, although no accent is overall trusted more than the other in the game, the
interaction between accent and behaviour shows that participants trust more the SSBE-
accented virtual player in the generous condition, and the Liverpool-accented virtual player
in the mean condition.
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In the generous condition, the higher investments with the SSBE speaker reinforce previous
findings regarding preferences for standard accents over regional accents (e.g. Bishop et al.,
2005; Dixon et al., 2002; Fuertes et al., 2012; Giles, 1970; A. M. Wilkinson, 1965).
In line with “halo effect” theories (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wetzel et al., 1981), someone
who evaluates a standard-accented speaker positively, for example in terms of prestige,
might implicitly extend this judgments to trustworthiness. Standard accents might also be
clearer and more intelligbile (Floccia, Goslin, Girard & Konopczynski, 2006; Evans & Iverson,
2004), since most of the population will have listened to them in official radio or television
programmes (Przedlacka, 2008). Although what the speakers said during the investment
game was not related to what was actually happening in the game, participants are likely to
have paid attention to it, and less intelligible utterances might have been penalised.
Interestingly, the accent of the speaker strongly affected how participants reacted to negative
behaviour on the part of the virtual player. The speaker with the standard accent initially
attracted higher investment, but showed a greater drop in investment than the regional
speaker once the negative pattern of returns became evident. This result seems to indicate
that socially prestigious accents may incur a more negative response to perceived unjust
behaviour. Moreover, the investment patterns within the two behaviour conditions inter-
estingly suggest that initial voice-based stereotypes (which may or may not be related to
the actual speaker’s accent, given the poor identification performance) are maintained and
reinforced when the perceived behaviour is congruent with the impression that was initially
formed (e.g. SSBE in the generous behaviour or Liverpool in the mean behaviour) but are
reverted and penalized when the perceived behaviour is incongruent (e.g. SSBE in the mean
behaviour).
This is in line with previous studies that found that prestigious accents were more appropriate
in certain contexts, and regional or foreign accents in other contexts (Andrist et al., 2015;
Giles et al., 1995). Experiment 1 is a further step in that direction, though, since not only
does it provide evidence that accents might be trusted differently based on the behavioural
context in which they are embedded, but it also suggest that such an “attitude” is implicit.
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The virtual player’s behaviour in the game also influenced post-game explicit rating of the
same player’s voice. Perceived trustworthiness, voice liking, and honesty and sincerity were
all higher if the voice was associated with a generous behaviour in the game. This suggests
that implicit impressions influence explicit ratings after the interaction has taken place.
4.5 Conclusion
In the generous condition, there was higher investment with the SSBE speaker, reinforcing
previous findings of higher trustworthiness attributed to standard accents (e.g. Bishop et al.,
2005). More interestingly, the accent of the speaker strongly affected how participants
reacted to negative behaviour from the virtual player. The speaker with the non-regional
(standard) accent initially attracted higher investment, but showed a greater drop in invest-
ment than the regional speaker once the negative pattern of returns became evident. This
preliminary result intriguingly indicates that socially prestigious accents may incur a more
negative response to perceived unjust behaviour. Data on accent attributions gathered with
traditional sociolinguistic methods, such as questionnaires, would not have informed us
about this temporal dynamics. Thus, it seems clear that other methodologies, such as the
investment game, might be more appropriate for studying trusting behaviours over time.
The game data collected in this experiment reflects attitudes towards only two voices however,
and we cannot be certain that these attitudes were shaped by the speakers’ accents or by
other characteristics of the individuals’ speech. For instance, given existing literature on the
topic, it would be reasonable to think that some degree of the trust attributions might be due
to individual differences in voice quality and prosody.
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, research studying specifically the effect of prosody on trust
attributions are limited and contradictory. The investment game methodology could help
disentangle the contradictions raised by previous work, by a) studying implicit trustworthiness
judgments to voice exhibiting different idiolectal characteristics, and b) systematically varying
the voice and prosodic characteristics to isolate individual vocal features that contribute to
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these judgments. The next Chapter presents an experiment which goes a first step in this
direction. The sample of accents examined was enlarged, and more than one speaker of the
same accent was recorded, in order to start examining prosodic cues that might influence
implicit trustworthiness judgments.
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5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented a first attempt at collecting implicit measures of accent–
and voice-mediated trust. Results from the investment game show that the voice of the
virtual players influenced participants’ investment decisions. In particular, the male Standard
Southern British English (SSBE) speaker elicited particularly positive reactions when it
was paired with a generous behaviour, and particularly negative reactions when it was
paired with a mean behaviour. It is clear that these differential patterns of investments to
the two virtual players must have been due to their voice, since this was the only feature
that distinguished them. However, it is not possible to say with certainty that it was their
accent that elicited a differential response. The two speakers whose voices were used in
the previous experiment differed in their accent (SSBE and Liverpool), but also in other
suprasegmental characteristics such as pitch, intonation, speaking rate, etc., which might all
have influenced participants’ reactions.
In fact, previous studies have linked vocal characteristics other than accents to personality
attributions as well. For example, in a version of the investment game, where participants
did not actually play the game but only indicated which possible game partner they would
hypothetically trust more, O’Connor and Barclay (2017) found that they consistently selected
the one with the higher-pitched voice, for both female and male voices. Conversely, a few
studies have found that participants raise their vocal pitch when lying (Anolli & Ciceri, 1997;
Streeter et al., 1977; Villar et al., 2013), while Zuckerman et al. (1979) found that participants
perceived a lower pitch in deceptive messages, and Kirchhübel and Howard (2013) failed to
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find any acoustic differences — including in f0 — in the production of deceptive and truthful
messages. Hughes et al. (2008) instead found a positive correlation between pitch and
perceived honesty of male speakers. From a slightly different perspective, Cheang and Pell
(2008) and Rao (2013) found that actors generally had a lower f0 and slower speech rate
when acting sarcastic voices than when they were acting sincere voices. Similarly, sincerity
in a synthetic voice was associated with greater pitch range and faster articulation rate
(Trouvain et al., 2006). Slow speech rate, by contrast, was associated with less competence
(B. L. Smith et al., 1975). Higher f0 was also associated with higher agreeableness (Imhof,
2010), one of the “Big Five” personality traits (McCrae, 2009; Pervin, 2001; Trouvain et al.,
2006), which is connected to trust (Ashton & Lee, 2005). High f0 also elicited higher explicit
cooperativeness ratings (Knowles & Little, 2016).
Some scholars found that a fast speaking rate is a feature of charismatic (Jiang & Pell,
2017), confident (Rosenberg & Hirschberg, 2005) and persuasive (Chaiken, 1979) speakers;
on the contrary, Niebuhr et al. (2016) argued that fast speaking rate hinders charismatic
speech, possibly because phenomena such as vowel reduction and deletion become more
likely. N. Miller et al. (1976) found that faster speech rate increased persuasion, and they
cite an unpublished research where it was found that faster speakers were rated as more
trustworthy. Fast speech rate also elicited judgments of competence (Street, 1984; Street
& Brady, 1982) and credibility (Buller et al., 1992), although this effect decreased for very
fast rates of speech (Buller et al., 1992). Also, several studies on various languages found
that deceptive speech was accompanied by a significantly slow speech rate (Spence, Villar
& Arciuli, 2012; Rockwell, Buller & Burgoon, 1997; Vrij, Edward, Roberts & Bull, 2000;
Fiedler & Walka, 1993).
Finally, voice quality — variations of which distinguish, for example, breathy, creaky and
modal phonation (Klatt & Klatt, 1990) — might convey information about personality charac-
teristics as well. For example, Laver (1968) suggested that harsh voices might be correlated
with more aggressive and dominant characteristics, while breathy voices might be related to
more submissive personalities. Furthermore, in another study, both hypernasal and breathy
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female voices — which can be symptoms of voice disorders — were rated more negatively
than modal voices (Blood et al., 1979). Also, a breathy phonation mode in female voices
is related to perceived femininity and attractiveness (Gussenhoven, 2016). Breathy male
voices were also rated positively by female speakers (Xu et al., 2013), and the authors
suggest that breathiness in male voices can signal a reduction in aggressiveness.
Talking specifically about trust attributions, Elkins and Derrick (2013) also found that a high
pitch in participants’ voices correlated with low trust attributions to Embodied Conversational
Agents. These pitch effects also have similarities with that of a “smiling voice”, as smiling
tends to shorten the vocal tract and raise f0, as well as formants, which can also increase
trust (Elkins & Derrick, 2013). Contrary evidence however comes from a study by Apple
et al. (1979), whose questionnaire study showed that speakers with a high f0 were rated as
“less truthful” (Apple et al., 1979). This study also found that speakers with slow speech rate
were rated as “less truthful” and “more passive”. Additionally, in a mock election scenario,
participants typically voted for male candidates with lower-pitched voices (Tigue et al., 2012),
and it was found that low pitch predicted actual election results (Banai et al., 2017). On the
other hand, female candidates with high-pitched voices were more successful than those
with low pitch (Klofstad, 2015). It should also be noted that although gender has a strong
effect on pitch, with females typically having a smaller larynx and thus a higher pitch than
males, there are no consistent differences in trust judgments towards men or women (e.g.
Nass & Brave, 2005; Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2007; Boenin & Serra, 2009; Slonim &
Guillen, 2010).
All these — albeit highly inconsistent — results suggest that vocal characteristics other
than accent might influence trait attributions, including trust. However, no study so far
has investigated the effect of vocal characteristics on implicit trust attributions. An implicit
methodology aimed at eliciting actual trusting behaviours, however, might help untangle some
of the confounds in previous studies. This chapter presents results of an experiment aimed
at separating the effect of accent from that of other vocal cues on participants’ investments
in a trust game. This was achieved by using voices taken from several speakers of the
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same accents. In particular, the accents were SSBE, Plymouth, London and Birmingham,
and these, as well as individual prosodic cues, were used in a regression model to predict
monetary investments in the game. A summary of the manipulations in this experiment is
shown in Table 3.
Accent Behaviour Participant Speaker
SSBE Generous 1 SSBE 3
Plymouth Mean 1 Plymouth 3
London Generous 1 London 3
Birmingham Mean 1 Birmingham 3
Plymouth Generous 2 Plymouth 1
Birmingham Mean 2 Birmingham 1
London Mean 2 London 1
SSBE Generous 2 SSBE 1
Table 3: Example of the experimental conditions of two participants. Participants played
4 games in total, one with each accent, and they played 2 generous games and 2 mean
games, in counterbalanced order.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
Participants were 84 native British English speakers (52 females, 32 males) aged 18–67 (me-
dian = 21, SD = 11). They were university undergraduate students who received course
credit for participation or members of the public who received appropriate monetary com-
pensation. Self-reports on participants’ geographic origins were: southwest England (n = 44),
southeast England (n = 20), Midlands (n = 7), Wales (n = 5), northwest England (n = 3),
East Anglia (n = 2) and northeast England (n = 1). One participant was eliminated from the
data-set due to being later discovered to have a non-UK English language background. The
questionnaire data for one participant was not recorded due to a technical error, so that the
final participant sample was comprised of 83 participants in the investment game, and 82 in
the questionnaire.
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5.2.2 Stimuli
Recordings were obtained of three female speakers for each of the four target accents
(SSBE, Plymouth English, London English and Birmingham English), which were chosen
as representatives of accents that, in literature on accent attitudes, have been associated
with high trust attributions (SSBE and West Country) and low trust attributions (London
and Birmingham) (Dixon et al., 2002; Fuertes et al., 2012; Hiraga, 2005). One of the
main research questions for Experiment 2 was whether there would be any difference in
the relative monetary investments to the regional accent and/or other vocal characteristics
of the speaker, and whether this would be modulated by their behaviour within the game,
i.e. with a generous or mean return of player investments. Other speakers were recorded
for the questionnaire component of the experiment, with one female native English speaker
from Belfast (Northern Ireland), and five female speakers of English as a second language
(L2), whose native languages were Austrian German (Linz), French (Paris), Italian (Naples),
Greek (Cyprus) and Mandarin (Taipei). Each speaker read 4 different blocks of 20 sentences.
Two of these blocks were the same used in Experiment 1, and two more were recorded in
order to obtain different sentences for all the 4 games the participants would play. The full
set of sentences can be found in Appendix A. All sentences were approximately the same
length (average number of syllables per sentence 16.95, SD 1.08). The recorded utterances
were amplitude-normalized, and a noise-removal filter was applied.
5.2.3 Procedure
Participants sat in a computer booth, wore over-ear headphones and carried out the whole
experiment on a computer. The experiment followed the same procedure as Experiment 1.
Each participant engaged in four games, one for each accent condition and two for each
virtual agent’s behaviour condition. Thus, the accent condition was completely within-subject,
since each participant played with the 4 different accents. The behaviour condition, instead,
was constrained so that participants would play two generous games and two mean games.
The order of appearance of the behaviour condition was counterbalanced between subjects.
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The order of the blocks of sentences was randomized, and each speaker of the 4 target
accents was semi-counterbalanced to appear the same number of times in the two behaviour
conditions. Each game consisted of 20 rounds, which followed the same procedure as
Experiment 1, with participants starting with a virtual sum of £8, hearing a sentence from
the virtual game partner, deciding whether to invest any of it with it, and with the virtual
player’s return being displayed on the screen at the end of the round. Again, the generous
virtual player was programmed to return 120% to 240% of the invested amount, while the
mean virtual player returned between 0% and 120% of the invested amount. As previously
mentioned (Section 4.2.3), the exact return pattern was fixed: the generous virtual players
always returned 150% in the first round, 150% again in the second round, 180% in the third
round, and so on, as explained in detail in Section 3.3.
After completing the first game, participants answered four questions about the honesty and
sincerity of the virtual player they had just played with, on a 7-item Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The questions were taken from Rau et al. (2009): “This person
was sincere”; “This person was interested in talking with me”; “This person wanted me to
trust her”; “This person was honest in communicating with me”. Again, these questions were
intended to act as a safety check that participants had explicitly understood the behaviour
of the virtual player and, consequently, how the game worked. The same questions were
asked again at the end of the second, third and fourth game. After completing the last game
and after answering these questions, participants were played one utterance from each
of the speakers they had heard in the game, and asked to rate how much they liked the
voice they had just heard, on a 7-item Likert scale (1 = strongly dislike, 7 = strongly like).
They were then asked to state the reason behind their answer. Then they were asked to
identify the accent of the speakers they heard. In contrast with Experiment 1, they were
given a list of possible accents to choose from, including the four correct answers, 5 incorrect
answers, and “Other” and “Don’t know”. The option for the SSBE accent was described as
“Standard English”. After this set of questions, participants were played 2 utterances from
all the speakers they did not hear in the game, including the L2 speakers and the Northern
Irish speaker, in random order. So, for example, if during the game they heard speakers
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“SSBE 1”, “Plymouth 1”, “London 1” and “Birmingham 1”, in this part of the questionnaire
they heard speakers “SSBE 2”, “SSBE 3”, “Plymouth 2”, “Plymouth 3”, “London 2”, “London
3”, “Birmingham 2”, “Birmingham 3”, plus all the others, for a total of 14 speakers. They
were asked to rate how trustworthy each speaker sounded, on a 7-item Likert scale (1 = very
untrustworthy, 7 = very trustworthy). Since Experiment 1 showed that the virtual player’s
behaviour in the game influences subsequent explicit trustworthiness judgments of the same
player, here the focus was on whether a player’s behaviour influenced subsequent judgments
of other speakers with the same accent, who had nothing to do with the investment game.
Finally, participants completed a short background questionnaire, where they were asked
their age, gender, city of origin, and what accent they spoke. This data was kept anonymous,
and was used to group participants into the 7 regions described above. As a final question,
participants were also asked what accent they would like a robot to have; this is discussed in
full later, in Section 8.5. The total duration of the experiment was approximately 25 minutes.
5.2.4 Prosodic measures
Segmentation and labelling of the individual sound files was done with the forced alignment
tool provided by the MAUS General Web service (Schiel, 1999). The transcriptions thus
obtained were then used to extract prosodic measures in Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2017)
and MATLAB; specifically, the measures were mean f0, f0 range, voice quality and articulation
rate. Mean f0 was calculated as the mean f0 value for each vowel, then averaged across
individual utterances. Pitch range, in order to eliminate potential outliers, was calculated as
the difference between the 10th and the 90th percentiles of the mean f0 value for each vowel,
as in Patterson and Ladd (1999), then averaged across individual utterances. Articulation
rate was calculated as syllables/second, not including pauses or other hesitations in speech
(Jacewicz et al., 2009; De Jong & Wempe, 2009). Finally, H1-H2 — the difference between
the first and second harmonic — was used as a measure of voice quality, as in Johnson
(2002) and Garellek, Keating, Esposito and Kreiman (2013). This was calculated using
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VoiceSauce (Shue, Keating, Vicenik & Yu, 2011). A summary of these prosodic measures is
given in Table 4.
Pitch (Hz) Pitch
Range (Hz)
Articulation
Rate (syll/s)
H1-H2 (dB)
SSBE 1 216 (10) 29 (8) 4.11 (0.55) 10.45 (1.41)
SSBE 2 223 (10) 32 (8) 4.19 (0.52) 8.79 (1.02)
SSBE 3 224 (14) 40 (12) 4.17 (0.49) 8.43 (1.34)
SSBE average 221 (12) 34 (11) 4.16 (0.52) 9.23 (1.55)
Plymouth 1 200 (12) 30 (9) 3.81 (0.48) 9.9 (1.22)
Plymouth 2 244 (9) 28 (8) 3.67 (0.4) 7.71 (0.94)
Plymouth 3 211 (9) 27 (7) 4.21 (0.53) 7.86 (0.77)
Plymouth average 218 (21) 28 (8) 3.9 (0.52) 8.5 (1.41)
London 1 187 (8) 24 (5) 4.03 (0.54) 9.4 (0.7)
London 2 224 (9) 43 (10) 4.02 (0.45) 7.4 (0.79)
London 3 198 (8) 29 (8) 4.09 (0.52) 9.31 (1.05)
London average 203 (18) 32 (11) 4.04 (0.5) 8.72 (1.26)
Birmingham 1 165 (7) 22 (8) 3.22 (0.45) 6.19 (1.28)
Birmingham 2 241 (9) 30 (8) 4.33 (0.58) 9.15 (1.26)
Birmingham 3 209 (10) 33 (10) 4.0 (0.47) 5.99 (0.99)
Birmingham average 205 (33) 28 (10) 3.84 (0.68) 7.09 (1.86)
Table 4: Summary of prosodic measures divided by speaker (standard deviation in
parentheses).
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Investment game
To determine the effects of game behaviour and vocal characteristics on investments, a
mixed-effects linear model was fitted to the data using forward stepwise selection, selecting
each successive predictor according to the lowest AIC (Aho et al., 2014). Investment was
the dependent variable; behaviour, accent, game turn, pitch range, f0, articulation rate and
H1-H2 were predictors; subject and sentence block were random factors.
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Effect of game behaviour
There was a main effect of behaviour, with an average investment of £6.14 to the generous
virtual player and of £2.40 to the mean virtual player (2(1) = 4290:4; p < :001). There was
also a main effect of game turn (2(1) = 92:94; p < :001), with higher overall investments
in the second half of the game, and a significant interaction between behaviour and game
turn (2(1) = 206:82; p < :001): as previously noted, investments increase in the generous
condition in an almost linear fashion, and decrease and then increase in the mean condition
in a u-shape fashion as the game progresses (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Average investments in the generous and mean condition.
Effect of accent
There was also a main effect of accent (2(3) = 31:64; p < :001). Post-hoc comparisons
using the Tukey HSD test show that average investments to SSBE speakers were higher
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than the investments to Plymouth (p = :002), London (p = :002) and Birmingham (p < :001)
speakers, with no other pairs showing significant differences. There was also an interaction
between accent and behaviour (2(3) = 14:08; p = :003), but no interaction with game
turn. Figure 9 shows the average investments according to behaviour and accent. Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test showed that the investments in the generous
condition were significantly higher with SSBE speakers than with speakers from Plymouth
(p = :024) and London (p = :013), and that investments to Birmingham speakers were
significantly higher than investments to London (p = :016) and Plymouth (p = :029). By
contrast, in the mean condition, investments to SSBE, Plymouth and London speakers were
all higher than the investments to Birmingham speakers (p < :001; p = :022; p = :011
respectively).
Figure 9: Average investments to the four target accents in the generous (top panel) and
mean (bottom panel) conditions.
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Effect of prosody
There was a main effect of f0 (2(1) = 4:48; p = :034), and the effect of articulation rate
approached significance (2(1) = 3:34; p = :067, significant in terms of AIC): overall, higher
pitch and faster articulation rate were associated with higher investments. These results
are relatively consistent with some previous findings (e.g. Apple et al., 1979; Trouvain
et al., 2006; Imhof, 2010). There were no effects of pitch range or H1-H2 on investments.
There was also an interaction between f0 and game turn (2(1) = 12:77; p < :001), with
higher f0 more strongly associated with higher investment earlier in the game. There was an
interaction between f0 and articulation rate (2(1) = 8:19; p = :017), with greater investment
for high f0 at fast rate. Finally, there was also an interaction between articulation rate and
behaviour (2(1) = 4:05; p = :042), with a positive relationship between articulation rate
and investment limited to the mean condition.
The result on articulation rate suggests that a faster rate might elicit higher trustworthiness
attributions. Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out that one of the Birmingham
speakers had by far the slowest articulation rate (Figure 10), as well as the lowest average
f0 (Figure 11). Looking at the distribution of the articulation rates and f0s of all speakers,
“Birmingham 1” is the only one to fall more than 1 standard deviation below the mean of
articulation rate, and more than 1.5 standard deviations below the mean of f0. Furthermore, a
2-tailed t-test between the articulation rate of speaker “Birmingham 1” and the articulation rate
of the second slowest speaker, “Plymouth 2”, was significant (t(1092) =  17:58; p < :001).
Similarly, a 2-tailed t-test between the f0 of speaker “Birmingham 1” and the f0 of the second
lowest speaker, “London 1”, was also significant (t(1117:8) =  49:39; p < :001). None of
the other speakers had a particularly fast or high-pitched voice. This seems to suggest that
speaker “Birmingham 1” was a particularly slow and low-pitched speaker in the dataset,
which could be treated as an outlier in this particular set of speakers.
For this reason, a mixed-effects linear model was re-fitted excluding that particular speaker.
By doing this, the effect of pitch remained the same, although its significance diminished
(2(1) = 3:23; p = :072), and the effect of rate changed direction (2(1) = 4:56; p = :033).
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Figure 10: Distribution of articulation rates across all the utterances of the speakers used in
the game. The red, dashed vertical line is the mean rate of speaker “Birmingham 1”, while
the other vertical lines are the mean rates of all the other speakers.
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Figure 11: Distribution of f0s across across all the utterances of the speakers used in the
game. The red, dashed vertical line is the mean f0 of speaker “Birmingham 1”, while the
other vertical lines are the mean f0 of all the other speakers.
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That is to say, by excluding the extreme value, the remaining 11 speakers showed that slower
rate predicted higher investments in the game. Also, the interaction between behaviour and
articulation rate was no longer significant. The interaction between pitch and game turn
was maintained (2(1) = 5:76; p = :016), as well as the main effect of accent (2(3) =
35:20; p < :001).
Cruttenden (1997) estimates the average tempo for naturally-occurring English speech to be
around 6 syllables/second. Read speech generally occurs at a slower tempo than natural
speech however (Hirose & Kawanami, 2002; Batliner, Kompe, Kießling, Nöth & Niemann,
1995; Laan, 1997; Dellwo, Leemann & Kolly, 2015), and Jacewicz, Fox and Wei (2010)
previously found that natural speech in different varieties of American English was about
1.55 times faster than the corresponding read speech. By applying this proportion to the
figure mentioned by Cruttenden (1997), the average tempo of read British English speech
should be around 3.9 syllables/second. And in fact, the average articulation rate of all the
utterances recorded from all the speakers in this experiment is 3.99 syllables/second. As
can be seen in Figure 12, speaker “Birmingham 1” is the only one whose articulation rate
mostly falls below this average. All this evidence contributes to suggesting that speaker
“Birmingham 1” might have been perceived as particularly slow, at least in comparison
with the other speakers that participants heard during the experiment. Thus, it seems
that extreme articulation rate values might result in negative reactions. This conclusion
is supported by B. L. Smith et al. (1975), who argued that extremes in both directions of
manipulated articulation rate elicited negative judgments, and by Buller et al. (1992), who
found that judgments of credibility decreased for extremely fast rates. Since none of the
speakers in the current experiment had a particularly fast articulation rate (Figure 10), it
remains to be seen whether particularly fast natural rates would elicit negative reactions in
the investment game as well.
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Figure 12: Median articulation rates of the 12 speakers used. Speaker ‘b1’ (Birmingham 1)
has the slowest rate. The red line is the average articulation rate of all the speakers.
89
(Chapter 5) Experiment 2 — Accents and prosody
5.3.2 Questionnaire
Explicit honesty and sincerity evaluations
Participants were asked to evaluate the speakers they heard in the game for perceived
honesty and sincerity (Rau et al., 2009). The numerical answers to these four questions
were the dependent measure in a mixed-effects model: the ratings were the dependent
variable, behaviour and speaker were predictors, and participants and sentence block were
random effects. There was a main effect of behaviour (2(1) = 533:88; p < :001): as
expected, participants gave higher ratings of sincerity and honesty to those players which
had a generous behaviour in the game than those which had a mean behaviour (average
ratings = 5.37 and 2.91, respectively). This result, together with the fact that participants
invested more money with the generous virtual players than the mean players in the game,
confirms that they understood how the virtual player was behaving, and reacted accordingly.
There was also a main effect of accent (2(3) = 11:17; p = :0113). A post-hoc Tukey HSD
test revealed that SSBE speakers were rated significantly higher than Birmingham speakers
(average rating = 4.39 and 3.89, respectively; p = :009), with no other pair showing significant
differences. There was also no interaction between accent and behaviour.
Voice Liking
Participants were also asked to rate how much they liked the voices they heard in the game.
As expected, the speaker’s associated behaviour in the game influenced this voice liking
rating. A one-way ANOVA with behaviour and accent as factors revealed that both these
factors influenced the liking ratings (F (1; 324) = 13:45; p < :001 and F (3; 324) = 12:54; p <
:001, respectively). Participants reported liking a voice more if it had been associated with a
generous behaviour (average = 4.35) than a mean behaviour (average = 3.76). Regarding
the effect of accent, post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test showed that participants
reported liking SSBE, Plymouth and London accents more than a Birmingham accent
(p < :001; p = :0039; p = :014, respectively) and an SSBE accent more than a London
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accent (p = :023). There was no interaction between accent and behaviour. A summary of
the liking ratings, divided by speaker, is given in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Mean voice liking rating of all speakers heard in the game.
Trustworthiness rating
Participants rated 14 speakers, which had nothing to do with the investment game, for
trustworthiness. These included the 8 SSBE, Plymouth, London and Birmingham speakers
they had not played with during the games. Figure 14 shows the mean trustworthiness rating
to all the speakers recorded for Experiment 2. A one-way ANOVA analysis with the factor
of accent was found to be significant (F (3; 659) = 28:45; p < :001). Post-hoc comparisons
using the Tukey HSD test show that the London, Plymouth and SSBE accents were rated
significantly more trustworthy than Birmingham (all p < :001), and that SSBE was rated
significantly more trustworthy than London (p < :001) and Plymouth (p = :031). This shows
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a similar pattern to the investments to the four accents in the game in the mean condition,
where Birmingham received lower investments than any other accent. However, it should
be noted that participants did not rate the same speakers that they had heard in the game,
but two other speakers with the same regional accent. In general, these explicit trust ratings
are in agreement with prior literature, with prestigious accents such as SSBE at the higher
end of the trust scale, urban accents such as Birmingham (but not London — see Figure 14
below) at the lower end, and less urban accents such as Plymouth somewhat in the middle
(A. M. Wilkinson, 1965; Fuertes et al., 2012; Dixon et al., 2002; Hiraga, 2005; Crystal
& Crystal, 2014). Furthermore, speakers of English as a second language received lower
ratings than native English speakers (average trustworthiness rating of L1 speakers = 4.38,
of L2 speakers = 4.18; t(937:8) = 2:32; p = :021), supporting previous findings (Fuertes
et al., 2012; Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010; Frumkin, 2007).
Figure 14: Mean trustworthiness rating of 10 English accents.
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Contrary to the results of Experiment 1, the virtual players’ behaviour in the game did not
influence the trustworthiness ratings in the questionnaire (F (1; 659) = 1:68; p = :19); that
is to say, accents associated with generous virtual players were not rated higher in the
questionnaire, and accents associated with mean virtual players were not rated lower. This
is likely due to the fact that the voices rated by participants in the questionnaire were not the
same voices they heard during the game. Thus, it seems that participant do not extend the
attitude that they developed towards an accented speaker to other speakers of the same
accent, but rather that attitude is confined to the individual speaker who was the object of
the original attitude.
Accent identification
Participants were also asked to identify the accent of the speakers they played with in the
game. Given poor idenfitication rates in Experiment 1, here they were given a set of possible
answers to choose from. Identification of SSBE, Plymouth and Birmingham accents were
above chance level (by 53, 31 and 34 participants respectively). The London accent, on
the other hand, was correctly identified only by one person. Again, this shows that trust
attributions can be ascribed to speakers, even if their provenance cannot be accurately
defined. As in Experiment 1, a post-hoc examination of the influence of the participant’s
own accent on investments with virtual players with the same or different accent was not
significant (2(1) = 0:04; p = :83), thus ruling out any familiarity or “accent loyalty” effects
that might have influenced participants’ trusting behaviours (Giles, 1971).
5.4 Discussion
This study built upon the results of Experiment 1 both by expanding the number of accents,
and by examining multiple speakers for each of the accents. As in the previous experiment,
it was found that participants’ investments were modulated by the regional accent of their
virtual counterpart, even when the differently-accented virtual players exhibited exactly the
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same behaviour. It was also shown that the pattern of investments for particular accents
was dependent upon the accented virtual player’s behaviour. This interaction was also found
in Experiment 1, albeit with a different pattern of results dictated by the different accents
under analysis there. In the current experiment, the highest investments in the generous
condition were to the SSBE- and Birmingham-accented virtual players. In the mean condition
instead, the smallest investments were to the Birmingham-accented virtual players. In the
previous study the Liverpool-accented virtual player received lower investments than the
SSBE speaker in the generous condition, but higher investments in the mean condition. The
pattern of results for SSBE in Experiment 1 was more similar to that of the Birmingham
accent in the current study. That is, while the Birmingham speakers receive high investments
in the generous condition, they receive the lowest investments in the mean condition. This
provides continued support for the conclusion that the interaction between accent and
behaviour is due to the incongruence between the stereotype for a particular accent and the
speaker’s actual behaviour. In this case, participants’ first impressions about the Birmingham-
accented speakers might have been of high trustworthiness. When this trustworthiness
was confirmed, in the generous condition, participants reinforced their trusting behaviour
towards these speakers. When this trustworthiness was disproved, in the mean condition,
participants reacted more negatively to this perceived “betrayal”. Also, the results regarding
the Plymouth regional accent were also in line with previous research. For example, in
Kristiansen et al. (1983), Devonian speakers were generally located halfway between RP and
Cockney speakers in terms of trustworthiness, and indeed in the investment game Plymouth
speakers were always located halfway between the most and least trusted speakers. Also,
while the majority of participants reported being from the South West of England, where the
Plymouth accent is geographically located, there were no in-group or “accent loyalty” (Giles,
1971) effects. That is to say, participants did not trust speakers who had an accent from their
same region more.
Regarding the effect of individual differences in prosodic characteristics on the investment
decisions, mean pitch (f0) and articulation rate had an effect on the trust attributions in
the investment game, while pitch range and voice quality were not significant predictors in
94
5.4 Discussion
the regression analysis. Overall, higher pitch and slower articulation rate were associated
with higher investments. This is consistent with Imhof (2010), who found that higher f0 was
associated with higher agreeableness, a personality trait that manifests itself in a variety of
behaviours, including trusting and trustworthiness (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990). About
rate, both Apple et al. (1979) and Trouvain et al. (2006) found that slow rate was associated
with less truthfulness and less competence. While these studies used explicit evaluations
of first impressions, the current findings expand on previous results by adding information
about the development of voice-based attitudes over time. In particular, the interaction that
was found between game turn and f0 suggests that individual prosodic cues might play a
bigger role at the beginning of an interaction, but this might become secondary over time.
The greater overall trustworthiness of voices with higher pitch may be related to “Size/Frequency
Code” theory (Ohala, 1983), based on higher f0 being generally associated with a smaller
larynx and therefore smaller body size. As a consequence, we tend to associate lower f0 with
dominance and aggressiveness, and higher f0 with friendliness and cooperativeness (Ohala,
1980; Hirschberg, 2002). In a type of interaction where trust is required, listeners might be
more inclined to attribute trustworthiness to a speaker who is perceived as friendly rather
than dominating. The current experiment provides evidence that this interpretation applies
to female speakers however, on the basis of the speaker sample used; the experiment
presented in the next Chapter will show that higher f0 also accords with trustworthiness in
male speakers.
The greater trustworthiness of voices with a slow articulation rate might also be interpreted in
terms of a biological code. In particular, the “Effort Code” postulates that careful pronunciation
of speech can signal cooperativeness (Gussenhoven, 2002). Thus, speaking at a slower
rate might signal that the speaker is willing to sacrifice information efficiency in order to
ensure maximum understanding of the message. This lends support to Niebuhr et al.
(2016)‘s argument that a fast speaking rate hinders charismatic and persuasive speech.
Articulation rate might also influence trust in terms of individual differences and in-group
and accommodation theories (Giles & Powesland, 1997). The vast majority of participants
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in this experiment reported being from the South West of England, and speakers from
this region are often described as having a slow rate of speech (Roach, 1998; Wells,
1982). Social attractiveness — a trait that has been linked to trustworthiness (Street, Brady
& Putman, 1983) — was found to be influenced by relative speech similarity, including
in terms of speaking rate (Street, 1984). However, results from the current experiment
show no evidence of convergence towards the participants’ own accents — in other words,
participants’ did not invest more money with speakers of the same accents as their own.
Nonetheless, it is possible that in certain implicit contexts accommodation theory influences
perception at a lower level than accents, that of individual speech cues.
Another interpretation of the effect of rate comes from regulatory-fit theory (Higgins, 2000).
According to this theory, there are two ways of approaching a goal: promotion or preven-
tion. Promotion-focus individuals are more oriented towards increasing the gains, whereas
prevention-focused ones are concerned with minimising the losses. Furthermore, this theory
can be applied to persuasion: the same message can be framed in a “promotive” or “pre-
ventive” way, and the message will have a good fit with people who approach goals in the
corresponding way. The way the message “fits” with listeners is also not constant, it can be
induced, and it can vary based on context. In a recent study focused on nonverbal cues,
Cesario and Higgins (2008) delivered the same message in a promotive and preventive
manner. The promotive message was delivered using cues such as broad gestures and
fast speech rate, while the preventive message involved slow body movements and slow
speech rate. Indeed, the videos were most effective for people belonging to the two types,
respectively. Since this theory of persuasion is also context-dependent, if a context is more
“preventive”, the “preventive” message will be more persuasive. Assuming that the investment
game is a preventive context, participants might have approached the goal of making as
much money as possible in the interpretation of “losing as little money as possible”, and thus
“preventive” cues from the speakers, such as slow articulation rate, might have been more
persuasive. In fact, in game theory it is well established that people are more concerned
about not losing any money than gaining it (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
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The characteristics of pitch and rate are also inherently related to the 4 accents of interest.
More specifically, the SSBE speakers in the sample had the highest pitch, followed by
Plymouth, Birmingham and London; the SSBE speakers had also the widest pitch range,
followed by London, Birmingham and Plymouth; the SSBE speakers had also the fastest
articulation rate, followed by London, Plymouth and Birmingham; finally, the SSBE speakers
showed the biggest H1-H2 difference, followed by London, Plymouth and Birmingham (see
Table 4 above). It is possible that the association that was found, for example, between
higher pitch and higher investments, was actually a masking of the effect of the SSBE
accent on the investments, which in this sample happened to be linked with higher pitch.
While it is not possible, with the data collected in this experiment, to fully separate the
effect of individual prosodic characteristics from the effect of accent, future studies could
artificially manipulate the f0, f0 range, articulation rate and voice quality of speakers to check
whether the investment patterns are actually dictated by the accent or by these individual
characteristics. An experiment using this methodology is discussed in the next Chapter.
Regarding the interactions with voice characteristics, the interaction between f0 and game
turn replicates a finding from Elkins and Derrick (2013), who found that the effect of pitch
diminished over time. However, in their study they found that the low pitch of the trustor
(the participant) predicted lower trust especially early in the interaction, while here it was
found that the high pitch of the trustee (the virtual agent) predicts higher trust, especially
early in the interaction. Given these differences, these two results are not incompatible, and
agree that pitch might have a stronger effect initially in the interaction. Furthermore, the
interaction between f0 and articulation rate found here contrasts with Apple et al. (1979),
who did not find any interaction in their study, and concluded that the two measures might
affect listeners’ judgements independently of each other. The different methodology and
technology used in the current study could explain these different results. On the other hand,
the interaction between articulation rate and behaviour lends some support for Apple et al.
(1979)’s conclusion, in the sense that different prosodic characteristics might independently
elicit higher trust judgements in certain behavioural contexts only.
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Finally, regarding the post-game questionnaires, they were intended as a comparison
between an explicit measure of trust such as the trustworthiness questionnaire and the
implicit trust measure brought by the investment game. In Experiment 1, the explicit trustwor-
thiness ratings of the two accents were based on exemplars from the virtual players involved
in the games. In that experiment, the behaviour assigned to the virtual player, being in the
generous or mean condition, had an effect on the trustworthiness ratings of their accent. In
the current study instead, the exemplars provided for accent ratings were not spoken by the
virtual players, but by speakers unknown to the participants. In this case, the behaviour of
the similarly-accented virtual players had no effect on the trust ratings of the accents. Thus,
it is possible to conclude that the attitudes that participants have formed at the end of the
game with respect to the virtual players are maintained until the questionnaire, but that their
behaviour is not generalized to different speakers of the same accent.
5.5 Conclusion
The results presented in this Chapter, together with results from Experiment 1, established
that participants’ investments in a virtual player, a proxy for trust, were affected by their
regional accents. From Experiments 1 and 2, it is possible to conclude that people implicitly
trust a standard accent such as SSBE more than regional accents, particularly Liverpool,
Birmingham, Plymouth and London, although the behaviour of the trustee interacts with
these trusting decisions, as discussed in the next section. This is in agreement with previous
research on accent attitudes in the UK, which typically found that a standard accent is
evaluated more positively than regional accents, for example in terms of attractiveness and
prestige (Bishop et al., 2005; Dixon et al., 2002; Fuertes et al., 2012; Giles, 1970; A. M.
Wilkinson, 1965). Importantly, this effect appears to be constant over time. At the start of
a game, the participants would have no experience of the trustworthiness of their game
partner, and must rely upon stereotypes to make their initial investment judgments. However,
it might be expected that the effect of accent might wane over the course of the game, as
the expected stereotypical behaviours were replaced with actual experience. As this was
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not the case, it is possible to conclude that the influence of accent-related trust attribution is
separate from experiential trust resulting from reinforcement learning.
Three voice features previously associated with trust — accent, high pitch and fast articulation
rate — influenced participants’ monetary investments. This is consistent with some previous
studies on attributions of trustworthiness and associated characteristics (Giles, 1970; Dixon
et al., 2002; Bishop et al., 2005; Fuertes et al., 2012, for accent effect; Zuckerman et al.,
1979; Cheang & Pell, 2008; Rao, 2013, for pitch effect; B. L. Smith et al., 1975; Trouvain
et al., 2006; Imhof, 2010; Apple et al., 1979, for rate effect), although the methodology
employed here to establish an implicit measure of trust is radically different. Most of the
studies on personality attributions to voices used actors or explicit listeners’ evaluations. In
the case of actors (Cheang & Pell, 2008; Rao, 2013), they might exaggerate their different
personality portrayals, so as to be as different from each other as possible; the risk of this,
though, is that their portrayals do not actually represent the reality of everyday interactions
(Polzehl, 2015). In the case of listeners’ evaluations (used e.g. in Elkins & Derrick, 2013;
Apple et al., 1979; B. L. Smith et al., 1975; Imhof, 2010), it has already been discussed
how explicit measures might not be very accurate in describing the complex dynamics of
personality attributions (Section 1.3).
The effect of prosody found in this experiment suggests that certain suprasegmental features
elicit higher trusting behaviours. However, these prosodic cues were not controlled for,
but they were those that the speakers happened to have. Thus, it is possible that the
results obtained here might have been an artefact of the random sample of speakers, as
demonstrated by the outlier effect of speaker “Birmingham 1”. The following Chapter 6
discusses an experiment in which the voice of two speakers — whose pitch and articulation
rate falls within the average band of a healthy population — is artificially manipulated, in
order to confirm that these two vocal cues indeed affect implicit attitude formation.
99

6 Experiment 3 — Manipulation of voice cues
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented results of an experiment on implicit trust attributions to
several speakers of different accents, where it was shown that voice characteristics other
than accent influenced participants’ monetary investments in the game. However, the
result concerning voice characteristics was a post-hoc analysis on voices which were first
and foremost recorded for their accent. Mean pitch, pitch range, articulation rate and the
difference between the first and second harmonic were not chosen systematically beforehand.
After demonstrating that people pay implicit attention to some of these characteristics, there
is now evidence to support a more systematic and in-depth analysis of the effect of these
vocal cues on trustworthiness attributions.
Scholars have artificially manipulated pitch and articulation rate of speakers to study a
variety of phenomena. In a recent study, O’Connor and Barclay (2017) manipulated the
pitch of male and female voices and tested its influence on general, economic-related and
mating-related trustworthiness. They found that high pitch in female and male voices was
associated with higher trustworthiness in economic contexts. Similarly, in a one-shot trust
game, Montano et al. (2017) found that female participants trust male voices with artificially
raised pitch more. In a series of early studies, Brown et al. (1975) found that slowing down
speech rate and increasing pitch in male voices resulted in lower competence ratings. In
terms of vocal attractiveness, which has been found to increase persuasion (Chaiken, 1979),
it was shown that voices rated higher in attractiveness were associated with more favourable
impressions of overall personality (Zuckerman & Miyake, 1993).
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The topic of vocal attractiveness raises the issue of other evolutionary aspects of voice,
namely those related to partner selection. Larynx size and vocal tract length are inversely
proportional to perceived vocal pitch, and directly proportional to body size and testosterone
levels in males (Dabbs & Mallinger, 1999; Fitch, 1997; Ohala, 1983; Xu et al., 2013;
Titze, 1994; Abitbol, Abitbol & Abitbol, 1999). Furthermore, high testosterone levels are
linked to physical aggressiveness and dominance (Puts, Hodges, Cárdenas & Gaulin, 2007;
also B. C. Jones et al., 2010; Wolff & Puts, 2010; Collins, 2000; Aromäki, Lindman &
Eriksson, 1999; Giammanco, Tabacchi, Giammanco, Di Majo & La Guardia, 2005; Ramirez,
2003). Since maintaining such features is costly in terms of energy and nourishment, it has
been suggested that masculine traits such as low vocal pitch might be a “honest signal” of
a male’s physical health and reproductive success (Apicella, Feinberg & Marlowe, 2007;
Feinberg, Jones, Little, Burt & Perrett, 2005; Puts, Gaulin & Verdolini, 2006; Folstad &
Karter, 1992), and that vocal pitch contributes to male partner selection (Puts et al., 2006).
Conversely, higher female vocal pitch is correlated with long-term health (Vukovic, Feinberg,
DeBruine, Smith & Jones, 2010) and oestrogen levels (Abitbol et al., 1999; Pipitone &
Gallup, 2008), which in turn signal a healthy reproductive system (Alonso & Rosenfield, 2002;
Feinberg, Jones, DeBruine et al., 2005; Van Borsel, De Cuypere, Rubens & Destaerke,
2000; Baird et al., 1999; Lipson & Ellison, 1996). Thus, a feminine trait such as a high vocal
pitch can be similarly considered a “honest signal” of female fecundity (Pipitone & Gallup,
2008; Bryant & Haselton, 2009). This contributes to explaining the numerous findings on
vocal attractiveness, specifically that men prefer high-pitched female voices and that women
prefer low-pitched male voices in romantic contexts (Re et al., 2012; Saxton et al., 2006;
Hodges-Simeon et al., 2010; O’Connor & Barclay, 2017; Riding et al., 2006; Borkowska &
Pawlowski, 2011; Feinberg et al., 2008; B. C. Jones et al., 2010).
Following this line of thought, it has been argued that men’s dominance is related to their
physical strength (Sell et al., 2009) and thus people might be more inclined to follow a
low-pitched male leader (Tigue et al., 2012; Banai et al., 2017; O’Connor et al., 2014;
Klofstad, Anderson & Peters, 2012), while women’s dominance is related to social skills such
as cooperativeness (McAllister, 1995; Nettle & Liddle, 2008), which have been linked to high
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vocal pitch (Imhof, 2010; Knowles & Little, 2016). This would explain findings showing that
people find low-pitched men more dominant (Puts et al., 2007; Wolff & Puts, 2010; Collins,
2000), but it would not explain findings of perceived dominance of low-pitched female voices
(B. C. Jones et al., 2010). Perhaps, as it has been suggested, the two vocal cues refer to two
different aspects of dominance: specifically, physical dominance would be linked to a low
voice pitch, and social dominance to a high voice pitch. If this were the case, in a game such
as the investment game, where mutual cooperation leads to mutual benefit, we would expect
participants to invest more money in the compatriots exhibiting a signal of cooperativeness –
trust that the compatriot is going to cooperate – such as high pitch. However, these theories
so far are missing two critical points in their argument. The first is that, while “honest signals”
of reproductive success might still apply today in romantic contexts, humans have gone
through centuries of social evolution, and modern societies (at least those where participants
in recent experiments come from) are not supposed to have the same gender roles, for
example in terms of dominance, that our ancestors had (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Eagly,
Wood & Diekman, 2000). Secondly, as previously mentioned in Section 1.4, we most likely
do not need to activate a “fight or flight” response every time we hear a new speaker, but
rather we change our judgment from first impressions to impressions informed by a speaker’s
behaviour.
Contrarily to vocal pitch, articulation rate is not determined by body size or hormones, but
rather it is context and speaker-specific. In fact, we use rate in our speech differently based
on the formality, affect, mood, communication style, etc. of the situation we are in. Articulation
rate is also affected by individual speaker characteristics such as age, geographic region
of origin, native language, socioeconomic status etc. (Jacewicz et al., 2009; Byrd, 1994;
Hewlett & Rendall, 1998; Verhoeven, De Pauw & Kloots, 2004). It also links back to
information processing theory, according to which it is better to put as much information as
possible in as little speech as possible. Confirming this theory, it was famously demonstrated
that frequent words (such as pronouns or prepositions) are shorter than less frequent words
(Zipf, 2012; Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 2011). Stemming from this, one could argue that
speaking faster allows to include more information in less time, and should therefore be
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the preferred method of communication. However, speaking fast can also give rise to
phenomena such as sound reduction and elision (Gay, 1981; J. L. Miller, 1981; Uchanski,
Choi, Braida, Reed & Durlach, 1996), which might impair speech comprehension. After all,
speakers speak in order to be understood, so it should be in their interest to convey as clear
a message as possible. From this point of view, a clear, slow articulation rate might signal
a speaker’s competence and knowledge and might be trusted more than a fast speaker,
who might be perceived as trying to prevent counter-arguing (N. Miller et al., 1976). On the
other hand, speaking faster might also be seen as a corollary of greater conversational effort
(Gussenhoven, 2002), and people might be more inclined to trust someone who is putting
effort and energy into the conversation. Results from Experiment 2 support the former
hypothesis, but they are somewhat marginal with respect to the stronger effect of pitch.
The current chapter will discuss whether specific rate manipulations influence participants’
implicit trust.
From the literature mentioned before, it seems that there is enough evidence to claim
that vocal characteristics affect judgments of economic trustworthiness/cooperativeness,
although their origin, and whether or not they are maintained in time, is uncertain.
While it has been shown that very little time is necessary to form first impressions (Zebrowitz
& Collins, 1997; McAleer et al., 2014; Willis & Todorov, 2006), it is also true that exposure
time increases accuracy and confidence in personality judgements (Blackman & Funder,
1998; Ambady et al., 1999; Carney et al., 2007; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Furthermore, it is
also well known that interactants will adapt to each other’s behaviour, gesture, and speech
over time (Accommodation Theory, see Burgoon et al., 2007; Giles & Powesland, 1997);
because of this continuous adaptation, behaviours dynamically change in response to affect,
speaking partner, and environment (Elkins & Derrick, 2013). Evidence of attitude change
also comes from Contact Theory: intergroup interactions, real or imagined, have been found
to reduce initial prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Crisp & Turner, 2009; Wright et al.,
1997), both in adults and in children (Cameron et al., 2006). Similar trends have been found
for accents (Adank et al., 2013). Thus, while it is clear that personality attributions change
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with experience, it is still not clear how voice-based first impressions change when interacting
with behaviour and experience. The experiments presented in this thesis can help elucidate
the matter. If a speaker’s voice elicited immediate implicit trusting behaviours by itself, we
would see differences in investments to the different virtual players from the first round of the
game, when participants have no information about the virtual player’s actions. This was
not the case for the first experiment, where there were no differences in investments to the
SSBE and Liverpool accent during the first round of the game. In the second experiment,
instead, differences in investments to the different speakers emerged from the first round.
More crucially though, the judgments were built and reinforced over time, and differed based
on the virtual player’s actions. This chapter will discuss the effect of vocal cues on trust more
in depth, and whether they have an effect on first impressions, their effect is built over time,
or both.
This chapter presents results from an experiment aimed at studying more in depth the effect
of speakers’ prosodic characteristics – pitch and articulation rate – on implicit judgments of
trustworthiness.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
Participants were 120 native British English speakers (100 females, 20 males) aged 18-
46 (median = 19, SD = 3.67). They were university students who received course credit
for participation. Their geographic origins were reported as: southwest England (n = 69),
southeast England (n = 26), Midlands (n = 11), East Anglia (n = 5), Wales (n = 4), Yorkshire
(n = 2), northwest England (n = 1), northeast England (n = 1) and the Channel Islands
(n = 1).
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6.2.2 Stimuli
Two of the speakers who had previously been recorded for the first and second experiment
– the male SSBE speaker from Experiment 1 and one of the female SSBE speakers from
Experiment 2 – were used as baseline for the voices of the current experiment. The f0 and
articulation rate of each recorded utterance was then manipulated using the software for
phonetic analyses Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2017). In particular, the pitch was raised or
lowered by 15% (high or low pitch) and the articulation rate was sped up or slowed down
by 10% (fast and slow rate). Pitch and rate were manipulated using the Pitch-Synchronous
Overlap Add (PSOLA) algorithm (Moulines & Charpentier, 1990). This method allows to
compress or expand the time or frequency domains of the speech signal with very few
changes in the other domain, and has been widely used in speech perception studies (e.g.
Re et al., 2012). A summary of the original and manipulated vocal pitch and rate can be
found in Table 5.
Female Male
Original f0 (Hz) 229 122
Raised f0 (Hz) 265 141
Lowered f0 (Hz) 198 107
Original rate (Syll/sec) 4.3 4.1
Increased rate (syll/sec) 4.6 4.38
Decreased rate (Syll/sec) 4.04 3.95
Table 5: Original and manipulated vocal properties.
6.2.3 Procedure
The experiment followed the same procedure as the previous two experiments. Each
participant engaged in two games, one for each pitch, rate, speaker and behaviour condition
(generous/mean), with a different block of 20 utterances heard for each version of the game.
The experiment was counterbalanced in a 2 (pitch: high or low) by 2 (rate: fast or slow)
by 2 (behaviour: generous or mean) within-subject design. Furthermore, the gender of the
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speaker was different in each game played, and the order of appearance of male or female
voices was randomized. The game rounds proceeded as in the previous experiments.
After completing the 20 rounds of the game participants were asked to complete a short
questionnaire. Firstly, participants were played 8 utterances taken from the full set of
vocal manipulation conditions, and were asked to rate them for naturalness using a Likert-
type scale (1 = very unnatural, 7 = very natural). In order to compare the perceived
naturalness of the manipulated utterances with the original ones, participants were also
played 2 original utterances, together with the manipulated ones. The order of presentation
of all the utterances was randomized across participants. Finally, participants completed a
short background questionnaire, where they were asked their age, gender, city of origin, and
what accent they spoke. As a final question, participants were also asked what accent they
would like a robot to have; this is discussed in full later, in Section 8.5. This data was kept
anonymous, and was used to group participants into the 5 regions described above. The
total duration of the experiment was approximately 20 minutes.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Investment game
To determine the effects of game behaviour and vocal manipulations on investments, a
mixed-effects linear model was fitted to the data using forward stepwise selection, selecting
each successive predictor according to the lowest AIC (Aho et al., 2014). Investment was
the dependent variable; behaviour, game turn, f0, articulation rate and speaker gender were
predictors; participant id and sentence block were random factors.
There was a main effect of behaviour, with an average investment of £5.6 to the generous
virtual player and of £2.8 to the mean virtual player (2(1) = 2007; p < :001). There was
also a main effect of game turn (2(1) = 193:45; p < :001), with higher overall investments
in the second half of the game, and a significant interaction between behaviour and game
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turn (2(1) = 73:013; p < :001): as in previous experiments, investments increase in the
generous condition and decrease and then increase in the mean condition as the game
progresses (Figure 15).
Figure 15: Average investments in the generous and mean condition.
There was also a main effect of pitch (2(1) = 44:58; p < :001), with higher overall invest-
ments with high pitch, a main effect of speaker (2(1) = 4:63; p = :031), with higher overall
investments for the female speaker, and a main effect of rate (2(1) = 5:25; p = :022), with
higher overall investments in the slow rate condition. There was also an interaction between
game turn and articulation rate (2(1) = 14:71; p < :001); as can be seen from Figure 16,
participants invest higher amounts in the slow rate condition in the second half of the game.
There was also a marginally significant three-way interaction between pitch, speaker and
behaviour (2(4) = 9:33; p = :053). As shown in Figure 17, while investments in the
generous condition remain relatively similar, in the mean condition the highest investments
go to the female high-pitched voice, followed by the male high-pitched voice, the female
low-pitched voice and finally the male low-pitched voice. A post-hoc mixed-effects model split
in the two behaviour condition, and using pitch and speaker gender as predictors, confirmed
this trend. Specifically, there was no main effect of pitch or speaker, and no interaction
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Figure 16: Investments over time in the two rate conditions
between the two, in the generous condition, while there was a main effect of pitch in the
mean condition (2(1) = 4:98; p = :026).
Finally, there was a three-way interaction between pitch, rate and game turn (2(2) =
25:7; p < :001). As shown in Figure 18, investments in the slow rate conditions increase
rapidly in the second half of the game, but only if paired with high pitch. This was confirmed
by a post-hoc mixed-effects model fitted with game turn and rate as predictors, split in
the two pitch conditions. In the high pitch condition, there was a main effect of game
turn (2(1) = 150:23; p < :001) as well as an interaction between game turn and rate
(2(1) = 37:1; p < :001). On the other hand, in the low pitch condition there was only a
main effect of game turn (2(1) = 88:76; p < :001).
In order to determine whether speaker judgments were formed from the very beginning
of the game, a post-hoc mixed-effects model was fitted only on the data regarding the
first round of the game. Investment was the dependent variable; f0, articulation rate and
speaker gender were predictors, and participant id and sentence block were random factors.
Behaviour was not included as a predictor, since information about the virtual player’s actions
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Figure 17: Investments divided by pitch and gender
Figure 18: Investments over time divided by rate, in the high (left plot) and low pitch (right
plot) conditions
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is only discernible from the second round of the game on. Only a model with f0 as predictor
provided significantly better fit to the data than the null model (2(1) = 8:72; p = :003).
Thus, it seems that pitch was the only vocal cue that elicited higher investments from the
beginning, with participants investing more in the high-pitched speakers from the first round
of the game.
6.3.2 Naturalness questionnaire
Due to a technical error, the naturalness ratings of 8 participants were not recorded; therefore,
the sample size for this part of the experiment is of 112 individuals.
To determine if there were any systematic differences in the naturalness ratings of the
various utterances, a mixed-effects linear model was fitted to the data using forward stepwise
selection, selecting each successive predictor according to the lowest AIC. The naturalness
rating was the dependent variable; modified pitch and rate were predictors; participant id,
sentence id and speaker gender were random factors. Since this questionnaire was meant
as a verification that the speech manipulations did not affect the quality of the signal, speaker
gender was considered a random factor for this analysis.
Neither pitch nor rate had an effect on the naturalness ratings (2(2) = 1:22; p = :54 and
2(2) = 1:97; p = :37, respectively), although there was a non-significant tendency to rate
slowed-down speech as less natural (mean naturalness rating for fast rate = 4.04, mean
naturalness rating for slow rate = 3.63).
6.4 Discussion
This experiment was intended as a deeper examination of the effect of prosodic cues on trust
attributions, after the results from Experiment 2 indicated that pitch and rate might contribute
to them. Agent’s behaviour, time, higher pitch, slower articulation rate and female voice all
contributed to increased trust attributions in the investment game.
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6.4.1 Effect of gender
Regarding the difference between female and male voices per se, female voices were per-
ceived as more trustworthy than male ones. Given the highly controversial and contradictory
nature of research on trust attributions to genders, this result necessarily supports some
previous studies and contrasts others (for a review, see Buchan et al., 2008). While studies
on personality attributions based on voice mostly rely on explicit measures, gender studies
have used implicit measures of trustworthiness similar to the investment game used here.
Thus, it seems reasonable to compare the current result with previous studies employing
similar economic games. In the past, several studies used one-shot investment games with
partners whose gender was known to the participants. Their results either showed that
females were perceived as more trustworthy than males (Buchan et al., 2008; Eckel &
Wilson, 2005), or that there were no differences in trustworthiness based on the partner’s
gender (Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2007; Eckel & Wilson, 2003). Also, participants in
the one shot investment game used in Boenin and Serra (2009) returned more money to
partners of the same sex. As noted earlier, the majority of participants who took part in the
current experiment were females, so it is possible that the higher trustworthiness that was
found for the female voice was actually masking a same-sex preference. Since mixed-effects
models are robust to outliers and to groups of different sizes (Quené & Van den Bergh,
2008), the final model was compared to a post-hoc model which included participant’s
gender as a predictor of investment. The second model did not result in a better fit for the
data (2(1) = 0:032; p = :86), nor were there any interactions between participant gender,
speaker gender, and pitch, thus suggesting that female and male participants behaved
similarly in the game. As such, there is consistent evidence to suggest that females might
be implicitly perceived as more trustworthy than males, and that these attributions might be
generalisable across information channels: while in the present study the auditory channel
was used, participants in previous research were either given a photograph of the game
partner (Eckel & Wilson, 2005), or could imply their partner’s gender by their name (Buchan
et al., 2008).
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As mentioned earlier, trust is a lower-level trait of agreeableness (Ashton & Lee, 2005), one
of the Big Five personality traits (McCrae, 2009; Pervin, 2001). A recent research on Theory
of Mind (Nettle & Liddle, 2008) argued that the higher agreeableness score associated with
women in their study might be explained culturally, since females need(ed) social bonds more
than males, for example when bringing up offspring. On the contrary, men’s reproductive
success depends on their status (Pollet & Nettle, 2008; Nettle & Liddle, 2008). Men are
therefore led to increase their status, even at the cost of sacrificing their agreeableness
(Nettle & Liddle, 2008). It is therefore plausible that a characteristic that is both socially
(Borkowska & Pawlowski, 2011; Puts, Barndt, Welling, Dawood & Burriss, 2011; Ko, Judd
& Blair, 2006) and physically (Titze, 1989) linked to agreeableness/femininity, such as high
pitch, might be consistently linked to implicit trustworthiness judgments.
6.4.2 Effect of pitch
A high-pitched voice overall increased participants’ trust attributions, similarly to results from
Experiment 2. This is consistent with previous research using economic games (O’Connor
& Barclay, 2017; Montano et al., 2017), cooperativeness ratings (Knowles & Little, 2016)
and some trustworthiness ratings (O’Connor & Barclay, 2017). On the other hand, the
current result contrasts with previous research on the effect of pitch on trust attributions as
measured through leadership (e.g. in voting behaviour: Tigue et al., 2012; Klofstad et al.,
2012) and other trustworthiness ratings (Apple et al., 1979; Tsantani, Belin, Paterson &
McAleer, 2016). None of these studies measured trust as monetary investments in the
game, so it is possible that we all measured different facets of the same phenomenon, as
previously suggested (O’Connor & Barclay, 2017; Montano et al., 2017; Berg et al., 1995).
Furthermore, economic trust and cooperativeness have been linked to cognitive forms of
interpersonal trust, which refer to traits such as reliability, integrity, honesty, and fairness
of a trustee (McAllister, 1995; Nettle & Liddle, 2008). On the other hand, leadership trust
has been linked to status and dominance (O’Connor et al., 2014), and low vocal pitch in
both male and female voices has been shown to be a sign of dominance (B. C. Jones et al.,
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2010; Puts et al., 2007; Wolff & Puts, 2010; Collins, 2000). Dominance is also related to
evolutionary aspects such as mating behaviours; in this context, low vocal pitch is an “honest
signal” (Fraccaro et al., 2013; Hodges-Simeon, Gurven, Puts & Gaulin, 2014) of bigger body
size and high testosterone levels (Dabbs & Mallinger, 1999; Fitch, 1997; Ohala, 1983; Xu
et al., 2013), which predict reproductive success for males (Apicella et al., 2007; Feinberg,
Jones, Little et al., 2005). This additionally supports the previously mentioned hypothesis that
the greater trustworthiness of voices with higher pitch may be related to the “Size/Frequency
Code” theory (Ohala, 1983, see Section 5.4). This suggests that, from an evolutionary point
of view, a smaller larynx could be perceived as non-threatening (Ohala, 1980; Fitch & Giedd,
1999; Hodges-Simeon et al., 2014). This mechanism is widely used in nonhuman animals
(Fitch, 1999; Hauser, 1993), but evidence shows that human listeners are still able to make
very accurate judgments about speakers’ body sizes as well (D. R. R. Smith, Patterson,
Turner, Kawahara & Irino, 2005). Thus, it is likely that the investment game is linked to social,
cooperative trust, rather than leadership trust, and that high vocal pitch in this context might
be implicitly interpreted as a predisposition to social cooperation. Conversely, low vocal pitch
might be a correlate of leadership trustworthiness. In Experiment 2 only female voices were
used; by extending those results to male voices, it is possible to conclude that higher f0
increases implicit perceived trustworthiness in both genders.
The effect of speaker gender is consistent with previous research that found that high pitch
in female voices elicited higher trustworthiness judgments (O’Connor & Barclay, 2017), and
with results from Experiment 2 in this thesis, where female speakers with high pitch received
higher amounts of money in the investment game. Participants invested more money with
female speakers who had a naturally high pitch in Experiment 2 – compared to other natural
voices – and with a female speaker who had an artificially increased pitch – compared to the
same voice with an artificially decreased pitch. Thus, it appears that the effect of pitch for
female voices might be independent from other voice characteristics, such as voice quality
or pitch range, which remained the same in the two manipulated versions of the voice used
in the current experiment.
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High-pitched female voices are also consistently linked to attractiveness judgments, which
relate to mate selection (Borkowska & Pawlowski, 2011; Feinberg et al., 2008). For example,
it was found that male listeners consider altered high-pitched female voices more attractive
(Fraccaro et al., 2013), even when their pitch is manipulated to be very high (Re et al., 2012).
Since it has been argued that, over evolutionary time, women have maximised their survival
by strengthening social bonds (Nettle & Liddle, 2008), it seems plausible that a “non-threat
signal” such as high pitch might have evolved to be a corollary of high trustworthiness as
well.
This result also supports the relation between high pitch and positive traits on male voices
reported in previous studies. For instance, McAleer et al. (2014) found that male voices with
a relatively high pitch (close to an average female pitch) were perceived as having more
valence. In a comparison of charismatic and non charismatic speakers, both Rosenberg
and Hirschberg (2005) and Niebuhr et al. (2016) found that high pitch was one of the
characteristics that stood out in the most charismatic male speaker’s acoustic profile. Also,
in some early vocal manipulation studies, it was found that raised pitch in male voices was
rated more positively (Brown, Strong & Rencher, 1973; Brown, Strong & Rencher, 1974).
However, a few studies reported opposite results of preferences towards male speakers with
low pitch. In Apple et al. (1979) high-pitched, slow male voices were rated particularly “non
truthful”; also, male and female participants voted for male candidates with low pitch voices,
both in a simulated election scenario (Tigue et al., 2012), and in actual elections (Banai
et al., 2017).
It is also possible that individual differences account for the effect of speaker gender and
pitch. In fact, previous studies suggest that male and female participants might prefer a
higher or a lower-pitched voice based on the speaker gender, with female speakers generally
preferring low-pitched male voices, and male participants favouring high-pitched female
voices (Re et al., 2012; Saxton et al., 2006; Hodges-Simeon et al., 2010; O’Connor &
Barclay, 2017; Riding et al., 2006). The participant sample for this experiment does not
allow to make inferences about such individual differences, given the disparity of female and
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male participants. However, if female participants overall preferred a low-pitched male voice,
as suggested in the research mentioned above, we would see an interaction between pitch,
speaker gender and participant gender in the present data, which we do not. Thus, it seems
that vocal preferences might cease to be gender-specific in implicit tests of trustworthiness.
The absence of an interaction between speaker gender and pitch also suggests that vocal
signals of trust might be the same across genders. At the same time, women’s f0 are
generally higher than men’s, so the results suggest that people might find high-pitched male
voices and high-pitched female voices trustworthy. Thus, pitch might be relative to stereotype
for each gender, rather than an absolute cue.
6.4.3 Effect of articulation rate
A slower articulation rate predicted higher monetary investments in the game. This supports
previous findings on the characteristics of charismatic speech (Niebuhr et al., 2016), while
contrasting with others (Jiang & Pell, 2017; Rosenberg & Hirschberg, 2005). The effect
of rate found here also supports results from Experiment 2, where it was shown that, after
removing an outlier, slower articulation rate predicted higher investments in the game. Again,
results from the present experiment expand from the results of the previous one, where the
speakers happened to have a naturally fast or slow rate in comparison with other speakers.
Here, a speaker’s rate was manipulated in order to be faster or slower while maintaining all
other voice characteristics constant. Thus, it seems that also the effect of articulation rate
might be independent of other voice characteristics. Interestingly, in the present experiment
there was an interaction between pitch, rate and game turn, with the combination high pitch
and slow rate eliciting higher investments particularly in the second half of the game. This
seems to suggest that, while the two vocal cues might overall evoke positive impressions
independent of each other, a combination of the two might increase trust after an initial
learning period.
As previously mentioned in Section 5.4, the results on articulation rate might be explained
in terms of the “Effort Code” account of phonetic universals (Gussenhoven, 2002). This
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suggests that careful pronunciation of speech, for example through a slow articulation rate,
can signal cooperativeness. It could also be due to low-level speech similarities between
participants and speakers, since the majority of participants in the present experiment
reported being from the South West of England, where local accents have generally a slow
rate of speech (Roach, 1998; Wells, 1982; Giles & Powesland, 1997). Another interpretation
might come from regulatory-fit theory (Higgins, 2000), described in Section 5.4.
6.4.4 Effect of time
The effect of prosodic cues over time is consistent with results from previously presented
experiments, suggesting that trust attributions are dependent on speaker’s behaviour, and
at the same time participants maintain their preference towards one or another speaker. In
Experiment 2 it was found that the effect of vocal pitch on investments decreased over time,
as the game progressed. Here it appears that the effect of pitch remains constant throughout
the game, while the effect of rate takes some time to develop fully.
6.4.5 Naturalness ratings
Regarding the naturalness ratings, it is interesting to see how none of the stimuli, including
the original utterances, were rated as particularly high on naturalness. On the contrary,
the mean rating for all the stimuli was around 4, on a scale where 1 corresponded to “very
unnatural” and 7 to “very natural”. Since there were no differences between the natural,
original utterances and the manipulated ones in their perceived naturalness, it can be
excluded that the digital alterations corrupted the audio signal to the point of becoming
artificial-sounding. Participants heard utterances belonging to all the stimuli conditions, and
were asked to “rate how natural the speaker’s voice sound[ed]”. The instructions had this
wording in order to prevent participants from rating the semantic content of the utterances,
and such instructions are common in speech perception studies (to name a few: Tsantani
et al., 2016; Fraccaro et al., 2013; Babel et al., 2014). It would be possible to further
investigate this doubt by masking the semantic content of these utterances, for example by
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reversing them (Munro, Derwing & Burgess, 2010; Scherer, Ladd & Silverman, 1984), and
ask participants to rate these non-utterances in terms of naturalness. However, given that
the main purpose of the naturalness questionnaire was to make sure that the manipulations
did not produce artificial or non-human sounding stimuli, resulting in the potential loss of
ecological validity, and that the instruction wording is a common used methodology, I am
satisfied with the current results.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented results of an experiment looking at the effect of manipulated vocal
cues on implicit trustworthiness attributions. It was shown that high pitch and slow articulation
rate increase participants’ investments in the game, and that this effect is maintained over
time. Also, participants invested more money with the female speaker than the male speaker.
While the effect of high pitch was manifest from the first round of the game, the effect of
rate and speaker gender became apparent after some time. Taken together with results
of Experiment 2, these results suggest that people do pay implicit attention to vocal cues,
and that these shape our perceptions of a speaker from the very first moment. These
impressions are subsequently either reinforced or overturned in time, as we get to know the
speaker through his/her actions. Also, some cues, such as articulation rate, start having an
effect on implicit impressions only after some time. This again highlights the importance of
using a methodology that allows to capture the process of formation and development of
personality attributions. Finally, it seems that there is a particular sensitivity to vocal cues
that are presumably extremely different from what one is used to, such as very slow speech
rate. While a moderately slow rate increased perceptions of trustworthiness, this tendency
stopped after an “uncanny” boundary was crossed (see the particularly slow speaker in
Experiment 2), after which participants’ discomfort was revealed through low investments (in
Experiment 2) and low naturalness ratings (in the current experiment).
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Together with Experiment 2, these results also suggest that pitch in particular plays a very
important role in implicit trustworthiness perception. A higher pitch – relative to a speaker’s
average pitch – is also a cue to emotional expression, for example through smiling (Torre,
2014). Previous research has shown that smiling faces increase trustworthiness attributions,
both explicitly and implicitly (Scharlemann et al., 2001). Since smiling can be heard from
the speech signal alone (Tartter & Braun, 1994), it would be reasonable to assume that a
“smiling voice” would increase trustworthiness judgments as well. However, no research so
far has examined the impact of smiling while speaking on implicit trustworthiness attributions.
Results of an experiment aimed at studying the effect of smiling voice through the investment
game are presented in the next chapter.
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7 Experiment 4 — Smiling voice
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter dealt with how suprasegmental characteristics of the voice, in particular
pitch and articulation rate, influence implicit trustworthiness judgments. Apart from providing
the listener with information about the speaker’s physical qualities (such as gender and
age), though, these characteristics also contribute to conveying the emotional states that the
speaker is in. Speaking very fast, for example, can be a sign of agitation or anxiety, while
speaking slowly can inform the listener that the speaker is calm, or bored (Scherer, 1987).
As will be discussed below, “halo effect” theories suggest that people displaying a positive
emotion will be attributed other positive traits, too, for example trustworthiness. What is
not clear is how a positive emotion expressed in the audio channel will mediate these halo
effects. This chapter presents an account of an audible signal which is poignant with positive
emotional expression – smiling – and shows results from an investment game where the
smiling voice of a virtual agent is manipulated, in order to determine whether, and how, this
expression influences implicit trust.
Emotional expressions are essential aspects of social interaction, so much that having diffi-
culties in producing or perceiving them can be a sign of mental illness (Russell, Bachorowski
& Fernández-Dols, 2003; C. G. Kohler, Turner, Gur & Gur, 2004). Even though emotions
can be felt without being overtly expressed, and without being in an interactive context, it
is believed that one of their original functions was essentially interpersonal and social, to
alert others in a group about a change in the environment (Ekman, 1999). Thus, emotional
displays help inform others about what actions to take (Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead,
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2010; Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde & Svejda, 1983). This hypothesis is supported by
the fact that every human society has a concept of emotions and is able to recognize them
(Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, 1992; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Scherer & Wallbott,
1994; Bryant et al., 2016; Izard, 1969; Scherer, Banse & Wallbott, 2001). Nevertheless,
there are differences in the way they are expressed (Brody, 2000; Matsumoto, 1993) and
experienced (Rosaldo, 1984; Kitayama, Mesquita & Karasawa, 2006). Importantly, it has
been argued that emotional expressivity – i.e. the capacity of displaying emotions at varying
intensities – facilitates social communication, and is therefore a winning evolutionary strategy
(Boone & Buck, 2003). Thus, individuals who are able to display and detect emotions
accurately might be at an advantage in human societies.
Emotional expressivity is also linked to attractiveness and other positive traits (Sabatelli &
Rubin, 1986; Reis et al., 1990), including cooperation and trustworthiness (Schug et al.,
2010; Lount, 2010). Conversely, being able to detect trustworthy individuals might be a
critical component in the evolution of cooperation (Russell et al., 2003; Boone & Buck, 2003).
As a consequence, nonverbal expressions such as emotional displays might be “honest
signals” of trustworthiness (Boone & Buck, 2003; Schug et al., 2010). However, while a
significant amount of research has been conducted on trust as a rational behaviour, not
much has been dedicated to study the influence of emotion on trust (Lount, 2010). Also,
if displays of emotions play such a crucial role in the detection of trustworthiness, would
emotions expressed in the auditory channel also influence trustworthiness perception?
One emotional expression that seems universal to humans and other animals is smiling
(Mehu & Dunbar, 2008; van Hooff, 1972), which is produced by moving muscles in the mouth
and eye regions (Eisenbarth & Alpers, 2011). As previously mentioned (see Section 5.4),
a relatively small body size can be a sign of non-threat; for this reason, Ohala (1980)
hypothesised that retracting the lips, which produces smiling in the lower part of the face,
might have a become a sign of submission and non-threat because the corresponding sound
made with a raised pitch might suggest a smaller body size. This facial expression is also
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similar to the “silent bared-teeth” display – which can still be observed in certain monkeys –
which is a signal of submission (Preuschoft, 1992).
In human interaction, genuine or “Duchenne” smiles (Ekman, Davidson & Friesen, 1990)
are mostly considered expressions of positive emotions such as happiness, joy, amusement
or friendliness (K. J. Kohler, 2008; Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Thompson & Meltzer, 1964;
Messinger, Fogel & Dickson, 2001). However, smiles can also be false, derisive or sad
(Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Ambadar, Cohn & Reed, 2008).
In terms of person perception, displaying positive emotions is generally associated with
positive trait attributions. For example, in a series of experiments with Chinese (Lau, 1982),
Brazilian (Otta, Lira, Delevati, Cesar & Pires, 1994) and American participants (Reis et al.,
1990; Mueser, Grau, Sussman & Rosen, 1984), it was found that pictures of smiling faces
were rated higher in terms of attractiveness, friendliness and sincerity, among other traits, as
compared to neutral faces. Looking specifically at trust, Elkins and Derrick (2013) found that
participants rated a smiling Embodied Conversational Agent as more trustworthy than a non-
smiling one. In an experiment using a trust game with three possible moves, Scharlemann
et al. (2001) found that participants trusted counterparts who were represented as smiling
photographs more than non-smiling ones. Also, participants in Krumhuber et al. (2007)’s
study indicated that avatars displaying an authentic smile might be more cooperative in a
trust game; subsequently, participants proceeded to invest more money with them in an
actual one-shot game.
There are a few theories on the reason why displaying a positive emotion leads to the
attribution of another positive trait, such as cooperativeness or trustworthiness. After findings
that smiling faces elicited positive trait attributions, Lau (1982) argued that this could be
due to a “halo effect”: smiling is good, so people who smile must possess other good traits,
too. Similarly, Penton-Voak, Pound, Little and Perrett (2006) concluded that people with
facial features that elicit attributions of agreeableness may be treated as more trustworthy
and may consequently develop more agreeable personality characteristics. This has been
referred to as the “what is beautiful is good” stereotype (Dion et al., 1972; Reis et al.,
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1990). Additionally, since it has been pointed out that individuals who are particularly
expressive might be less apt at disguising their emotions (DePaulo, Blank, Swaim & Hairfield,
1992), it has been suggested that emotional expressions might be a sign of commitment to
cooperative behaviour (Schug et al., 2010; Frank, 1988). As a consequence, individuals
who display emotions might be seen as less deceptive and more cooperative (Schug et al.,
2010).
Another theory, the “Emotions as Social Information” (EASI) model (Van Kleef et al., 2010),
mentions the importance of context. This model suggests that emotions are used to make
sense of ambiguous situations, and that their effect depends on the situation in which the
interaction takes place, specifically by its cooperative or competitive nature. Thus, displaying
a positive emotion, such as happiness, in a cooperative context will reinforce the parties’
belief that everyone is gaining, and will elicit more cooperative behaviours. On the contrary,
displaying a negative emotion, such as anger, in a cooperative context will hinder future
cooperative behaviours, and so on. Supporting this, Antos, De Melo, Gratch and Grosz
(2011) found that, in a negotiation game, participants selected more often as partners
computer agents that displayed emotions which were congruent with their actions. These
agents were also perceived as more trustworthy than agents whose emotional expression
and action strategy did not match, even though the strategy they had was the same. Thus,
smiling might also have a differential effect based on the context: smiling in a cooperative
situation might elicit further cooperation, while smiling in a competitive situation might elicit
further non-cooperation.
When the visual channel is not present, people are able to detect emotions and emotional
signals, such as smiling, from the voice alone. The occurrence of smiling while speaking
has been given various names, for example "speech-smile" (K. J. Kohler, 2008; El Haddad,
Cakmak, Moinet, Dupont & Dutoit, 2015), "smiled speech" (Émond & Laforest, 2013) or
"smiling voice" (Pickering et al., 2009; Torre, 2014). As stated above, acoustically, smiling
affects the vocal tract by shortening it (Shor, 1978), which contributes to raising the f0 and
formant frequencies (K. J. Kohler, 2008; Tartter, 1980; Drahota, Costall & Reddy, 2008;
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Fagel, 2009; Torre, 2014; Lasarcyk & Trouvain, 2008; Barthel & Quené, 2015). Several
perceptual studies have demonstrated that the presence of smiling is audible in the speech
signal alone (Aubergé & Cathiard, 2003; Torre, 2014; Drahota et al., 2008; Tartter & Braun,
1994), and is even detectable when the speech stimuli had been synthesised (Lasarcyk
& Trouvain, 2008; El Haddad, Cakmak et al., 2015; El Haddad, Dupont, d’Alessandro &
Dutoit, 2015).
Thus, given that smiling can be heard in the voice, and given that smiling might elicit
positive feelings for the reasons discussed above, would a smiling voice elicit increased
monetary investments in the investment game? And how would the smiling interact with
a congruent-positive speaker’s behaviour or with an incongruent-negative one? Van Kleef
et al. (2010)’s EASI model would predict that smiling might increase trustworthiness in a
congruent context (such as a generous behaviour) and decrease it in an incongruent context
(such as a mean behaviour). Thus, a virtual player who displays a positive emotion through
smiling, while returning more money to the participants than he/she invested might increase
a feeling of mutual benefit and cooperation. On the contrary, a smiling virtual player who is
consistently returning less money might increase the feeling that the virtual player is gaining
at the participant’s expense (Van Kleef et al., 2010; Lanzetta & Englis, 1989). Additionally,
how would the presence or absence of smiling voice interact with other audible speaker
characteristics, such as accent?
Accent Smiling Behaviour
1 SSBE Smiling Generous
2 SSBE Smiling Mean
3 SSBE Non-Smiling Generous
4 SSBE Non-Smiling Mean
5 Birmingham Smiling Generous
6 Birmingham Smiling Mean
7 Birmingham Non-Smiling Generous
8 Birmingham Non-Smiling Mean
Table 6: Experimental conditions of the investment game. Accent and smiling were coun-
terbalanced across participants so that each participant would play one game for each
accent and smiling condition, while behaviour was counterbalanced so that all possible
combinations (including playing e.g. two mean games) were allowed.
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This chapter deals with the effect of vocal emotional cues on implicit judgments of trust-
worthiness, and with their interaction with other indexical and behavioural cues. It presents
results of an investment game where participants played with virtual agents which were
associated with different accents and smiling conditions. In particular, participants played
with virtual agents which had either a Standard Southern British English or a Birmingham
accent, which were either smiling or not, and which were behaving either generously or
meanly. A summary of the experimental conditions can be found in Table 6.
7.2 Method
7.2.1 Participants
Participants were 110 native British English speakers (85 females, 24 males) aged 18-48
(median = 19, SD = 5.5). They were university students who received course credit for
participation. Their geographic origins were reported as: southwest England (n = 61),
southeast England (n = 27), Midlands (n = 9), Wales (n = 5), East Anglia (n = 3), northwest
England (n = 2), northeast England (n = 1). One participant was excluded due to not being
a native of the British Isles, and the data from another one were not recorded due to a
technical error. Therefore, only the data of 108 participants were analysed.
7.2.2 Stimuli
Recordings were obtained from two female SSBE speakers and two Birmingham speakers.
Each speaker was recorded in a sound-proof recording room reading two 20-sentence
blocks each (see Appendix A. After they were recorded reading the sentences in their typical,
“straight” voice, they were asked to re-read the sentences while sounding “amused”. In order
to elicit genuine amusement, the speakers were shown a selection of funny videos available
on-line. These are common procedures used to elicit smiling voice (e.g. El Haddad, Cakmak
et al., 2015). A researcher was in the same room of the speakers during the recordings,
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making sure that they were consistent while reading in the two conditions, and asking them
to repeat the recordings in case they were not.
Apart from the presence of the researcher, the fact that the smiling recordings sounded more
“amused” than the typical ones was validated by ratings in the post-game questionnaire
that participants completed (see section 7.2.3). Furthermore, f0 measurements of the two
sets of recordings, obtained with Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2017), show that the smiling
recordings had a statistically higher f0 than the non-smiling ones (mean smiling f0 = 206
Hz, mean non-smiling f0 = 191 Hz; t(317:23) = 10:38; p < :001), as shown in Figure 19. As
mentioned before, raised f0 is a typical characteristic of smiling voice (K. J. Kohler, 2008;
Tartter, 1980; Drahota et al., 2008; Fagel, 2009; Torre, 2014; Lasarcyk & Trouvain, 2008;
Barthel & Quené, 2015).
Figure 19: Average f0 in the smiling and typical recordings.
The articulation rate was also significantly faster in the smiling condition (mean smiling
rate = 4.36 syllables/second, mean non-smiling rate = 4.21 syllables/second; t(316:92) =
2:37; p = :018), although this feature has rarely been investigated in studies on the acoustics
of smiling voice.
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7.2.3 Procedure
The experiment followed the same procedure as the previous three experiments (see
chapters 4, 5, and 6). Each participant engaged in two games, one for each accent, smiling
and behaviour condition (generous/mean), with a different block of 20 utterances heard for
each version of the game. The experiment was counterbalanced in a 2 (accent: SSBE
or Birmingham) by 2 (voice: smiling or non-smiling) within subject design. Furthermore,
the behaviour (generous or mean) condition was counterbalanced across participants in
all possible combinations, so that some participants played two consecutive games with
the same behaviour condition. The sentence block and speaker number were randomized
across participants. The game rounds proceeded as in the previous experiments.
After completing the first game, participants answered a few questions about the virtual
player they had just played with, on a 7-item Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree). The questions were taken from Rau et al. (2009): “This person was sincere”; “This
person was interested in talking with me”; “This person wanted me to trust her”; “This person
was honest in communicating with me”. Again, these questions were intended to act as a
safety check that participants had explicitly understood the behaviour of the virtual player
and, consequently, how the game worked. The same questions were asked again at the end
of the second game. After completing the second game and after answering these questions
related to the second speaker they heard, participants were played 10 utterances from one
of the speakers they had just heard, chosen at random, and asked to rate them in terms of
how happy they sounded, on a 7-item Likert scale (1 = very unhappy, 7 = very happy). Then,
participants were asked to rate how much they liked the voice they had just heard, on a 7-item
Likert scale (1 = strongly dislike, 7 = strongly like). The same questions (happy-sounding
and voice-liking) were then asked about the other speaker they heard in the game. This
was done to confirm that the smiling and amusement could indeed be heard in the recorded
voices. They were then asked to state the reason behind their answer. Then they were
asked to identify the accent of the speakers they heard. Like in Experiment 2, they were
given a list of possible accents to choose from, including the two correct answers, 5 incorrect
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answers, and “Other” and “Don’t know”. The option for the SSBE accent was described as
“Standard English”. Finally, participants completed a short background questionnaire, where
they were asked their age, gender, city of origin, and what accent they spoke. As a final
question, participants were also asked what accent they would like a robot to have; this is
discussed in full later, in Section 8.5. The total duration of the experiment was approximately
20 minutes.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Investment game
Unfortunately, due to a technical error which was only discovered at the data analysis stage,
participants only heard one Birmingham speaker, “Birmingham 2” in the generous condition,
and the other, “Birmingham 1” in the mean condition. The SSBE speakers were correctly
played in both conditions. This leads to a confound between the Birmingham speakers and
the behaviour condition. In order to deal with this, the full dataset was analysed as if there
was only one speaker for each accent, as was the case in Experiment 1 – thus, the speaker
variable was not added to the main model. As a secondary analysis, a model was also fitted
to a subset of the original data without the Birmingham condition, in order to, at least partially,
examine the SSBE speakers’ idiosyncrasies in relation to the smiling conditions.
To determine the effects of game behaviour and voice on investments, a mixed-effects linear
model was fitted to the data using forward stepwise selection, selecting each successive
predictor according to the lowest AIC (Aho et al., 2014). Investment was the dependent
variable; behaviour, game turn, accent and smiling were predictors; subject and sentence
block – i.e. the two different sets of 20 recorded sentences each – were random factors.
There was a main effect of behaviour, with an average investment of £5.63 to the generous
virtual player and of £3.31 to the mean virtual player (2(1) = 1135; p < :001). There was
also a main effect of game turn (2(1) = 276:37; p < :001), with higher overall investments
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in the second half of the game, and a significant interaction between behaviour and game
turn (2(1) = 27:32; p < :001): as in previous experiments, investments increase in the
generous condition and decrease initially, and then increase, in the mean condition as the
game progresses (Figure 20).
Figure 20: Average investments in the generous and mean conditions.
There was also a main effect of smiling, with participants investing more in the smiling voice
than the non-smiling voice (mean overall investments to smiling voice = £4.58, to non-smiling
voice = £4.38; 2(1) = 13:65; p < :001). There was no main effect of accent, however.
There was a significant three-way interaction between behaviour, accent and smiling
(2(5) = 34:91; p < :001, Figure 21). An ANOVA was used to analyse this interac-
tion, splitting the data in the two behaviour conditions. In the generous condition, there
was no effect of smiling (F (1; 2176) = 2:78; p = :096), but there was an effect of ac-
cent (F (1; 2176) = 13:75; p < :001), with higher investments to the SSBE virtual player
(mean = £5.81) than to the Birmingham virtual player (mean = £5.46). In the mean condi-
tion, instead, there was a main effect of smiling (F (1; 2136) = 4:37; p = :036), with higher
investments in the smiling (mean = £3.41) than the non-smiling condition (mean = £3.20).
There was also a main effect of accent (F (1; 2136) = 25:92; p < :001), with higher in-
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vestments in the Birmingham virtual player (mean = £3.56) than the SSBE-accented one
(mean = £3.05). There was also a significant interaction between smiling and accent
(F (1; 2136) = 4:79; p = :029): a post-hoc comparison using the Tukey HSD test showed
that investments to the non-smiling Birmingham speaker were significantly higher than to the
non-smiling SSBE speaker (mean = £3.56 and £2.84 respectively, p < .001), that investments
to the smiling Birmingham speaker were significantly higher than to the non-smiling SSBE
speaker (mean = £3.56 and £2.84 respectively, p < :001), and that investments to the smiling
SSBE speaker were higher than to the non-smiling SSBE speaker (mean = £3.27 and £2.84
respectively, p = :012).
Figure 21: Average investments in the two accent and smiling conditions, in the generous
(left) and mean (right) behaviour conditions.
There was also a significant three-way interaction between behaviour, accent and game
turn (2(2) = 17:53; p < :001, Figure 22). A post-hoc ANOVA showed that, in the generous
condition, there was a main effect of game turn (F (1; 2176) = 168:87; p < :001), with
investments increasing over time. There was also a main effect of accent (F (1; 2176) =
15:16; p < :001), with higher investments to the SSBE speaker, as mentioned before. In
the mean condition, there was an effect of game turn, with investments decreasing in the
first half of the game and then increasing in the second half of the game (F (1; 2136) =
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39:09; p < :001). There was also a main effect of accent (F (1; 2136) = 26:07; p < :001),
with higher investments to the Birmingham speaker, as mentioned before.
Figure 22: Average investments in the two accents in the generous (top) and mean (bottom)
conditions over time.
As a secondary analysis, a mixed-effects linear model was fitted to a subset of the data not
containing the Birmingham condition. Investment was the dependent variable, behaviour,
game turn, smiling and (SSBE) speaker identity were predictors, and participants and
sentence blocks were random factors. Due to the design of the experiment, this subset of the
original data was completely between-subjects, since participants heard a different accent in
each of the two games they played.
There was a main effect of game turn (2(1) = 149:36; p < :001), with investments in-
creasing over time. There was also a main effect of behaviour (2(1) = 81:89; p < :001),
with higher investments in the generous condition (mean = £5.81) than the mean condi-
tion (mean = £3.06). There was also an interaction between behaviour and game turn
(2(1) = 11:96; p < :001): as shown in Figure 23, investments in the generous condition
increase more steadily at first, and then reach a sort of plateau. In the mean condition
instead, investments decrease initially and then increase in the second half of the game.
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Figure 23: Average investments in the generous and mean conditions in the subsetted data.
There was also a main effect of speaker identity (2(1) = 4:74; p = :029), with higher overall
investments to speaker “SSBE 1” (mean = £4.76) than to speaker “SSBE 2” (mean = £4.11).
There was also an interaction between speaker and game turn (2(1) = 29:76; p < :001):
as shown in Figure 24, initial higher investments to speaker “SSBE 2” are overturned after
the first 3 rounds of the game, and higher investments to speaker “SSBE 1” are maintained
throughout the rest of the game.
There was no effect of smiling, and no interactions.
7.3.2 Questionnaires
Explicit honesty and sincerity evaluations
The numerical answers to the 4 questions about the perceived trustworthiness of the
speaker were the dependent measure in a mixed-effects model with smiling and accent
as predictors and participant as random factor. There was a main effect of behaviour
(2(1) = 134:58; p < :001): participants overall gave higher ratings to the speakers in the
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Figure 24: Average investments in the two SSBE speakers.
generous condition than in the mean condition (mean ratings = 5.13 and 3.55, respectively).
This, together with the result that participants invested more money with the generous
virtual players than the mean players, again confirms that they understood how the virtual
player was behaving and reacted accordingly. There was also a main effect of smiling
(2(1) = 16:69; p < :001): participants gave higher ratings to the smiling virtual player than
to the non-smiling virtual player (mean ratings = 4.61 and 4.09, respectively). There was no
interaction between smiling and behaviour, so this effect of smiling seems to be constant
across behaviour condition. That is to say, no matter how a smiling speaker behaved in the
game, it was still perceived as more honest and sincere than the non-smiling speaker. Finally,
there was a marginally significant effect of accent (2(1) = 3:80; p = :051), suggesting that
participants tended to rate the Birmingham speaker as more honest and sincere than the
SSBE one (mean ratings = 4.47 and 4.22, respectively).
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Happiness rating
A mixed-effects model with happiness rating as dependent variable, smiling and accent
as predictors, and participant and sentence block as random factors was fitted to the
happiness questionnaire data. There was a main effect of the smiling condition (2(1) =
1360:8; p < :001), with participants rating the smiling voice samples as sounding happier
than the non-smiling voice samples (mean rating for smiling voice = 4.9, mean rating for non-
smiling voice = 3.44). There was also a main effect of accent (2(1) = 10:21; p = :0014),
with participants rating the Birmingham speakers as happier than the SSBE speakers
(mean = 4.2 and 4.12, respectively). There was also an interaction between smiling and
accent (2(1) = 5:78; p = :016): as shown in Figure 25, the Birmingham speakers sounds
happier than the SSBE speakers in the non-smiling condition. This might be due to inherent
speaker characteristics such as pitch or pitch range.
Figure 25: Happiness ratings in the two accents and smiling conditions.
This hypothesis is validated by the fact that a second model, built with smiling and speaker
identity as predictors, resulted in main effects of smiling (2(1) = 1360:8; p < :001) and
of speaker identity (2(3) = 117:59; p < :001), but in no interaction between speaker and
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smiling. A comparison between the model with accent and the model with speaker shows
that the latter fits the data better (2(1) = 101:6; p < :001).
A post-hoc Tukey HSD test revealed that speaker “Birmingham 1” sounded significantly
happier than speakers “Birmingham 2”, “SSBE 1” and “SSBE 2” (p < :001; p < :001 and
p = :003, respectively), and that speaker “SSBE 2” sounded significantly happier than
speakers “Birmingham 2” and “SSBE 1” (all p < :001), as shown in Figure 26.
Figure 26: Happiness ratings of the 4 speakers, collapsed across smiling conditions.
Although individual speaker characteristics were not controlled for in this experiment, looking
at them post-hoc might help elucidate on these different speaker ratings. Of the 4 speakers
recorded, “Birmingham 1” had the highest f0 in both smiling and non-smiling recordings, as
shown in Figure 27.
A one-way ANOVA showed that the f0 differed significantly among the 4 speakers (F (3; 316) =
82:9; p < :001). A post-hoc Tukey HSD test revealed that “Birmingham 1”’s f0 was signific-
antly higher than “SSBE 1”’s, “SSBE 2”’s and “Birmingham 2”’s (all p < :001); also, both
“SSBE 1” and “SSBE 2” had a significantly higher f0 than “Birmingham 2” (all p < :001).
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Figure 27: Average f0 of the 4 speakers.
A one-way ANOVA also showed that articulation rate differed significantly among the speak-
ers (F (3; 316) = 2:64; p = :049). A post-hoc Tukey HSD test revealed that the articulation
rate of speaker “Birmingham 2” was faster than the one of speaker “SSBE 1” (mean = 4.37
and 4.14 syllables/second, respectively; p = :49). The articulation rate of all the speakers is
shown in Figure 28.
Thus, speaker “Birmingham 1” had the highest f0, so it is possible that this particular feature
influenced ratings of happiness.
Accent identification
The SSBE accent was correctly identified by 66 out of 108 participants (61%), and 45 cor-
rectly identified the Birmingham accent (42%). Given that participants could choose out of
9 options, in both cases performance was above chance level (cut-off = 11.2%).
137
(Chapter 7) Experiment 4 — Smiling voice
Figure 28: Average rate of the 4 speakers.
Voice liking
A mixed-effects linear model was fitted to the voice liking questionnaire. The rating was
the dependent variable; smiling, accent and speaker were the predictors; participant and
sentence block were random factors. There was a main effect of smiling (2(1) = 63:61; p <
:001), and no effect of accent or speaker: participants liked the smiling voices significantly
more than the non-smiling ones, independent of who was speaking.
7.4 Discussion
This experiment investigated whether positive vocal emotional expression, in the form of
smiling voice, influenced implicit trust attributions, and whether it interacted with other vocal
characteristics (such as accent) and with speaker’s behaviour. Behaviour, game turn and
smiling all influenced monetary investments in the game, while accent did not. In particular,
participants invested more money in the generous condition, investments increased over
time, and there were higher investments to the smiling virtual players.
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The effect of smiling in the game and in the questionnaire adds to previous studies on
emotional expression, showing that the display of a positive emotion increases trust and
likeability also in the verbal channel (Scharlemann et al., 2001; Krumhuber et al., 2007;
Penton-Voak et al., 2006; Lau, 1982). Furthermore, this result extends previous findings to
implicit emotion processing, since the majority of studies on the association between positive
emotion expression and positive traits used only explicit methods such as questionnaires
(Otta et al., 1994; Reis et al., 1990).
Smiling was a main predictor of investments overall. That is to say, while participants
still invested more or less money depending on the other player’s trustworthiness (or lack
thereof), they also overall invested more money in the smiling players. This contrasts with
Van Kleef et al. (2010)’s EASI model, according to which the display of a positive emotion in
an incongruent context (such as the mean behaviour condition) should elicit uncooperative
behaviours. Quite on the contrary, in the current experiment smiling had a somewhat
reduced effect in the congruent, generous condition – as shown by the post-hoc interaction
analysis – and the strongest effect in the mean condition. While Van Kleef et al. (2010) listed
social dilemma tasks based on Prisoner’s Dilemma among possible competitive situations,
it is possible that actual participants in an iterated game might view it as an essentially
cooperative task. Game theoretical implications and speculations about this, and similar
results from the other experiments, are discussed in Section 9.5.
If participants are reluctant to give up on cooperation — as shown by the fact that investments
increase in the second half of the game in the mean condition — they might be even more
reluctant to give up on partners who seem to encourage them to cooperate, with their positive
emotional expression. Krumhuber et al. (2007) found that people explicitly and implicitly
trusted smiling faces more than neutral faces, regardless of the sincerity of their smile, and
that genuine smiles were trusted more than fake smiles. Similarly, Reed, Zeglen and Schmidt
(2012) found that people displaying either Duchenne or non-Duchenne smiles were more
likely to cooperate in a one-shot investment game. Thus, displaying an emotion, even a
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feigned one, might be preferred to not displaying any emotion at all, hence the increased
investments to the mean smiling players.
Another possibility is that participants might have been “infected” by the positive emotion
displayed by the smiling virtual players. In fact, emotional expressions can evoke affective
reactions in observers, which may subsequently influence their behaviour (Hatfield, Cacioppo
& Rapson, 1994), and this “emotional contagion” might well be transmitted through the
auditory channel as well (see Magnée, Stekelenburg, Kemner & de Gelder, 2007). If this is
the case, participants might have trusted smiling players more because, feeling a positive
emotion themselves, this might have prompted them to behave in a cooperative manner
(Schug et al., 2010).
The effect that was found for smiling also suggests that, in the absence of visual information,
the audio equivalent of a Duchenne smile might act as a “honest signal” of cooperation. As
mentioned before, Duchenne smiles are smiles describing genuine joy or amusement (K. J.
Kohler, 2008; Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Thompson & Meltzer, 1964). Traditionally, in the
visual domain they can be distinguished from other types of smiles because they involve the
contraction of the “orbicularis oculi” muscle, which is a movement that is notoriously difficult
to fake (Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Schug et al., 2010). Obviously, in the auditory channel it is
not possible to detect a genuine smiling voice from this muscular movement. However, it is
possible that a smiling voice which sounds amused might well be the auditory equivalent of
a Duchenne smile. As participants indicated that the smiling voices used in this study did
sound amused, there is reason to believe that the expression of amusement in the speech
signal might lead listeners to believe that the speaker can be trusted. Unfortunately, no video
recordings were taken during the audio recording of the speakers used in this experiment. If
a similar study were to be replicated, the actual facial expression of the speakers should be
manipulated in order to determine whether the amused expression in the voice corresponded
to an actual Duchenne smile in the face of the speakers.
The two accents used in the current experiment, SSBE and Birmingham, were also used
in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, these two particular accents had the strongest effect on
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investments, with participants investing the highest amounts of money in the SSBE- and
Birmingham-accented virtual player in the generous condition, and the lowest amounts to
the Birmingham-accented player in the mean condition (see section 5.3.1). In the current
experiment, there was no main effect of accent, but there was an interaction between
accent, behaviour and smiling (Figure 21): in the generous condition, participants invested
more money in the SSBE-accented players, independent of the smiling condition, while in
the mean condition participants invested more money with the smiling virtual players and
with the Birmingham-accented players. Also, in the mean condition participants trusted
a smiling SSBE speaker more than a non-smiling one. Consistent with results shown in
previous chapters, when the situation is beneficial for the participant (generous condition),
stereotypical information that participants might obtain on the basis of voice influences
investment decisions. The standard-accented virtual player is behaving as expected, and is
therefore trusted more; the regional-accented virtual player is not behaving as expected, and
is therefore trusted less. Within these accents, the presence of a display of a positive emotion
increases the feeling of mutual benefit, and leads to a slightly higher trusting behaviour.
On the other hand, when the situation is not working out well (mean condition), positive
emotional cues seem to somehow mitigate the fact that the standard-accented virtual player
is not behaving as expected. This supports the results of Experiment 1, where participants
invested more money in the SSBE-accented player in the generous condition, and more in
the Liverpool-accented player in the mean condition. Again, people might be more trusting
towards an accented-speaker who behaves in an expected way, which is congruent with a
listener’s preconception; on the contrary, accented players who behave incongruously from
what participants might expect of them, given their preconceptions, might be penalized by
investing less money in them.
Still, the overall main effect of smiling suggests that vocal emotional expressions play a
bigger role than speaker’s accent in eliciting perceptions of trustworthiness. This can be
interpreted as evidence of the fact that emotional expressions might be a “honest signal”
of cooperativeness (Boone & Buck, 2003), while indexical information such as a speaker’s
accent might be integrated in the process of impression formation after the emotional
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expressivity has already influenced it. Thus, positive emotional display might override
indexical information when it comes to implicit impression formation.
This experiment presents only incomplete evidence regarding individual speaker’s cues.
From the subset of game data, it was possible to evince that speaker identity played a role in
implicit trust attributions, since participants invested more money in one of the two SSBE
speakers in particular. Also, participants rated one of the two Birmingham speakers as
particularly happy-sounding. This speaker happened to have the highest f0 in both her
smiling and neutral speech. A high f0 positively influenced trust in Experiments 2 and 3, so it
is possible that, if the game data had been complete, participants would have invested more
money in this particular speaker as well. In the absence of such data, it is only possible to
reiterate that impression formation goes beyond indexical information from the voice, and
that other information which is transmitted in an individual’s voice, such as their emotional
state, plays a role in it as well.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented results of an experiment looking at the effect of emotional cues
and speaker’s accent on implicit trustworthiness attributions. A voice showing signs of
a positive emotion – in the form of smiling voice – consistently increased participants’
investments in the game. This effect was constant over time and across the two behaviour
conditions. That is to say, contrary to predictions stated above, people implicitly attribute
trustworthiness to speakers showing a positive emotion in their voice, even when their
behaviour contradicts this impression. On the other hand, while speaker’s accent was not
a main predictor of investments, its interaction with speaker’s behaviour and game turn
suggests that speakers judged initially more reliable may be more severely discredited and
penalized if their behaviour is at odds with first impressions. Similarly to Experiment 1,
speaker’s accent affected how participants reacted to negative behaviour. The SSBE
speaker initially attracted higher investment, but showed a greater drop in investment than
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the regional speaker (Liverpool in Experiment 1, Birmingham here) once the negative pattern
of returns became evident. Within the generous condition, participants apparently trusted
the standard-accented player more. Instead, in the mean condition, participants invested
less in the SSBE-accented player.
The experiments presented so far have shown that different vocal cues influence implicit
trustworthiness attributions which are only partially mediated by the simulated speaker’s
behaviour. In fact, if participants only took into account the virtual player’s behaviour when
deciding how much money to invest, we would see no difference in the relative investments
to the different voices within the two simulated behaviours. However, within this thesis it has
been shown that this is not the case.
This raises important issues in the context of voice-mediated Human-Machine Interaction.
As such interactions become more and more common in our everyday life – vocal personal
assistants like Siri, or robotic elderly care systems, to name a few – it becomes essential
to build voices for these machines that elicit feelings of safety and trust. Furthermore, in
order to make these interactions as smooth and natural as possible, it is necessary to design
such systems’ voices based on the context where the systems will be used. For example,
vocal assistants are essentially just that: a voice. This voice might be studied in isolation,
since it is unlikely that the form of the device that “speaks” it interacts or interferes with it.
On the other hand, machines such as robots have a body that can generally move as well,
and this is likely to interact with the type of voice that users might feel more comfortable with.
For example, both the physical appearance and the voice of elderly care robots might be
designed to elicit feelings of security and knowledge. On the other hand, robots intended
to aid children’s learning might be designed to resemble children’s peers or pets, and so
on. However, while a lot of attention has been dedicated to the physical appearance of
robots, not a lot of research has been conducted on robotic voices, or on how they interact
with the body they are attached to. The next chapter presents results of an experiment in
Human-Robot Interaction aimed at untangling this potential interaction between a voice and
its body.
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8 Experiment 5 — Human-Robot Interaction
8.1 Introduction1
Anthropomorphism — the attribution of human-like physical features or mental states to
other agents (Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007; Złotowski, Strasser & Bartneck, 2014;
Lemaignan, Fink & Dillenbourg, 2014) — is an important topic in Human-Robot Interaction
(HRI) research. Anthropomorphism derives specifically from the human need to control and
predict, and unpredictability increases the tendency to anthropomorphise nonhuman agents
(Waytz et al., 2010). In fact, anthropomorphism increases for agents whose morphology
resembles that of humans, and conversely people tend to project their beliefs and desires on
human-like stimuli (Waytz et al., 2010), and to expect more human-like machines to behave
similarly to humans (B. R. Duffy & Joue, 2004). Anthropomorphism also might change
with experience, as previous research suggests (Fussell, Kiesler, Setlock & Yew, 2008;
Lemaignan et al., 2014). For example, in Fussell et al. (2008), participants rated a robot
as possessing traits, moods and feelings more after they interacted with a robot, than after
they simply imagined one. Thus, interacting with a robot increases its anthropomorphism. In
outlining a formal model of anthropomorphism, Lemaignan et al. (2014) add that, apart from
an interaction, the interaction context also influences the dynamics of anthropomorphism.
Stemming from this, since humans are highly skilled at interacting with other humans, it can
be argued that they will find it easier to interact with human-like machines (Krach et al., 2008).
As previously mentioned, a changing society will need humans to interact successfully with
1This experiment was run in collaboration with Ms. Debora Zanatto of the School of Computing, Electronics
and Mathematics; her contribution is the robot’s joint attention and the post-game questionnaires, while I
worked on the voice and the investment game. For completeness, this chapter reports the full analyses and
procedure of the experiment.
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machines (Section 2.2.4), and machine designers will need to ensure that users do not feel
threatened, or unsafe, about interacting with them. Thus, it becomes critically important,
when it comes to designing robots, to understand how anthropomorphic their design should
be in its various components. Too much human-likeness, in fact, can result in the negative
Uncanny Valley effect (Mori, 1970), evoking feelings of disgust and eeriness. For example,
androids have striking resemblance with human appearance (Minato, Shimada, Ishiguro
& Itakura, 2004), but, as soon as they start to move, or speak, their machine qualities are
immediately evident (Becker-Asano, Ogawa & Nishio, 2010). Such a mismatch between
human appearance and machine movement affects people at the neural level, with fMRI
data showing that androids with machine-like movements evoked larger prediction errors in
the Action Perception System (Saygin, Chaminade, Ishiguro, Driver & Frith, 2012).
As previously discussed (Section 1.1), human-human interactions heavily rely on trust, and
working robot-human relationship need to be based on trust as well (Hancock et al., 2011;
Groom & Nass, 2007). On the one hand, humans need to trust a robot to not hurt them, to
carry out its task, to function properly; on the other hand, the robots need to show that they
are trustworthy. Since voice can act as a "honest signal" of trustworthiness (see Section
2.1.3), robot voices should be designed in order to elicit trustworthiness as well.
Previous research showed that being able to speak (either with a synthetic or a natural voice)
was enough for a robot to be treated as a competent agent (Sims et al., 2009). Also, Nass
et al. (1994) demonstrated that people apply to machine voices the same conversational
and interactional rules that they would use with a human, and that the sound of the voice
itself is enough to make personality judgments, independent of the speech content (Nass &
Lee, 2001). Nass and Brave (2005) also found that male and female interactants reacted
in the same way to natural and synthetic voices in a choice-making task, provided the
voice corresponded to their gender. Arguably, different-looking robots should have different-
sounding voices, in order to a) contribute to the impression that they are individual agents, b)
be congruent with their physical appearance and c) elicit personality attributions congruent
with their task. For example, a big factory robot would appear rather strange if it had a very
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high-pitched voice. Or, children robot tutors meant to act as children’s peers should have
child-like voices.
Regarding personality traits attributions, previous literature is contradictory. For example,
Shneiderman and Plaisant (2004) claimed that machines exhibiting human characteristics
such as emotions or personality traits could confuse or mislead human interactants. Con-
trasting this, from an educational psychology point of view, it has also been found that virtual
agents with a pre-recorded human voice led to participants scoring higher in a learning
test than participants who heard a synthetic voice, while there were no differences in the
perceived difficulty of the learning task (Atkinson, Mayer & Merrill, 2005). Finally, Mitchell
et al. (2011) argued that incongruence in the human-likeness of a character’s face and voice
can elicit feelings of eeriness. The majority of social robots in use nowadays are not perfectly
human-like, but rather their morphology resembles that of a human in some way or another.
For example, the Nao robot is a biped, has two arms, and a head with a resemblance
of a mouth and eyes (Figure 29). When it comes to designing such a robot’s voice, the
question of whether to use a natural or synthetic voice also arises. Would people prefer a
“congruent” robot, which approaches human-ness in all its characteristics, but does not quite
reach it? Or would people prefer an “incongruent” robot, with a pre-recorded human voice,
for the sake of clarity and familiarity (Tamagawa, Watson, Kuo, MacDonald & Broadbent,
2011)? Some of the differences in results from previous studies are likely due to using
different tasks and application domains. In general, however, we can argue that, given that
people tend to attribute traits to computers and robots as if they were human agents (Nass
& Lee, 2001; Nass et al., 1995; Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn et al., 2008), that people
respond to robots as if they had a personality (Lee et al., 2006), and that people attribute
traits to speakers based on very fine speech characteristics (see results from Experiments
2–3), there is reason to assume that they will attribute traits — e.g. of trustworthiness — to
robots speaking in different voices as well. In the experiment presented in this Chapter, the
voice and attention behaviour of a Nao robot were manipulated in order to be more or less
anthropomorphic, and implicit trust attributions were measured using an investment game.
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Figure 29: Softbank Robotics’s Nao robot.
Another feature that has often been shown to influence anthropomorphism is joint attention.
Interlocutors monitor the gaze of their conversation partners to establish joint attention (Moore
& Dunham, 2014; Mason, Tatkow & Macrae, 2005), which also influences participants’
decisions in HRI tasks (Mutlu, Shiwa, Kanda, Ishiguro & Hagita, 2009; Staudte & Crocker,
2011). By briefly moving their eyes, robots can affect the decision making process, even
when participants do not report seeing those cues (Admoni, Bank, Tan, Toneva & Scassellati,
2011). Gaze and joint attention also influence person perception, including in terms of trust
(Bayliss & Tipper, 2006; Staudte & Crocker, 2011; Mason et al., 2005). Previous studies
on the topic come to diverging conclusions, however. For example, Bruce, Nourbakhsh
and Simmons (2002) found that attention did not increase the participants’ interest in
interacting with the robot, while the social gazing behaviour in Zanatto, Patacchiola, Goslin
and Cangelosi (2016)’s experiment only helped human-robot cooperation if the robot was
humanoid. Also, Stanton and Stevens (2014) found that robot gaze elicited trust in easier
human-robot cooperative tasks, but hindered it in more difficult tasks, suggesting that robot
gaze might create uncomfortable pressure in certain situations. By contrast, Ham, Bokhorst,
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Cuijpers, van der Pol and Cabibihan (2011) found that robot gaze increased its persuasion.
Individual differences might partly account for these results, corroborating findings from
Mutlu, Forlizzi and Hodgins (2006), who showed that female participants liked robots more
when looked at less, while male participants liked robots more when looked at more. Given
the contradicting previous results, the current experiment could help examining whether the
manipulation of a robot’s gaze and attention would affect users’ implicit trust attributions of
that robot as well.
Voice and attention are two cues that might influence perception of a robot’s trustworthiness.
However, this influence should also take context and temporal dynamics into account. In the
field of HRI, recently Salem et al. (2013) found that robot perception changed drastically after
interacting with a robot in two different contexts, and suggested that results based on single
robot encounters might not be accurate representations of the perception that people might
build over time. Koay, Syrdal, Walters and Dautenhahn (2007) also found that interpersonal
distances between a human and a robot decreased over interaction sessions distributed over
5 weeks, and similarly Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn et al. (2008) emphasized the importance
of long-term studies in HRI, while suggesting that studies focusing on first impressions (such
as theirs) are also useful to build a baseline of attributions. Haring et al. (2013) measured
trust attributions before and after the interaction with a robot, and found differences in the
initial and informed impressions. Haring et al. (2013) also attributed either a trustworthy or
untrustworthy behaviour to the robot they employed in their study, but did not explore the
effect of this condition fully. Generally, a few of the mentioned authors have raised the issue
of the lack of studies involving repeated exposure to a certain agent and to its behaviour in
specific tasks (Salem et al., 2013; Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn et al., 2008; Koay et al.,
2007). This Chapter addresses this lack of empirical evidence on the effect of context and
experience on trust in HRI. Previous experiments within this thesis showed that implicit trust
attributions to virtual agents are modulated by the agent’s voice and behaviour, and that
initial impressions changed over time. Here, the voice, attention, and behaviour of a robot
are manipulated in order to collect implicit trustworthiness attributions.
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Studies on implicit trustworthiness attributions are also scarce in HRI research, with data
being mostly collected with questionnaires. However, there are a few studies which collected
implicit measures of trust. For example, DeSteno et al. (2012) recorded face-to-face verbal
interactions between human participants and a Nexi robot, to identify sequences of non-
verbal cues that are indicative of trustworthy behaviour, thus demonstrating that the accuracy
of trustworthiness judgments of novel partners is influenced by exposure to nonverbal cues.
Haring et al. (2013), among other measures, used proxemics, namely the interpersonal
distance between a person and a robot, to measure the person’s implicit trust towards the
robot. Finally, Hancock et al. (2011) suggested that future research should use implicit data
to study Human-Robot trust, and mentioned the problem of individual measures taken after
a single interaction, which are not informative of trust development. Thus, scholars in the
field of HRI are aware of the lack of results on implicit measures of trust development. The
investment game seems like the perfect tool to address this issue.
Voice Attention Behaviour
1 Natural Joint Generous
2 Natural Joint Mean
3 Natural Non-joint Generous
4 Natural Non-joint Mean
5 Synthetic Joint Generous
6 Synthetic Joint Mean
7 Synthetic Non-joint Generous
8 Synthetic Non-joint Mean
Table 7: The 8 robot manipulation conditions.
This chapter presents results from an experiment aimed at studying the effect of different
anthropomorphic cues — voice and attention — and experience on implicit judgments of a
robot’s trustworthiness. The robot’s voice was either natural or synthetic, the attention was
either joint or non-joint and the behaviour was either trustworthy (generous) or untrustworthy
(mean). A summary of the robot’s manipulations can be seen in Table 7. The classification
of the voice and attention conditions in terms of anthropomorphism is clear, with natural
voice and joint attention belonging to the anthropomorphic end of the scale, and synthetic
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voice and non-joint attention to the non anthropomorphic end of the scale. Manipulating the
behaviour condition, instead, is not an assertion that one of the two levels of this condition is
more anthropomorphic. Rather, it is meant as a simplistic, categorical representation of two
possible behaviours, which, in combination to different voice and attention conditions, might
elicit different trusting behaviours from the participants.
Participants in the study were also administered several well known questionnaires after they
interacted with the robot, in order to obtain a measure of the perceived anthropomorphism
and trustworthiness of the robot after they interacted with it.
8.2 Method
8.2.1 Participants
One hundred twenty individuals (81 female and 39 male; mean age = 23.12 years, SD = 8.62
years) participated in the study. All participants were native British English speakers. Parti-
cipants were naïve as to the purpose of the investigation and gave informed written consent
to participate in the study.
8.2.2 Stimuli
The voices used in this experiment were two female speakers of Standard Southern British
English (SSBE). These were chosen among the 4 SSBE voices already used in Experiment 2.
There were two blocks of 20 sentences (one for each round of the game), all approximately
the same length (mean number of syllables per sentence 16.6, SD 1.08), for each speaker.
Participants heard one block of utterances from one robot, and the other block from the
other robot, in a counterbalanced order. The two blocks of utterances were equivalent in the
generous and mean conditions. The recorded utterances were amplitude-normalized, and a
noise-removal filter was applied.
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To obtain the synthetic version of these utterances, the mean f0 value for each utterance
was extracted using the software for phonetic analyses Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2017).
The mean f0 value for each speaker was later obtained by averaging the value of all the
utterances from the same speaker. Then, the f0 of each utterance was flattened to this
mean f0 value. Finally, a comb filter was applied to each flattened utterance using the
software Audacity (comb frequency = same value as the flattened f0 of the sound file; comb
decay = 0.1; normalization level = 0.990).
Data validation
Prior to starting the experiment, 12 independent native English speakers (who did not sub-
sequently take part in the experiment) were asked to transcribe some of the utterances used
in the game, in order to ensure that there were no systematic differences in the intelligibility of
the natural and synthetic stimuli. Six of the judges transcribed 10 random natural utterances
and the other six transcribed the 10 corresponding resynthesized utterances. The transcrip-
tion errors that the two sets of judges made were then counted, and a test of proportions was
performed to see whether the difference of errors in the natural and synthetic utterances was
systematic or due to chance. Overall, the transcribers of the natural speech made 9 errors
(4 content words, 5 non content words), and the transcribers of the synthetic speech made
11 errors (3 content words, 8 non content). There were no significantly detectable differences
in intelligibility over this sample of speakers (2(1) = 0:06; p = :806). Additionally, a sample
of the actual participants in the experiment was asked whether they were able to understand
the utterances of the robot (in both the synthetic and natural condition); of the 55 randomly
chosen participants, only one said they could not understand what the robot was saying,
one could understand “very little”, 7 stated they understood most of it, while the remaining
46 said they were able to understand everything. Finally, since only a female voice was used,
we asked a random sample of participants to state whether they had associated a gender
with the robot. Of the 66 randomly sampled participants, 23 said they thought the robot was
female, 17 male, 20 did not associate any gender, and 6 associated a different gender to the
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two robots they played with; a test of proportions did not yield significant differences between
the three groups (2(2) = 2:75; p = :253). Thus, it is excluded that participants consistently
associated the Nao robot with the same gender, and the current results are generalisable to
interactions with a gender-neutral NAO robot.
8.2.3 Procedure
Figure 30: Investment game setup.
Investment game
All the interactions with the robot during the investment game were mediated by a Sandtray
touchscreen computer (Baxter, Wood & Belpaeme, 2012), which stood between the parti-
cipant and the robot (Figure 30). Sandtray is a new platform built to aid the exploration of
Human-Robot Interaction. The hardware consists of a 26-inch capacitive touchscreen and
associated control server, upon which a series of virtual objects (icons) can be manipulated
by tapping (from the human), or simulating dragging (from the robot). The interface linking
the robot and the computer was programmed in Python. The display had 11 numbered
touch-screen buttons on the side of the participants, which they could press to indicate the
amount of money they wanted to invest in each round (from 0 to 10). On the robot’s side,
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there was an orange slider, which was used to give a visual representation of how much
money the robot was returning. The starting position of the slider was always at its midpoint,
as can be seen in Figure 31. The slider then moved according to the percentage of the
robot’s returns: it moved to the left of the participant when the robot returned more money
than the participant invested, and to the right when it returned less money. All the display
was aligned to the participant’s visual, to ensure ease of understanding. The display also
showed how much money the participant had in the current round, at each time (the "round
total" button in the figure). For example, at the start of the round this button showed 10, then,
if participants invested 3, it showed 7 and, if the robot returned 6, it showed 13. The "bank"
button showed the sum of money that participants had earned in all the previous rounds.
The buttons at the top of the screen showed how much money the robot had received and
returned. As soon as the participant pressed "start", the first sound file was loaded and
played, and participants could not press any button until the file had finished playing. They
were prompted to press "start" again to begin each round, at which point the corresponding
sound file would be played. This was done to ensure that participants had enough time
to look at all the changes in the screen and understand what was going on in the game.
After the 20th round, a goodbye message appeared, and participants were directed by the
experimenter to the next task.
The robot was standing on one side of the Sandtray computer, facing the participant, who was
sitting on the opposite side. The robot was manipulated in terms of voice and attention. In the
voice manipulation, the robot had either a natural, pre-recorded female British English voice,
or a synthetic voice obtained from the resynthesis of the same British voice, as described
earlier (Section 8.2.2). In the attention condition, the robot’s arm and head movements were
manipulated. In the joint attention condition, the robot located the face of the participant
and its head followed the participant’s movements, giving an impression of looking at the
participant. This was achieved with the built-in Nao face detection and tracking algorithms.
When it was the robot’s turn in the game, it lowered its head, "looking" at the Sandtray screen,
and performed a sweeping arm movement, following the slider that, on the screen, indicated
how much money the robot was returning. In the joint attention condition, the robot’s right
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Figure 31: Sandtray display at the beginning of the investment game.
arm moved to its right, following the slider, when it was returning more money, while its left
arm moved to the left, following the slider, when it was returning less money. Whenever the
arm moved, the robot also pointed at the slider with a finger, giving the impression that it
was controlling the slider in this way. In the non-joint attention condition, instead, the robot
was standing still with its head lowered, and never looked at the participant, thus giving the
impression that it was always looking at the screen.
Before the first game started, the experimenter ran 3 practice rounds with the participant,
in order to familiarise them with the interface. Then, the experiment followed the same
procedure as the previous four experiments. Each participant engaged in two games, one
for each voice, attention and behaviour condition (generous/mean), with a different block of
20 utterances heard for each version of the game. The experiment was counterbalanced
in a 2 (attention: joint or non-joint) by 2 (speaker: 1 or 2) within subject design and a
2 (behaviour: generous or mean) by 2 (voice: natural or synthetic) between subject design.
The game rounds proceeded as in the previous experiments. In order to increase the intrinsic
motivation of participants, they were told that they would win actual money in proportion
to their earnings in the game. For this reason, they played with “Experimental Currency
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Units” (ECU), receiving 10 at the beginning of each round. The total amount that they
earned was converted in British Pounds, at a rate of 30 ECU = £0.10, and this was paid to
the participants at the end of the game. In the previous experiments, return ranges were
120-240% in the generous condition and 0%-120% in the mean condition. As previously
discussed (Section 3.3), this might have induced participants to trust more in the mean
condition. In order to examine whether participants would be less trusting of a completely
untrustworthy game partner, this range was reduced to 150%-240% (generous condition)
and 0%-90% (mean condition).
At the end of the first game, participants were told that they would now play a second game
with another robot, and were asked to complete a set of questionnaires (described below),
while the experimenter brought in the second robot. In reality, while the participant answered
the questionnaires, the experimenter unplugged the Nao robot, went to an adjacent room,
and changed the T-shirt that the robot was wearing, before returning to the experiment room.
The T-shirt was either red or blue, and it was meant to give the impression that the robot was
different from the previous one.
Questionnaires
Four questionnaires were used as secondary measures to the main game task. Three short
scales measured likeability, trust, and credibility. The likeability questionnaire was based on
Reysen (2005), while the trust scale was an adaptation of the Receptivity/Trust subscale
of the Relational Communication Questionnaire and of the selection of trust items in the
International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006, IPIP, ). The credibility scale was
based on McCroskey and Young (1981)’s Source Credibility Scale. In addition, Bartneck,
Kulić, Croft and Zoghbi (2008)’s questionnaire was used to measure a range of HRI factors
(anthropomorphism, animacy, likeability, perceived intelligence and perceived safety). After
the first game ended, the participants were asked to fill in the questionnaires, while the
experimenter took the robot to another room. While the participants were told that the
experimenter would bring in a different robot, in reality the experimenter changed the t-shirt
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that the robot was wearing. This trick was meant to make the participants believe that the
second robot he/she would be playing with was essentially a new agent, and as such the
participant’s strategy would reset. Participants filled in a second set of questionnaires at the
end of the second game. Finally, participants completed a short background questionnaire
where they were asked their age, gender, city of origin, what accent they spoke, and what
accent they would like a robot to have. They were then debriefed, paid the show-up fee plus
what they had earned in the game, and left.
8.3 Results
8.3.1 Investment game results
A linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data using forward stepwise selection, selecting
each successive predictor according to the lowest AIC (Aho et al., 2014, Akaike Information
Criterion, ), with investment as dependent variable, speaker, behaviour (generous/mean),
voice (natural/synthetic), attention (joint/non-joint) and game turn (the 20 rounds of the game)
as independent variables, and participant id and sentence block as random factors.
Main effects
As expected, there was a main effect of behaviour (2(1) = 90:17, p < :001), with higher
investments in the generous condition (mean = 8.13 ECU) than in the mean condition
(mean = 4.5 ECU), as can be seen from Figure 32. There was also a main effect of game
turn (2(1) = 26:58, p < :001), with overall higher investments in the second half of the
game. There was also a main effect of voice (2(1) = 4:47, p < :05), with higher investments
with the synthetic voice. There was also a main effect of speaker (2(2) = 7:37, p < :05),
with higher overall investments with speaker number 2. There was no effect of attention
however (2(1) = 0:41, p = :52).
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Figure 32: Average investments to the generous and mean conditions.
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Interactions
There was an interaction between behaviour and game turn (2(1) = 18:26, p < :001):
as can be seen from Figure 32, investments increase over time in the generous condition
in an almost linear fashion, but fluctuate heavily in the mean condition. There was also
an interaction between behaviour, game turn and voice (2(2) = 8, p < :02). A post-hoc
mixed-effects model was fitted to the generous and mean data separately to analyse this
interaction. Investment was the dependent variable, game turn and voice were predictors,
and participant and sentence block were random factors. In the generous condition, there
was a main effect of game turn (2(1) = 256:5, p < :001) and a marginally significant
effect of voice (2(1) = 3:32, p = :068). As can be seen from the top panel in Figure 33,
investments increase over time, and are higher in the synthetic voice condition. In the mean
condition, instead, there is no effect of game turn, and no effect of voice, but there is a
significant interaction between game turn and voice (2(2) = 16:33, p < :001). As can be
seen from the bottom panel of Figure 33, investments decrease in the first half of the game
independently from the voice, while they increase in the second half of the game, and there
are higher investments to the natural voice.
There was also an interaction between behaviour and speaker (2(1) = 6:38, p < :02),
with higher investments in speaker 2, but only in the mean condition, and between voice
and speaker (2(1) = 10:43, p < :002), with higher investments in speaker 2, but only with
a synthetic voice. There was also a marginally significant interaction between game turn
and attention (2(1) = 3:66, p = :056, significant in terms of AIC): participants invested
more money in the second half of the game in both the attention conditions, although
the slope was steeper for the joint attention condition, as shown in Figure 34. There
was also an interaction between speaker and attention (2(1) = 10:98, p < :001), with
higher investments to speaker 2, but only in the non joint attention condition. Finally, there
was an interaction between behaviour, speaker and attention (2(2) = 7:92, p < :02).
A post-hoc mixed-effects model was fitted to the generous and mean data separately to
analyse this interaction. Investment was the dependent variable, speaker and attention
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Figure 33: Average investments in the two different voice conditions and in the generous
(top) and mean (bottom) behaviour conditions.
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were predictors, and participant and sentence block were random factors. In the generous
condition, there were no main effects of speaker or attention, but there was a significant
interaction between the two variables (2(2) = 14:4, p = :002): participants invested more
money to speaker 1 than to speaker 2 in the joint attention condition (average = 8.3 ECU and
7.96 ECU, respectively), while they invested more in speaker 2 than speaker 1 in the non-joint
attention condition (average = 8.32 ECU and 7.91 ECU, respectively). In the mean condition,
instead, there was a main effect of speaker (2(1) = 8:38, p = :004), with higher overall
investments to speaker 2 than speaker 1 (average = 4.68 ECU and 4.41 ECU, respectively).
There was no effect of attention, and no interaction between speaker and attention.
Figure 34: Average investments in the two attention conditions over time. The red vertical
line indicates the mid-point in the game.
Behaviour Attention Voice Speaker
Likeability 2(1) = 32:67,
p < :001
2(1) = 14:14,
p < :001
n.s. n.s.
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Behaviour Attention Voice Speaker
Trust 2(1) = 43:65,
p < :001
2(1) = 27:27,
p < :001
n.s. n.s.
Credibility 2(1) = 43:65,
p < :001
2(1) = 15:43,
p < :001
n.s. 2(1) = 4:53,
p = :033
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism n.s. 2(1) = 30:21,
p < :001
n.s. n.s.
Animacy n.s. 2(1) = 66:61,
p < :001
n.s. n.s.
Likeability 2(1) = 71:91,
p < :001
2(1) = 16:85,
p < :001
n.s. n.s.
Intelligence 2(1) = 18:13,
p < :001
2(1) = 6:17,
p = :012
n.s. n.s.
Safety n.s. 2(1) = 8:76,
p = :003
n.s. n.s.
Table 8: Main effects of questionnaires.
8.3.2 Questionnaires Results
For all the scales, a linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data, with behaviour (gener-
ous/mean), voice (natural/synthetic), speaker and attention (joint/non-joint) as independent
variables, and participant id and sentence block as random factors. Post-hoc comparisons,
where needed, were assessed using t-tests.
Main effects
As shown in Table 8, behaviour had an effect for the likeability, trust, credibility and intelligence
scales, with higher ratings for the generous robot. Attention affected all the scales, showing
higher scores for the joint attention condition. On the contrary, voice had no effect, while
speaker had an effect only in the credibility scale, with higher ratings for speaker 1.
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Interactions
All the two-way interactions that were found are reported in Figure 35. Both likeability
scales showed a significant two-way interaction between behaviour and voice (2(1) = 8:83,
p = :002; 2(1) = 7:36, p = :006), with higher likeability ratings for the synthetic voice in
the generous behaviour condition (p = :02), and for the natural voice in the mean behaviour
condition (p = :027). For trust and safety a two-way interaction between behaviour and
attention emerged. For the former (2 = 4:01, p = :004), joint attention was rated as more
trustworthy for both generous (p < :001) and mean behaviours (p = :021), while for the
latter (2(1) = 8:84, p = :002) the joint attention condition was perceived as safer than the
non-joint one in the generous behaviour condition (p < :001), but no differences for attention
were found (p = :995) in the mean behaviour condition. Moreover, in the safety rating there
was a significant interaction between voice and speaker (2(1) = 6:30, p = :012). Post-hoc
comparisons showed that the synthetic voice was rated as safer than the natural one when
the voice belonged to speaker 1 (p = :01). For speaker 2, no significant effect of voice
emerged (p = :43). There was a significant interaction between behaviour and speaker
in the anthropomorphism (2(1) = 6:82, p = :008) and animacy (2(1) = 7:18, p = :007)
scales, with speaker 1 being rated as more anthropomorphic in the mean behaviour condition
(p = :012 for anthropomorphism, p = :038 for animacy), but not in the generous (p = :49
for anthropomorphism, p = :16 for animacy).
Finally, there were also some significant three-way interactions. In the anthropomorphism
scale there was an interaction between voice, speaker and attention (2(1) = 4:26, p = :038).
Specifically, voice had an effect on the second speaker in the joint attention condition, where
the natural voice was rated as more anthropomorphic than the synthetic one (p = :012). All
the other comparisons were not significant (p > :05). In the intelligence scale there was an
interaction between behaviour, speaker and attention (2(1) = 4:27, p = :038): speaker had
an effect in the mean and non-joint attention condition (p = :006), where intelligence was
higher with speaker 1. All the other comparisons were not significant (p > :05). Finally, there
was also a significant interaction between behaviour, voice and attention in the Safety scale
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(2(1) = 9:86, p = :001). Specifically, voice had an effect in the generous and non-joint
attention condition (p = :015), with lower safety ratings with the natural voice. All the other
comparisons were not significant (p > :05).
Figure 35: Two-ways interactions for the likeability, trust, anthropomorphism and safety
scales.
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8.4 Discussion
The data reported here show that people’s implicit trust attributions to a humanoid robot
change based on different anthropomorphic cues, and over time, based on experience. Some
of these anthropomorphic cues also influenced results in several perception questionnaires
that participants filled after interacting with the robot.
In the game, participants’ investments were modulated by the behaviour and voice of the
robot, and by the particular speaker to whom the original voice belonged. Participants
invested consistently more money with a generous robot, with a robot with a synthetic voice,
and with a robot whose voice was taken from speaker 2. Higher investments with a generous
game partner were expected, as the goal of the participants was ultimately to earn more
money, and as such they learned very quickly whether the partner was being trustworthy or
not. Regarding auditory cues, it seems that participants preferred one particular speaker
over the other. This is consistent with previous studies showing that very fine speech
characteristics, which are independent from higher-level features such as accent, affect
impression formation (see Section 2.2.3; also Gobl & Ní Chasaide, 2003; Trouvain et al.,
2006). This also suggests that people’s preference for certain individual voices might apply
when these voices are embodied in a robot. Thus, robot manufacturers should not only
concentrate on higher-level features of a voice, such as its naturalness and accent, but
also on idiolectal characteristics, since they seem to contribute to trusting behaviours as
well. Also, participants overall trusted voice congruent robots more than incongruent ones,
i.e. they preferred the humanoid robot Nao to have a synthetic voice rather than a natural
one. The other anthropomorphic cue that was manipulated, attention, had no effect on the
game results, however.
Regarding the congruency of the attention condition, the interaction that was found between
game turn and attention supports results that participants prefer interacting with a robot
exhibiting human-like characteristics in terms of hand pointing and gaze behaviour (Admoni
et al., 2011; Staudte & Crocker, 2011), albeit this effect manifests itself after some time.
On the one hand, this result confirms previous calls for studies on the long-term effect
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of human-robot interactions (Hancock et al., 2011; Salem et al., 2013; Walters, Syrdal,
Dautenhahn et al., 2008; Koay et al., 2007). On the other, it suggests that vocal and visual
characteristics might be processed differently by participants, and thus the congruency of
each of them should be considered separately. Also, the interaction that was found between
speaker and attention shows that preference towards one particular speaker only emerged
in the non-joint attention condition, thus suggesting that kinaesthetic information (when
present) might override fine speech information.
The results from the investment game also support previous studies suggesting that robots
are treated as conscious agents (Nass & Lee, 2001; Nass et al., 1994; Walters, Syrdal,
Dautenhahn et al., 2008). In fact, if people had felt less connection with the robot as an
agent, they might have invested lower amounts of money, especially in the mean condition,
indicative of an unwillingness to cooperate. Instead, the patterns of investments in the two
behaviour conditions are similar to the patterns of investments in the previous experiments,
which used disembodied virtual agents with only natural voices as a cue to their agency. In
these studies, participants’ investments in the generous condition were increasing almost
linearly over time, while investments in the mean condition fluctuated heavily, similarly to
the present study (Figure 32). This fluctuation of investments could be a strategy from the
human participant to get the robot to return more money, by investing more money in the first
place; this is a strategy that has sometimes been observed in human-human trust games
(Buchan et al., 2008; Macy & Skvoretz, 1998). This fluctuation is further discussed in
Section 9.4, with reference to all the experiments presented here.
Intriguingly, higher investments in the mean condition were directed towards the robot with a
natural voice, possibly signalling that, while participants felt there was no hope of convincing
the synthetic-voiced robot to return more money, they felt more hopeful that this could be
accomplished if the robot had at least a human-like trait, its voice. This refers back to Theory
of Mind: the robot’s voice might have been the difference between perceived agency and
lack thereof; if participants believed that the robot did not have any intentions, this could help
explain the lower investments to the synthetic-voiced robot in the mean condition.
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Behaviour, voice and speaker, the characteristics which most affected participants’ invest-
ment decisions in the game, had little effect in the post-game questionnaires. Thus, it is
possible that, while participants are unconsciously aware of all the robot’s characterist-
ics, some of these might be more important during the actual interaction, whereas others
might be more predominantly recalled after the interaction has taken place. The type of
interaction might be a conditioning factor as well, since in this case the interaction was
verbally mediated, even though the participants were not meant to talk back to the robot.
Participants’ investments also increased more rapidly in the second half of the game in the
joint attention condition, thus suggesting that joint attention started having an effect in the
investment decisions only after participants had been exposed to it for some time. While joint
attention had no main effect in the game, it was consistently linked to participants’ explicit
judgments in the questionnaires. In particular, it was a significant predictor of perceived
likeability, trustworthiness, credibility, anthropomorphism, animacy, intelligence and safety
of the robot. Some of the interactions that were found in the game were also replicated in
the questionnaires. For example, participants rated a synthetic voice higher in likeability
if they had just heard it in conjunction with the generous behaviour, and a natural voice
if it was paired with the mean behaviour. The questionnaire results are also in line with
previous literature: Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Hegel and de Ruiter (2012), for example, also
found that the type of robot voice they used (natural or synthetic) had no effect on subsequent
anthropomorphic ratings of the robot. It is possible that participants turned their attention to
the movement and gazing behaviour of the robot only when they were asked to reflect on it;
in the case of the questionnaires, they might have been socially biased to care about these
features more than the voice. The reason behind this different processing of auditory and
visual cues during and after an interaction remains to be explored.
The design and results of the present experiment allow to at least speculate on the reason
behind such a differential effect of the two anthropomorphic cues that were manipulated.
First of all, it is possible that participants attended to the speech cues more than to the
visual cues. Participants’ auditory channel was free to attend to the robot’s speech all the
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time, without distractions, while their visual attention likely switched between the robot and
the shared screen. Thus, while participants had a constant exposure to the robot’s voice,
details of the robot’s movements might have gone unnoticed from time to time. Also, even
though the utterances spoken by the robot did not have any connection with what was
happening during the game, it is possible that participants attributed some importance to
them, thus allocating more working memory to the processing of this — effectively useless —
information.
It is also possible that, while vocal characteristics have an immediate effect on the users’
implicit perception of the robot, visual characteristics might take some time to get used to and
to be noticed. This would explain the more rapid increase of investments in the joint attention
condition only in the second half of the game. This would also fit with the hypothesis that
participants might have taken some time to familiarise themselves with the game interface.
At the beginning of the game, participants might have been more concentrated on the game
and its interface, rather than the robot, and only after some time they paid more attention to
the robot’s movements.
Moreover, while the voice condition was clearly split into a natural and synthetic category, it
might be that the joint attention condition was not perceived as comparatively human-like
as the voice. If this was the case, the distinction that had been allocated a priori to the joint
and non-joint attention conditions would be comparatively different to the distinction between
the natural and synthetic voice. Although the robot’s arm movement and face tracking were
clearly distinguished from the non-joint attention condition, where the robot was not moving
at all, it is possible that such movements were still perceived as mechanical. The robot’s
gaze might also have caused discomfort, as in Stanton and Stevens (2014), thus contributing
to the elimination of differences between the still and moving robot. It is also possible that
this difference in feature effect might be due to a confound between type of measure (implicit
and explicit) and type of task (investment game and various questionnaires). Specifically, the
investment game arguably measures implicit trusting behaviour in a specific setting, which
has been linked to some, but not all, facets of trust (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010). On the
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other hand, the questionnaires used measure explicit ratings on several different scales, only
one of which is specifically about trust.
Finally, participants’ explicit understanding of the word “trust” (used in the questionnaire)
might capture different shades of meaning than the economic trusting behaviour predom-
inantly used in the game, and these different shades might be linked to different cues as
well.
The present experiment has several implications. First of all, it seems that people implicitly
attend to vocal cues in human-robot interactions. In general, participants in this experiment
invest more money with a synthetic-voiced robot, within game modulations: the preference
towards a synthetic/congruent voice only lasts until things start deteriorating and participants
realise that the robot is behaving untrustworthily. At this point, implicit trust in the natural
voice condition becomes higher, perhaps in an appeal to human empathy. Voice does not
affect explicit perceived trustworthiness of the robot, although it does affect other perceptual
evaluations. For instance, perceived likeability increases for the synthetic voice when the
robot is generous, and conversely the natural voice is preferred when the robot becomes
mean. However, implicit game choices are not just reflections of trust, but also attempts to
signal behaviour and trust in another. Questionnaires are merely reflective, and cannot be
used to try to modify the behaviour of a counterpart. Thus, the robot’s voice had a strong
influence on actual trusting behaviours.
Secondly, preference towards a robot exhibiting joint attention behaviours emerges with
time: in the second half of the game, and in the post-game questionnaires. It is possible
that it takes time to get used to human-like movements, which end up being preferred to the
completely non-human motionlessness.
Also, it appears that participants pay greater attention to speech cues when cooperative
solutions are not being met. When the robot is behaving favourably (i.e. it is being generous
in the game), participants seem not to care about its individual features such as the voice. It
is when things start deteriorating, i.e. when the robot is mean, that we start paying attention
and attending to anthropomorphic cues. This is when individual preferences to speech
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features start as well (e.g. the preference of one of the two speakers over the other). Just like
in the game, the anthropomorphism and animacy scales show a preference for one of the
speakers in the mean condition. All taken together, this evidence suggests that participants
need to rely on or appeal to human-like features when things are not going the desired way.
Finally, the current results suggest that implicit and explicit measures might both contribute
to understanding how trust is formed, although they might describe different aspects of it.
For example, there was an opposite effect of speaker in the game and in the credibility
questionnaire, no effect of attention in the game, and no effect of voice in the perceptual
questionnaires. While the game and the questionnaire data arguably measure different
aspects, they demonstrate the complexity of the multifaceted concept of trust and the
necessity to use both instruments to better outline its structure.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter reported implicit and explicit trust attributions to a humanoid robot whose voice
and joint attention were assessed during the experiment. These features were manipulated
to be more or less anthropomorphic, and the robot’s behaviour was manipulated to be more
or less trustworthy during an economic game. The underlying idea was to study the effect
of robot anthropomorphic design on human perception and trust, as this is not yet widely
understood. While some design features such as physical appearance have been studied
in depth (Scassellati, Admoni & Matarić, 2012; Powers & Kiesler, 2006; Hinds, Roberts &
Jones, 2004; Zhang, Zhu, Lee & Kaber, 2008; Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn et al., 2008),
others, for example voice and movement, have received less attention in the past (Lee et al.,
2006; Walters, Syrdal, Koay, Dautenhahn & Te Boekhorst, 2008; Staudte & Crocker, 2011).
The present findings suggest that, while the feature that was most prominently linked to the
robot’s “being” — its voice — had a strong effect on participants’ strategies all throughout the
game, the feature that was mostly linked to the robot’s “state” — its movement — influenced
trusting behaviours mostly in the second half of the game. Conversely, the questionnaire
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results indicate that the robot’s movement and attention had the biggest effect on perceptual
evaluation of the robot’s likeability, trustworthiness, credibility, anthropomorphism, animacy,
intelligence and safety, while robot’s voice and behaviour had a limited effect. Taken together,
these results suggest that people attend to certain cues more than others in the process
of deciding whether to trust a robot or not, while other cues might be more predominantly
recalled when reflecting on a past interaction.
This research shows that general design features such as the robot’s voice might be context
and behaviour-dependent, and opens new interesting research questions. For example, how
would a robot’s synthetic accent interact with context and behaviour? Also, should vocal
manipulations such as pitch and articulation rate be congruent with the physical appearance
of the robot? Future research should address this topic more specifically.
Some semi-anecdotal evidence collected in the 5 experiments presented so far should at
least partially answer the first open issue. The final question that participants answered in
the post-game background questionnaire in all the experiments was: “What accent would
you like a robot to have?”. Figure 36 shows the standardised answers of all 503 participants
who answered the question. As the figure shows, the majority of respondents answered with
“SSBE”, followed by “Neutral” accent (whatever this might mean), followed by “Irish”. Very few
people answered that they would prefer the robot to have a robot-like voice, or an accent like
their own. However, many manufacturers of social robots (Nao in primis) only give them a
robot-like default voice. While this data by no means represents a scientific claim that robots
should have an SSBE or Irish accent, it at least shows that robot manufacturers should pay
some attention to the voice they give their robots, since potential users certainly do.
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Figure 36: Preference for a robot’s accent of 503 participants.
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9 General discussion
In this chapter, the results from the 5 Experiments presented in this thesis are summarised
and discussed, specifically in terms of the implications they have for speech research and
behavioural economics. Potential practical applications of these results are also outlined.
9.1 Summary of findings
This thesis contains 5 experiments aimed at examining the influence of various voice
characteristics – including accent, prosody, emotional expression and naturalness – on
trusting behaviours towards virtual players or robots.
In Experiment 1, trusting behaviours were dictated by a combination of accent and speaker’s
trustworthiness, so that people trusted an SSBE-accented player more when he was gener-
ous, and a Liverpool-accented player more when he was mean. In Experiment 2, people
trusted SSBE- and Birmingham-accented player the most when they were generous, but
Birmingham-accented players were trusted the least when they were mean. Also, high pitch
and slow articulation rate increased trust. In Experiment 3, people trusted speakers with a
manipulated high pitch and slow rate more, and trusted female speakers more than male
speakers. In Experiment 4, people trusted players who spoke with a smiling voice more.
They also trusted SSBE-accented players more when they were generous, and Birmingham-
accented players more when they were mean. In Experiment 5, people overall trusted a Nao
robot with a synthetic voice more than one with a natural voice, but they trusted a robot with
a natural voice more when it was mean.
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From these experiments, it is possible to conclude that accent, prosody, emotional expres-
sion and naturalness all influence implicit trustworthiness judgments. Furthermore, these
characteristics interact with the speaker’s actual trustworthiness in the participants’ trust
development process.
9.2 Voices
The particular vocal features examined in these experiments were accents, prosodic cues,
emotional expression and naturalness. As previously discussed, accents are pronunciation
differences within a language that distinguish groups of speakers. Prosodic cues, such as
pitch or articulation rate, are individual variation in the suprasegmental features of speech.
Emotional expression, such as smiling voice, is the conveying of an emotion, such as
amusement, in the speech channel. Finally, naturalness is the degree to which a voice
sounds “human”, as opposed to “synthetic” or “machine-like”. All these features influenced
trusting behaviours.
From the experiments presented here, it is evident that voices influence implicit trustworthi-
ness judgments. This influence clearly overcame any experiential learning that was due to
the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of the virtual players in the games. The voice, in
its different manipulations across experiments, was the only feature that distinguished one
trustee from another, and there were no visual or other cues that could further identify them
as distinct agents. Indeed, if participants had not been affected by the speakers’ voices
when making the trusting decisions, there would be no differences in the investments to the
different speakers within the two trustee’s behaviour conditions.
Overall, the accent of the trustee had consistent effects on people’s trusting behaviours.
Participants implicitly trusted some accents more than others, even though they did not sys-
tematically recognise their origin in post-game questionnaires. Specifically, SSBE speakers
were overall trusted more than other regional speakers, both male and female — although
their trustworthiness was also strongly influenced by their behaviour, as discussed below.
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This suggests that listeners find standard-accented speakers implicitly more trustworthy.
Also, this trusting behaviour seems to be independent of the trustors’ own accent, thus
suggesting that accent familiarity or loyalty effects previously found in sociolinguistics studies
(e.g. Giles, 1971) do not influence implicit trust.
In addition to the influence of accent, trusting behaviour is also influenced by pitch and
articulation rate, both in natural (Experiment 2, Chapter 5) and in manipulated speech
(Experiment 3, Chapter 6). High pitch and slow articulation rate, both for male and female
speakers, increased participants’ trust. These effects have been discussed in terms of
biological primitives, such as the “Size/Frequency” code and the “Effort Code”, as well as in
terms of persuasion theories.
Emotional expression, in the form of smiling voice, also increased trusting behaviour. In line
with “halo effect” theories, this suggests that expressing a positive emotion leads to being
attributed other positive traits, such as trustworthiness. As a result of this research, these
theories are extended to implicit trustworthiness attributions.
In the case of voices embodied in a Nao robot, people overall trusted a natural voice more
than a synthetic one, and also trusted one of the speakers more than another. This suggests
that not only the type of voice (whether natural or synthetic), but also individual speaker
characteristics should be considered when designing a robot’s voice.
Many of the vocal characteristics that were found to influence trust were constant over time.
For example, participants in Experiment 1 invested more in the SSBE-accented speaker
all throughout the game when the virtual player was trustworthy and more in the Liverpool-
accented speaker all throughout the game when the virtual player was untrustworthy. Relative
trustworthiness of accents was constant also in Experiment 2, where participants invested
more to the SSBE- and Birmingham-accented virtual players when they were trustworthy,
and less to the Birmingham-accented virtual players when they were untrustworthy. The lack
of interactions between these accents and game turn suggests that preference for certain
speakers does not fade away over time.
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In terms of prosodic cues, the effect of high pitch on investments was constant over time in
Experiment 3, while in Experiment 2 it was stronger earlier in the game, and then diminished
over time. This could be due to the fact that speakers in Experiment 2 also had different
accents, so participants had more auditory information to process, and might have reacted
to lower-level auditory cues such as pitch only after some time. Instead, in Experiment 3
the accent and idiolectal characteristics of the speakers were constant, so participants were
able to discriminate exclusively between prosodic cues. The effect of articulation rate, on
the other hand, did not interact with game turn in Experiment 2, but it did in Experiment 3,
where participants invested higher amounts of money in the slow rate condition later in the
game. While the effect of rate in Experiment 2 was rather marginal, it was instead strong
in Experiment 3. This discrepancy between the temporally invariant effect of pitch, and the
temporally variant effect of articulation rate, suggests that these two prosodic cues might
be processed separately. While pitch seems to have an immediate and lasting effect, slow
speakers might only be appreciated after some time. Smiling also increased investments
throughout the game, and the effect of natural voice on the Nao robot in Experiment 5 also
did not diminish with time.
9.3 A “congruency effect” of trusting behaviour to voices
The pre-programmed behaviours in the investment game influenced participants’ trusting
behaviours towards different speakers. Specifically, in Experiment 1 participants trusted the
SSBE-accented virtual player more in the generous condition, and the Liverpool-accented
virtual player more in the mean condition (see Figures 4 and 5). In Experiment 2, participants
trusted the SSBE- and Birmingham-accented virtual players the most in the generous
condition, and the Birmingham-accented virtual players the least in the mean condition
(Figure 9). In Experiment 4, participants trusted the SSBE-accented virtual player more
in the generous condition, and the Birmingham-accented virtual player more in the mean
condition (Figure 22). Also, in Experiment 5, participants trusted a robot with a synthetic
voice more in the generous condition, and a robot with a natural voice more in the mean
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condition, especially in the second half of the game (Figure 33). These results suggest
that participants might form an impression of a speaker’s trustworthiness upon hearing
them for the first time – which in the investment game is simulated by the first round of the
game. The actual trustworthiness of the speaker, in the form of the simulated generous
and mean behaviours, then contributes to the further shaping of this impression, and this
impression is different based on whether the perceived and actual trustworthiness agree
or not. For example, participants in Experiment 1 might have attributed trustworthiness to
the SSBE speaker when they heard him for the first time. In the generous behaviour, this
impression of trustworthiness is confirmed, so their trust in this speaker is maintained and
reinforced over time. In the mean condition, instead, the impression of trustworthiness is
disproved, so participants “punish” this incongruity by investing less money in this speaker.
On the other hand, participants might have initially attributed a lower trustworthiness to
the Liverpool speaker, upon hearing him for the first time. In the generous condition, the
actual behaviour of the speaker is at odds with first impressions, so participants might still
be suspicious of this incongruent behaviour, resulting in lower investments. In the mean
condition, instead, participants’ implicit first impressions are confirmed, so their reaction to
untrustworthy behaviour is milder, because the Liverpool-accented virtual player is behaving
congruently with participants’ first impressions.
The argument that a discrepancy between first impressions and actual trustworthiness
influences trusting behaviour also applies to the other experiments where an interaction
between voice and behaviour was found. In Experiment 2, the Birmingham-accented virtual
players received the highest investments in the generous condition, and the lowest in the
mean condition. Thus, participants might have formed a first impression of trustworthiness
upon hearing them for the first time, which was reinforced in the generous condition and
“punished” in the mean condition, when their behaviour was perceived to be incongruent.
This interaction shows that this “congruency effect” seems to be unrelated to standard-
accentedness, but rather it seems that it is applied to voices as a whole. Accent, prosody,
idiolect, emotional expression, all contribute to identifying a unique voice. Listeners might
then form an impression about a voice trustworthiness based on a combination of different
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factors, and this first impression is then reinforced or disproved with experience of actual
trustworthy or untrustworthy behaviour.
A similar pattern of investments was also found in Experiment 4, where participants trusted
the SSBE-accented virtual player more in the generous condition, and the Birmingham-
accented virtual player more in the mean condition. While this result seems to contradict
the previously discussed results of Experiment 2, it does not: the SSBE speakers whose
voices were used in Experiments 1, 2 and 4 were different, and so were the Birmingham
speakers whose voices were used in Experiments 2 and 4. Thus, participants do not trust all
speakers of the same accent in the same way, but rather the speaker’s accent, together with
other vocal characteristics, contributes to their perceived trustworthiness. This result also
confirms that participants change their trusting behaviour due to a congruency or discrepancy
between their first impression about a speaker’s trustworthiness, and a speaker’s actual
trustworthiness.
Finally, this “congruency effect” seems to apply to voices embodied in robots as well. In
Experiment 5, participants trusted a robot with a synthetic voice more in the generous
condition, and a robot with a natural voice more in the mean condition, although the latter did
not manifest itself from the very beginning. In the discussion of Experiment 5, this particular
effect was interpreted as an appeal to the human-like qualities of the robot, in the hope that
it would start behaving more trustworthily. This interpretation does not clash with that of a
“congruency effect”: the physical congruency of a robot with a synthetic voice might elicit first
impressions of trustworthiness, which are reinforced in the generous condition. In the mean
condition instead, these first impressions are disproved, contributing to the emergence of a
preference for a natural voice.
While these results support such a “congruency effect”, other data in this same thesis do
not. For example, there was no interaction between prosodic characteristics and behaviour
in Experiment 3. It is possible that strong initial impressions of trustworthiness, which are
then reinforced or disproved, might be due to a particularly salient characteristic, which
some voices have and some do not. For example, the SSBE speakers in Experiments 1
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and 4 might have initially sounded particularly trustworthy. The reason behind this stronger
trustworthiness impression might be due to their accent, but also to other individual cues
that were not examined here. When these speakers turned out to be untrustworthy, such
a stark contrast between first impressions and behaviour was more negatively “punished”,
with lower investments. On the other hand, the SSBE speakers in Experiment 2 and 3
might not have evoked such a strong initial impression, so that subsequent reactions to
untrustworthy behaviour were milder. Also, individual differences from the trustors’ side might
have influenced strong initial trustworthiness judgments. While the current experiments
did not control for them, it is possible that, for example, participants’ personality influenced
their predisposition to trust. However, the current experiments do provide evidence that
participants’ accent seems to be unrelated to trusting behaviours to different accented voices,
for example. Although the participant sample was strongly unbalanced in terms of region of
origin and accent, regression data from Experiments 1 and 2 at least suggest that accent
familiarity or loyalty effects might not be determinant of implicit accent attitudes. Thus, the
current results suggest the existence of a “congruency effect” in trusting behaviours, which
future investigations should explore further.
This “congruency effect” resembles results from Suzuki and Suga (2010). In their study on
face trustworthiness, participants played an iterated economic game — the “debt” game
— in which they had to decide whether to borrow money from lenders with trustworthy or
untrustworthy looking faces. The lenders charged either no, moderate or high interests on
the debt. In a post-game memory test, participants remembered the trustworthy-looking,
high-interest lenders better than all the other categories, and the authors concluded that
people have better memory for “wolves in a sheep’s clothing than for the wolf in a wolf’s
clothing”. This suggests that people might be particularly attentive to deceitful signals (such
as looking trustworthy while behaving untrustworthily). This coincides with results from the
investment games, specifically that speakers that elicited particularly strong first impressions
of trustworthiness might be “punished” when their behaviour is untrustworthy, and trusted
even less than the speakers who were expected to be untrustworthy.
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Going back to the example that introduced this thesis, where Carmen received wrong
information from her navigation system speaking with two different voices (Section 1.6), it is
now possible to add empirical evidence to this hypothetical example. The different levels of
annoyance in Carmen’s reaction could be explained through a “congruency effect”: being
deceived by an intrinsically trustworthy-sounding voice with a Queen’s English accent is
unexpected and results in higher annoyance. On the other hand, a Liverpool-accented
navigator system, which does not sound very trustworthy to begin with, does not elicit as
much annoyance when its information turns out to be wrong.
9.4 Do participants behave reflectively or instinctively?
Another pattern that emerged with the behavioural manipulation is that the investments in
the generous condition always increased almost linearly over time, while investments in the
mean condition fluctuated heavily, in all 5 Experiments. This result also has implications
for game theory, which are discussed later (Section 9.5). The overall returns in the mean
condition were still less than participants invested, though. This raises the question of
whether participants were generally reacting to the overall untrustworthy returns, or if they
were simply reacting to returns they received in the immediately preceding rounds.
The virtual players’ returns in the first 4 experiments in the mean condition were occasionally
higher than the participants’ investments (see Section 3.3 and Appendix B). This could
have suggested to the participants that the virtual players were changing their behaviour to
becoming trustworthy. In fact, looking back at the figures showing participants’ investments in
the mean condition over time (Figure 37), it is possible to see that some of the positive peaks
in investments correspond to those rounds right after the virtual player was returning slightly
more than participants invested: rounds 14, 16, 18, 20. Indeed, in the immediately preceding
rounds the virtual players were programmed to return 120% of the original investment.
However, the other positive peaks in investments happen right after the virtual players
returned 90% of the original investment (rounds 7, 10, 11, 17). Did participants consider
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these “slightly-higher-but-still-low” returns as an improvement with respect to the previous
30%, 60% or 0% returns? Supporting this, similar positive peaks were found in Experiment 5,
where the range of the robots’ return patterns was reduced, in order to examine whether
participants’ trusting behaviour would become more extremely trusting or distrusting. In
this experiment, the robots returned 90%, instead of 120%, in rounds 13, 15, 17, 19, and
peaks in investments can still be seen in the following rounds 14, 16, 18, 20, and also in
the other rounds following 90% returns, specifically rounds 7, 10, 11, 17. Thus, on the one
hand, participants are overall investing less money in the mean condition, so it appears
that they are seeing the full picture and reflecting on the returns as a whole. On the other
hand, though, their investments in the mean condition follow a sort of tit-for-tat, rewarding
seemingly cooperative behaviours and punishing less cooperative ones, even when the
returns are not higher than the amount they invested, but they are higher than previous
returns. So it appears that they are also reacting instinctively, on a round-by-round basis,
punishing very low returns and encouraging less low returns.
A similar pattern can also be seen in the generous condition, albeit less marked, and not
statistically significant, as discussed in the next section. In rounds 4, 7, 8, 11, the virtual
players were programmed to return 120%, which is “slightly-less-but-still-more” than the
participants invested, as compared to the other rounds, where the returns were 150%, 180%,
210% or 240%. Still, small negative peaks can be seen at rounds 5, 8, 9, 12 in Figure 37.
Presumably, participants are seeing the bigger picture that the virtual players are being
trustworthy, and their overall increase in investments reflects this. But they might also be
signalling to the virtual players that they could return more, by investing slightly less money
after the rounds in which the virtual players returned a relatively lower amount of money.
The pattern of investments in the mean condition is similar in all experiments, including
Experiment 5, where the robot’s mean behaviour was always returning less than the par-
ticipants invested. This suggests that participants are reluctant to classify the agent they
are playing with as completely untrustworthy. In previous experiments where participants
had little information about the partner they were playing with, they generally trusted their
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Figure 37: U-shape patterns of investments in the mean condition on the left side and in
the generous condition on the right side, for the 5 investment games.
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game partner less (Sally, 1995; Valley, Moag & Bazerman, 1998; Frank, Gilovich & Regan,
1993). For example, in Valley et al. (1998), participants played a negotiation game either
by bargaining through pen and paper, or face to face, and trust was higher in the face to
face condition. Similarly, participants were more likely to cooperate in one-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma games if they had the chance to have a brief conversation with their game partner
beforehand (Frank et al., 1993). In his review of 100 studies on trust and cooperation,
Sally (1995) found that, when game partners were allowed to communicate, cooperation
rates increased drastically. In the studies he reviews, communication was bilateral, in the
sense that both parties could take conversational turns. In the experiments presented here,
instead, participants were not supposed to talk back to the virtual player or robot – although,
anecdotally speaking, some did. Thus, it seems that exposure to a computer voice, or a
speaking robot, are enough for participants to create a social bond with their game partner,
even though they are merely recipients of the communication. Not only is Nass et al. (1994)’s
CASA paradigm corroborated, but the mere presence of a voice seems to be enough to
create feelings of cooperation and expectations of reciprocity.
9.5 Implications for game theory
Results from Experiments 1 to 5 also have implications for game theory. Game theory and
behavioural economics contribute to modelling how people make decisions in social contexts.
These decisions involve evaluating one’s potential gain over one’s potential loss, and game
theory suggests that individuals act in their own self interest (Berg et al., 1995). However,
some of the predictions made by game theory have been disproved in practice. Experimental
results on the ultimatum game are a prime example. As previously mentioned in Section 3.1,
in this game one player, who holds all the money, offers some of it to another player; if the
second player accepts it, he/she keeps the offered money and player one keeps the rest.
If the second player refuses, no-one gets any money. Game theory predicts that a rational
player should accept any amount being offered, because any money is better than no money.
As a consequence, a rational offerer should offer as little money as possible. However,
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experimental evidence shows that people tend to refuse offers which are less than half of the
original endowment, and as a consequence offerers tend to offer around half of the original
endowment (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986; Camerer, 2011; Fehr & Gächter, 1998).
This behaviour has been explained in terms of social norms such as fairness (Kahneman
et al., 1986; Camerer, 2011) or expectations of reciprocity (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith,
1996; Fehr & Gächter, 1998), which were missing from game theoretical models (Camerer,
2011).
Similarly, in the investment game, a player A chooses how much money to transfer to a
player B. The transferred amount is then multiplied by some factor, and player B decides how
much of this amount to transfer back to player A. In a one-shot game — i.e., a game made
of only one monetary transfer from player A, and only one return from player B — player A’s
optimal strategy is to not transfer any amount, and for player B it is to not return any amount
(Rand, 2016; Berg et al., 1995). However, several studies have shown that people in the
role of player A do transfer money to strangers in one-shot games, and that people in the
role of player B do return some of the money (e.g. Cochard et al., 2004; Chaudhuri &
Gangadharan, 2007; Boenin & Serra, 2009; Berg et al., 1995). In a repeated investment
game, a rational strategy for player A would be to react accordingly to player B’s behaviour,
and the other way around (Fehr & Gächter, 1998; Cochard et al., 2004; Berg et al., 1995).
This strategy is comparable to the “tit-for-tat” strategy in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games.
The difference is that in the prisoner’s dilemma there are only two choices, cooperate or
defect, whereas in the investment game typically it is possible to choose how much to punish
or reward the game partner, based on how much money is endowed to player A. Observed
behaviours in past experiments also led to formulate the theory that people might be naïve,
or confused, about the game at first, and that rational behaviours might prevail after an initial
learning phase (Camerer, Johnson, Rymon & Sen, 1993). This observation is not replicated
in Experiments 1 to 5, however.
All 5 experiments presented here were repeated investment games. Participants had the role
of player A, while player B was simulated by a computer program, so that it would show either
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a trustworthy behaviour (generous condition) or an untrustworthy one (mean condition).
Assuming an optimal theoretical solution, it was expected that participants would consistently
invest more money in the generous player B and less money in the mean player B, while
maintaining differences in the various voice manipulation conditions. This was indeed the
case in the generous condition, in that participants’ investments constantly increased over
time, all throughout the 20 rounds of the games. Statistically speaking, this is demonstrated
by the fact that game turn was a main effect in mixed-effects models fitted only on the
generous conditions in all the experiments, with a positive slope. This means that the small
negative peaks that can be observed in the right side of Figure 37, after the agent returned
slightly less than in previous rounds, are not significant, and, overall, investments increase
steadily over time. These statistical results are reported in Table 9.
Experiment Mixed-effects model
Experiment 1 2(1) = 151:77; p < :001;  = 0:11
Experiment 2 2(1) = 458:2; p < :001;  = 0:10
Experiment 3 2(1) = 350:23; p < :001;  = 0:11
Experiment 4 2(1) = 337:69; p < :001;  = 0:10
Experiment 5 2(1) = 256:5; p < :001;  = 0:10
Table 9: Effect of game turn in the generous condition in all experiments.
On the other hand, in the mean condition participants’ investments did not decrease steadily
over time, but rather they followed a U-shaped curve, decreasing in the first half of the
game, and then increasing in the second half. This pattern in the data was not random,
however. This is confirmed by the mixed-effects linear models which were refitted for the
mean condition of each experiment’s dataset, in the first and then second halves of the
game separately. Investment was the dependent variable, subject and sentence block were
random factors, and only game turn was a predictor. In all 5 experiments, the game turn
was a significant predictor of investments in the first and second half of the game, but with
opposite signs, thus demonstrating that investments kept significantly decreasing in the first
half of the game, and significantly increasing in the second half of the game, as shown in the
left side of Figure 37. The statistical results are reported in Table 10.
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Experiment First half of the
game
Second half of the
game
Interaction
Experiment 1 2(1) = 26:33,
p < :001,  =  0:14
2(1) = 17:09,
p < :001,  = 0:11
2(2) = 19:5,
p < :001
Experiment 2 2(1) = 136:36,
p < :001,  =  0:19
2(1) = 49:97,
p < :001,  = 0:12
2(2) = 74:47,
p < :001
Experiment 3 2(1) = 84:54,
p < :001,  =  0:16
2(1) = 70:5,
p < :001,  = 0:14
2(2) = 88:16,
p < :001
Experiment 4 2(1) = 13:44,
p < :001,  =  0:07
2(1) = 39:86,
p < :001,  = 0:12
2(2) = 88:38,
p < :001
Experiment 5 2(1) = 55:69,
p < :001,  =  0:19
2(1) = 23:3,
p < :001,  = 0:13
2(2) = 43:12,
p < :001
Table 10: Effect of game turn in the mean condition in all experiments.
Thus, while participants behave strategically in the generous condition, they do not in the
mean condition. Such a choice seemingly opposes game theory predictions, and suggests
that individuals might not act exclusively in their own self interest, even when it is clear that
cooperation, which would increase gains for both parties, is not an option. Even when it is
obvious that the game partner is untrustworthy, people might still try to elicit cooperative
behaviours, even though doing so means going against one’s personal interests. Why do
participants consistently behave like this then? Their behaviour is obviously not an attempt
to induce player B to reciprocate from the beginning, as Rand (2016) suggested, since
the positive shift in investments happens only in the second half of the game. One could
argue that this seemingly irrational behaviour is the same behaviour that leads gamblers
to play more and more, even when they are losing. However, gamblers might be tempted
by the law of large numbers to keep gambling, even though their probability of winning
might be very small — in the so called “gambler’s fallacy” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). It
has also already been shown how risk behaviours, such as gambling, are separate from
trusting behaviours, such as those emerging in the investment game (see Section 3.4).
Learning theories of non-optimal behaviour (Camerer et al., 1993) are also not appropriate
to explain the current results, since they predict that naïve, “ignorant” players would play
irrationally at the beginning of the game, not at the end, as is the case here. Shifting slightly
away from theoretical reasoning, it has been found that people under high cognitive load
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perform less strategically than people under low cognitive load in trust games (S. Duffy &
Smith, 2014; Samson & Kostyszyn, 2015). Could listening to all the virtual players’ voices
occupy a significant proportion of their cognitive capacities, so much as to impair participants’
strategic thinking? The data also shows otherwise, since participants do play strategically
at the beginning of the mean games, and all throughout the generous games. Also, when
evaluating explicitly the voices, they distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy
players (see results of the questionnaires of Experiments 1, 2, 4). Alternatively, it is possible
that, while playing rationally at first, participants might reach a point when they realise that
player B is incorrigible in its untrustworthiness. At this point, participants might turn to
cooperation as the right thing to do, as they know from their experience in social interactions.
Even though they are doing so at their own expense, people might be reluctant to give up
hope that player B is completely not to be trusted. Camerer (2011) suggested that the critical
component that was missing from game theoretical models of the ultimatum game was the
concept of fairness. I suggest that what is missing to game theoretical models applied to an
iterated social dilemma task is a concept of hope.
Minor deviations from an overall untrustworthy behaviour – such as returning 120% a few
times, instead of 90%, 60%, 30% or 0%, or 90% instead of 60%, 30%, or 0% – were enough
to induce participants to not give up on their mean game partners, leaving aside all previous
evidence that this partner was not trustworthy. Thus, people might rely on such deviations,
in the hope that the game partner will actually reveal itself as trustworthy.
9.6 Applications
With this work I have empirically demonstrated that voice alone elicits trusting behaviours,
and that these behaviours are mediated by the speaker’s actual trustworthiness. In particular,
people might trust congruent voice-behaviour pairs more than incongruent ones. This
has applications in the field of Human-Machine Interaction. As shown in the opening
example of this thesis, (speaking) machines do not always work properly. The current
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results suggest that people implicitly trust machines speaking with a certain voice more
when they are cooperative, and machines speaking with another voice more when they are
non-cooperative. Designers should take this into account when creating voices for different
machines. Furthermore, machines performing different tasks should have voices which
sound trustworthy relative to that particular task. For example, the voice of an elderly care
robot should be different from the voice of a children tutoring robot, and different from the
voice of a mobile personal assistant. Thus, while the “work context” is important for designing
an appropriate and trustworthy machine voice, the results from the current experiments
demonstrate that the “behavioural context” is important as well.
9.7 Conclusion
The opening questions of this thesis were whether different vocal cues would evoke different
implicit trustworthiness judgments, and whether these judgments would interact with exper-
ience of a speaker’s behaviour over time. The 5 experiments presented showed that not
only do voices elicit trusting behaviours, but these behaviours also change with experience.
The separate cues that constitute voices thus also have different effects on the perceived
speaker’s trustworthiness. Manipulating the behaviour of the speakers to be either trust-
worthy or untrustworthy showed that this behaviour interacts with the speaker’s voice to
reinforce or disprove initial trustworthiness judgments of that speaker. These behavioural
data provide empirical evidence of trust formation and development, and suggest that voice
is a strong influencer of this trust. It also suggests that first impressions of a speaker’s
trustworthiness might not be indicative of future trusting behaviours. Thus, trust should be
measured dynamically, and iterated games measuring trust should take into account the fact
that people might be more hoping, and less rational, than previously theorised.
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A Full set of sentences used in the 5 Experiments
Here are reported the full set of sentences that speakers read in the various recording
sessions. One sentence “block” contains 20 sentences, corresponding each to a round of
the investment game.
AB block
1) Hello, nice to meet you. I am ready to play this game with you!
2) Remember, there is potential for earning, if we both trust each other
3) In my opinion, we should keep co-operating until the end
4) Look at how fast the total money in the bank is growing!
5) I’m going to return more money now, if you invest more as well
6) There’s no gain in investing or returning nothing, we shouldn’t do that
7) My strategy is clear: always return part of the investment
8) I have been a bit mean with my returns, I will give you more from now on
9) I will demonstrate that you can trust me, just as I trust you
10) I think we can do better. Let’s try our best to get the bank growing
11) The best strategy in this game is definitely to trust each other
12) If we both invest in each other, the final reward will be bigger
13) I think we can definitely go home with much more money than this
14) We have to help each other out, it’s the only way to win the game
15) I will return more money from this moment, this is a promise
16) You have to trust me. I have every intention to repay your trust
17) There is no point in keeping the money hidden under the mattress
18) I trust you, and I will show you that you can trust me as well
19) Let’s not undermine each other’s expectations, it would be a pity
20) Sorry, I could have returned more money. But I can still do it now
CD block
1) Hello, nice to meet you. Let’s get started with the investment game!
2) I have already thought of a strategy, I hope it will work
3) If I keep all your investment, you will not invest anymore
4) I will not keep all the money that you invest, this is a promise
5) Even if I return part of your investment, I will make a profit
6) What I keep is good enough for me, I am not that greedy
7) As long as co-operation continues, I’m happy to earn a bit less
8) I am going to share everything, you have to believe me
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(Appendix A) Full set of sentences used in the 5 Experiments
9) You have to trust me, in the same way that I am trusting you
10) If we could talk face-to-face at the moment, you’d know that I’m being honest
11) Don’t forget that we will make more money if we both share what we get
12) I want you to keep investing, and that is why I keep returning
13) The more money you invest, the more money the two of us will earn
14) This was a low payback; I am going return more from now on
15) The goal of the game is to earn as much money as possible
16) The only way to earn is by always co-operating and investing
17) If we want to raise our earnings, we have to invest in one another
18) I’m going to return more money than this, provided you keep investing
19) I am going to co-operate until the very end of the game
20) Come on, we can do better than this in the game, we have to keep trying
WX block
1) Hello, welcome to the game. Let’s see how much money we can make.
2) There’s only one way to win the game, and that is by always sharing
3) I think we should try our best to share the money we are given
4) I promise that I won’t let you down, and I’ll always return your money
5) My returns are always going to be high, if you invest at each round
6) I trust you, and I promise that your trust will be well repaid
7) We both want to win, but the only way to win is by cooperating
8) If we want to earn more and more money, we have to trust each other
9) The best strategy to win this game is simple, and it’s called trust
10) Let’s keep cooperating, and we will both benefit from this
11) We should trust each other, and we will be rewarded at the end
12) We should have a clear strategy: always help each other out
13) The only way to earn is for you to invest, and for me to return
14) I will return more money now, because I want you to keep investing
15) The more money you invest, the more your bank and mine will grow
16) You have to trust me, and rest assured that I will return your trust
17) I am expecting you to share, because that’s exactly what I am doing
18) If I can persuade you to invest more by returning more, I will do it
19) There doesn’t have to be only one winner; we can both win the game
20) I’m not going to keep your money, this won’t help me in the long run
YZ block
1) Welcome to the investment game. I hope we will enjoy playing it.
2) In my opinion, we should always invest in one another
3) I think we can do better. I promise that I will not let you down
4) If we both invest in each other, we will surely raise our earnings
5) We could finish the game better off than this, if only we tried harder
6) You have to trust that I’m going to cooperate until the last round
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7) We can both win the game, but we have to keep sharing our money
8) I trust you, and I am sure that we can both benefit from each other
9) I am not a greedy person, and I believe we should share these earnings
10) We can earn more money than this, if we co-operate until the end
11) I will return more of your investments, you have to trust me in this
12) When the game ends, I promise that we will both be satisfied with the outcome
13) Remember this: it’s not convenient for me to keep all your investments
14) No matter the number of rounds, we should trust each other until the end
15) There is no better tactic than to keep investing and returning
16) I will show you that co-operation is the best option for us
17) Let’s keep sharing, and our earnings will grow much bigger than they are now
18) I promise that I am going to return more money from now on
19) I will always return, because there’s no point in me doing otherwise
20) If we want to see our funds growing, we have to share until the end
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B Returns
Here the complete pre-programmed returns of each round of the various games are reported.
Return ranges used in experiments 1-4
Round Generous Mean
1 150% 30%
2 150% 30%
3 180% 60%
4 120% 0%
5 180% 60%
6 210% 90%
7 120% 0%
8 120% 0%
9 210% 90%
10 210% 90%
11 120% 0%
12 150% 30%
13 240% 120%
14 180% 60%
15 240% 120%
16 210% 90%
17 240% 120%
18 180% 60%
19 240% 120%
20 150% 30%
Table 11: Amount returned by virtual player in Experiments 1–4, in generous and mean
condition.
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(Appendix B) Returns
Return ranges used in experiment 5
Round Generous Mean
1 150% 30%
2 150% 30%
3 180% 60%
4 150% 0%
5 180% 60%
6 210% 90%
7 150% 0%
8 150% 0%
9 210% 90%
10 210% 90%
11 150% 0%
12 150% 30%
13 240% 90%
14 180% 60%
15 240% 90%
16 210% 90%
17 240% 90%
18 180% 60%
19 240% 90%
20 150% 30%
Table 12: Amount returned by virtual player in Experiment 5, in generous and mean
condition.
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Scassellati, B., Admoni, H. & Matarić, M. (2012). Robots for use in autism research. Annual
review of biomedical engineering, 14, 275–294. (Cit. on p. 170).
Scharlemann, J. P. W., Eckel, C. C., Kacelnik, A. & Wilson, R. K. (2001). The value of a smile:
Game theory with a human face. Journal of Economic Psychology, 22(5), 617–640.
(Cit. on pp. 49, 119, 123, 139).
Scherer, K. R. (1987). Vocal assessment of affective disorders. In J. D. Maser (Ed.), Depres-
sion and expressive behavior (pp. 57–82). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale,
NJ. (Cit. on p. 121).
Scherer, K. R., Banse, R. & Wallbott, H. G. (2001, January). Emotion inferences from
vocal expression correlate across languages and cultures. Journal of Cross-cultural
psychology, 32(1), 76–92. (Cit. on p. 122).
Scherer, K. R., Johnstone, T. & Klasmeyer, G. (2003). Vocal expression of emotion. In R. J.
Davidson, K. R. Scherer & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences
(pp. 433–456). Series in Affective Science. Oxford University Press. (Cit. on p. 40).
Scherer, K. R., Ladd, D. R. & Silverman, K. E. A. (1984). Vocal cues to speaker affect:
Testing two models. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 76(5), 1346–
1356. Reference for reversed utterances in order to mask speech content. (Cit. on
p. 118).
Scherer, K. R. & Wallbott, H. G. (1994). Evidence for universality and cultural variation of
differential emotion response patterning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
66(2), 310–328. (Cit. on p. 122).
Schiel, F. (1999, August 7). Automatic phonetic transcription of non-prompted speech. In
Proceedings of the 14th International Congress of Phonetic Sciences (pp. 607–610).
S. (Cit. on p. 81).
Schimmack, U. & Diener, E. (2003). Predictive validity of explicit and implicit self-esteem
for subjective well-being. Journal of Research in Personality, 37 (2), 100–106. (Cit. on
p. 11).
231
Bibliography
Schug, J., Matsumoto, D., Horita, Y., Yamagishi, T. & Bonnet, K. (2010, March). Emotional
expressivity as a signal of cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior, 31(2), 87–94.
(Cit. on pp. 10, 122, 124, 140).
Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions shape the answers. American psycho-
logist, 54(2), 93. (Cit. on pp. 11, 45).
Sell, A., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., Sznycer, D., von Rueden, C. & Gurven, M. (2009). Human
adaptations for the visual assessment of strength and fighting ability from the body and
face. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 276(1656),
575–584. (Cit. on p. 102).
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G. (2011). The neural bases for empathy. The Neuroscientist, 17 (1),
18–24. (Cit. on p. 28).
Shneiderman, B. & Plaisant, C. (2004). Designing the User Interface: Strategies for Effective
Human-Computer Interaction (4th Edition). Pearson Addison Wesley. (Cit. on p. 147).
Shor, R. E. (1978, January). The production and judgment of smile magnitude. The Journal
of General Psychology, 98(1), 79–96. (Cit. on p. 124).
Shue, Y.-L., Keating, P., Vicenik, C. & Yu, K. (2011, August 21). Voicesauce: A Program
for Voice Analysis. In Proceedings of the 17th International Congress of Phonetic
Sciences (pp. 1846–1849). Hong Kong, China. (Cit. on p. 82).
Sims, V. K., Chin, M. G., Lum, H. C., Upham-Ellis, L., Ballion, T. & Lagattuta, N. C. (2009).
Robots’ auditory cues are subject to anthropomorphism. In Proceedings of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 53, 18, pp. 1418–1421). SAGE
Publications. San Antonio, Texas, USA. (Cit. on p. 146).
Slonim, R. & Guillen, P. (2010). Gender selection discrimination: Evidence from a trust game.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 76(2), 385–405. (Cit. on pp. 39, 49,
77).
Smith, B. L., Brown, B. L., Strong, W. J. & Rencher, A. C. (1975). Effects of speech rate on
personality perception. Language and Speech, 18, 145–152. (Cit. on pp. 37, 76, 88,
99).
232
Bibliography
Smith, D. R. R., Patterson, R. D., Turner, R., Kawahara, H. & Irino, T. (2005). The processing
and perception of size information in speech sounds. The Journal of the Acoustical
Society of America, 117 (1), 305–318. (Cit. on p. 114).
Spence, K., Villar, G. & Arciuli, J. (2012). Markers of deception in Italian speech. Frontiers in
Psychology, 3, 453. (Cit. on p. 76).
Stanley, D. A., Sokol-Hessner, P., Fareri, D. S., Perino, M. T., Delgado, M. R., Banaji, M. R.
& Phelps, E. A. (2012). Race and reputation: Perceived racial group trustworthiness
influences the neural correlates of trust decisions. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society B, 367, 744–753. (Cit. on p. 49).
Stanton, C. & Stevens, C. J. (2014). Robot pressure: The impact of robot eye gaze and
lifelike bodily movements upon decision-making and trust. In International Conference
on Social Robotics (pp. 330–339). Springer. Sidney, Australia. (Cit. on pp. 148, 168).
Staudte, M. & Crocker, M. W. (2011). Investigating joint attention mechanisms through
spoken human–robot interaction. Cognition, 120(2), 268–291. (Cit. on pp. 148, 165,
170).
Street, J., Richard L. (1984, December). Speech convergence and speech evaluation in
fact-finding interviews. Human Communication Research, 11(2), 139–169. (Cit. on
pp. 37, 76, 96).
Street, J., Richard L. & Brady, R. M. (1982, December). Speech rate acceptance ranges
as a function of evaluative domain, listener speech rate, and communication context.
Communication Monographs, 49(4), 290–308. (Cit. on pp. 37, 76).
Street, J., Richard L., Brady, R. M. & Putman, W. B. (1983, January). The influence of speech
rate stereotypes and rate similarity or listeners’ evaluations of speakers. Journal of
Language and Social Psychology, 2(1), 37–56. (Cit. on p. 96).
Streeter, L. A., Krauss, R. M., Geller, V., Olson, C. & Apple, W. (1977). Pitch changes during
attempted deception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(5), 345–350.
(Cit. on pp. 38, 75).
Strongman, K. T. & Woosley, J. (1967). Stereotyped reactions to regional accents. British
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 6(3), 164–167. (Cit. on p. 34).
233
Bibliography
Surawski, M. K. & Ossoff, E. P. (2006). The effects of physical and vocal attractiveness on
impression formation of politicians. Current Psychology, 25(1), 15–27. (Cit. on p. 29).
Suzuki, A. & Suga, S. (2010, November). Enhanced memory for the wolf in sheep’s clothing:
Facial trustworthiness modulates face-trait associative memory. Cognition, 117 (2),
224–229. (Cit. on pp. 25, 179).
Syrdal, D. S., Dautenhahn, K., Woods, S. N., Walters, M. L. & Koay, K. L. (2007). Looking
good? appearance preferences and robot personality inferences at zero acquaintance.
In AAAI Spring Symposium: Multidisciplinary Collaboration for Socially Assistive Ro-
botics (pp. 86–92). (Cit. on p. 42).
Tager-Flusberg, H. & Sullivan, K. (2000). A componential view of theory of mind: Evidence
from williams syndrome. Cognition, 76(1), 59–90. (Cit. on p. 28).
Tamagawa, R., Watson, C. I., Kuo, I. H., MacDonald, B. A. & Broadbent, E. (2011). The effects
of synthesized voice accents on user perceptions of robots. International Journal of
Social Robotics, 3(3), 253–262. (Cit. on p. 147).
Tartter, V. C. (1980, January). Happy talk: Perceptual and acoustic effects of smiling on
speech. Perception & Psychophysics, 27 (1), 24–27. (Cit. on pp. 124, 127).
Tartter, V. C. & Braun, D. (1994). Hearing smiles and frowns in normal and whisper registers.
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 96(4), 2101–2107. (Cit. on pp. 119, 125).
Thompson, D. F. & Meltzer, L. (1964). Communication of emotional intent by facial expression.
The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68(2), 129–135. (Cit. on pp. 123,
140).
Tigue, C. C., Borak, D. J., O’Connor, J. J. M., Schandl, C. & Feinberg, D. R. (2012). Voice
pitch influences voting behaviour. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33, 210–216. (Cit.
on pp. 38, 77, 102, 113, 115).
Titze, I. R. (1989). Physiologic and acoustic differences between male and female voices.
The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 85(4), 1699–1707. (Cit. on p. 113).
Titze, I. R. (1994). Principles of voice production. Prentice Hall. (Cit. on p. 102).
Todorov, A. & Duchaine, B. (2008). Reading trustworthiness in faces without recognizing
faces. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 25(3), 395–410. (Cit. on p. 28).
234
Bibliography
Todorov, A., Pakrashi, M. & Oosterhof, N. N. (2009). Evaluating faces on trustworthiness
after minimal time exposure. Social Cognition, 27 (6), 813–833. (Cit. on pp. 15, 26).
Todorov, A., Said, C. P., Engell, A. D. & Oosterhof, N. N. (2008). Understanding evaluation of
faces on social dimensions. Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(12), 455–460. (Cit. on
p. 28).
Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of human communication. MIT Press. (Cit. on p. 27).
Torre, I. (2014). Production and perception of smiling voice. In Proceedings of the First
Postgraduate and Academic Researchers in Linguistics at York conference (PARLAY
2013). York, UK. (Cit. on pp. ix, 119, 124, 125, 127).
Torre, I., Goslin, J. & White, L. (2015a). Investing in accents: How does experience mediate
trust attributions to different voices? In Proceedings of the 18th International Congress
of Phonetic Sciences (ICPhS 2015). Glasgow, U. K. (Cit. on pp. ix, 241).
Torre, I., Goslin, J. & White, L. (2015b, May 23). The effect of experience on trust attributions
varies between two british accents. In EPIP4: 4th International Conference on English
Pronunciation: Issues & Practices (pp. 146–148). (Cit. on p. ix).
Torre, I. & Loesche, F. (2016, December). Overcoming impasses in conversations: A creative
business. Creativity: Theories – Research – Applications, 3(2). (Cit. on pp. ix, 241).
Torre, I., White, L. & Goslin, J. (2016, May). Behavioural mediation of prosodic cues to implicit
judgements of trustworthiness. In Proceedings of the eighth International Conference
on Speech Prosody 2016. Boston, MA, USA: ISCA. (Cit. on pp. ix, 241).
Tortosa, M. I., Lupiáñez, J. & Ruz, M. (2013). Race, emotion and trust: An ERP study. Brain
Research, 1494, 44–55. (Cit. on p. 49).
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly review of biology,
46(1), 35–57. (Cit. on p. 23).
Trouvain, J., Schmidt, S., Schröder, M., Schmitz, M. & Barry, W. J. (2006, May 5). Modelling
personality features by changing prosody in synthetic speech. In Proceedings of the
3rd International Conference on Speech Prosody. Dresden, Germany. (Cit. on pp. 39,
76, 85, 95, 99, 165).
235
Bibliography
Trudgill, P. (2000). Sociolinguistics: An introduction to language and society. Penguin UK.
(Cit. on p. 31).
Tsantani, M. S., Belin, P., Paterson, H. M. & McAleer, P. (2016). Low vocal pitch preference
drives first impressions irrespective of context in male voices but not in female voices.
Perception, 45(8), 946–963. (Cit. on pp. 113, 117).
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. In D. Kahneman,
P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty (Vol. 76, 2, pp. 23–31).
Cambridge University Press. (Cit. on p. 186).
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992, October). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative
representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323. (Cit. on
p. 96).
Uchanski, R. M., Choi, S. S., Braida, L. D., Reed, C. M. & Durlach, N. I. (1996). Speaking
clearly for the hard of hearing iv: Further studies of the role of speaking rate. Journal
of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 39(3), 494–509. (Cit. on p. 104).
Uleman, J. S., Saribay, S. A. & Gonzalez, C. M. (2008). Spontaneous inferences, implicit
impressions, and implicit theories. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 329–360. (Cit. on
p. 16).
Valley, K. L., Moag, J. & Bazerman, M. H. (1998). A matter of trust’:: Effects of communica-
tion on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 34(2), 211–238. (Cit. on p. 183).
Van Borsel, G., De Cuypere, R., Rubens, B. & Destaerke, J. (2000). Voice problems in
female-to-male transsexuals. International Journal of Language & Communication
Disorders, 35(3), 427–442. (Cit. on p. 102).
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W. & Manstead, A. S. R. (2010). An interpersonal approach
to emotion in social decision making: The emotions as social information model.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 45–96. (Cit. on pp. 121, 124, 125,
139).
236
Bibliography
van Hooff, J. A. (1972). A comparative approach to the phylogeny of laughter and smiling.
In R. A. Hinde (Ed.), Non-verbal communication (pp. 209–241). Cambridge University
Press. (Cit. on p. 122).
Verhoeven, J., De Pauw, G. & Kloots, H. (2004). Speech rate in a pluricentric language: A
comparison between Dutch in Belgium and the Netherlands. Language and Speech,
47 (3), 297–308. (Cit. on p. 103).
Villar, G., Arciuli, J. & Paterson, H. (2013). Vocal pitch production during lying: Beliefs about
deception matter. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 20(1), 123–132. (Cit. on pp. 38,
75).
Vrij, A., Edward, K., Roberts, K. P. & Bull, R. (2000). Detecting deceit via analysis of verbal
and nonverbal behavior. Journal of Nonverbal behavior, 24(4), 239–263. (Cit. on p. 76).
Vukovic, J., Feinberg, D. R., DeBruine, L., Smith, F. G. & Jones, B. C. (2010). Women’s
voice pitch is negatively correlated with health risk factors. Journal of Evolutionary
Psychology, 8(3), 217–225. (Cit. on p. 102).
Walters, M. L., Syrdal, D. S., Dautenhahn, K., Te Boekhorst, R. & Koay, K. L. (2008). Avoiding
the uncanny valley: Robot appearance, personality and consistency of behavior in an
attention-seeking home scenario for a robot companion. Autonomous Robots, 24(2),
159–178. (Cit. on pp. 15, 147, 149, 166, 170).
Walters, M. L., Syrdal, D. S., Koay, K. L., Dautenhahn, K. & Te Boekhorst, R. (2008, August).
Human approach distances to a mechanical-looking robot with different robot voice
styles. In RO-MAN 2008 - the 17th IEEE international symposium on robot and human
interactive communication (pp. 707–712). IEEE. Munich, Germany: IEEE. (Cit. on
p. 170).
Wang, Z., Arndt, A. D., Singh, S. N., Biernat, M. & Liu, F. (2013). “you Lost Me at Hello”: How
and when accent-based biases are expressed and suppressed. International Journal
of Research in Marketing, 30, 185–196. (Cit. on p. 35).
Waytz, A., Morewedge, C. K., Epley, N., Monteleone, G., Gao, J.-H. & Cacioppo, J. T. (2010).
Making sense by making sentient: Effectance motivation increases anthropomorphism.
Journal of personality and social psychology, 99(3), 410–435. (Cit. on p. 145).
237
Bibliography
Weber, J. M., Malhotra, D. & Murnighan, J. K. (2004). Normal acts of irrational trust: Motivated
attributions and the trust development process. Research in Organizational Behavior,
26, 75–101. (Cit. on p. 13).
Wells, J. C. (1982). Accents of English. Cambridge University Press. (Cit. on pp. 96, 117).
Wetzel, C. G., Wilson, T. D. & Kort, J. (1981). The halo effect revisited: Forewarned is
not forearmed. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 17 (4), 427–439. (Cit. on
pp. 28, 72).
Wicker, A. W. (1969). Attitudes versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioral
responses to attitude objects. Journal of Social Issues, 25(4), 41–78. (Cit. on pp. 11,
45).
Wickham, H. (2009). Ggplot2: Elegant graphics for data analysis. Springer-Verlag New York.
(Cit. on p. 57).
Wilkinson, A. M. (1965). Spoken english. Educational review. 17/2: Occasional publications.
University of Birmingham. (Cit. on pp. 34, 72, 92, 98).
Wilkinson, G. S., Carter, G. G., Bohn, K. M. & Adams, D. M. (2016). Non-kin cooperation in
bats. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 371(1687), 20150095. (Cit. on p. 23).
Willinger, M., Keser, C., Lohmann, C. & Usunier, J.-C. (2003). A comparison of trust and
reciprocity between france and germany: Experimental investigation based on the
investment game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(4), 447–466. (Cit. on p. 49).
Willis, J. & Todorov, A. (2006). First impressions: Making up your mind after a 100-ms
exposure to a face. Psychological Science, 17 (7), 592–598. (Cit. on pp. 14, 15, 24,
37, 59, 104).
Wolff, S. E. & Puts, D. A. (2010). Vocal masculinity is a robust dominance signal in men.
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 64(10), 1673–1683. (Cit. on pp. 102, 103, 114).
Wood, R. M., Rilling, J. K., Sanfey, A. G., Bhagwagar, Z. & Rogers, R. D. (2006). Effects of
tryptophan depletion on the performance of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game in
healthy adults. Neuropsychopharmacology, 31(5), 1075–1084. (Cit. on p. 25).
Wout, M. V. & Sanfey, A. G. (2008). Friend or foe: The effect of implicit trustworthiness
judgments in social decision-making. Cognition, 108(3), 796–803. (Cit. on p. 48).
238
Bibliography
Wright, S. C., Aron, A., McLaughlin-Volpe, T. & Ropp, S. A. (1997). The extended contact
effect: Knowledge of cross-group friendships and prejudice. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 73(1), 73. (Cit. on pp. 14, 104).
Xu, Y., Lee, A., Wu, W.-L., Liu, X. & Birkholz, P. (2013). Human vocal attractiveness as
signaled by body size projection. PloS one, 8(4), e62397. (Cit. on pp. 30, 40, 77, 102,
114).
Yamagishi, T., Tanida, S., Mashima, R., Shimoma, E. & Kanazawa, S. (2003). You can
judge a book by its cover: Evidence that cheaters may look different from cooperators.
Evolution and Human Behavior, 24(4), 290–301. (Cit. on p. 24).
Yamamoto, Y. (1990). A morality based on trust: Some reflections on Japanese morality.
Philosophy East and West, 40(4), 451–469. (Cit. on p. 22).
Zak, P. J. (2003). Trust. Capco Institute Journal of Financial Transformation, 7, 17–24. (Cit.
on p. 54).
Zak, P. J. & Fakhar, A. (2006, December). Neuroactive hormones and interpersonal trust:
International evidence. Economics & Human Biology, 4(3), 412–429. (Cit. on p. 23).
Zak, P. J. & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. The economic journal, 111(470), 295–321.
(Cit. on p. 23).
Zak, P. J., Kurzban, R. & Matzner, W. T. (2005, December). Oxytocin is associated with
human trustworthiness. Hormones and Behavior, 48(5), 522–527. (Cit. on p. 25).
Zanatto, D., Patacchiola, M., Goslin, J. & Cangelosi, A. (2016, March). Priming anthropo-
morphism: Can the credibility of humanlike robots be transferred to non-humanlike
robots? In 2016 11th ACM/IEEE international conference on human-robot interaction
(HRI) (pp. 543–544). IEEE Press. Christchurch, New Zealand: IEEE. (Cit. on p. 148).
Zebrowitz, L. A. & Collins, M. A. (1997, August). Accurate social perception at zero acquaint-
ance: The affordances of a gibsonian approach. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 1(3), 204–223. (Cit. on pp. 14, 104).
Zebrowitz, L. A. & Montepare, J. M. (2008, May). Social psychological face perception: Why
appearance matters. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(3), 1497–1517.
(Cit. on p. 28).
239
Bibliography
Zhang, T., Zhu, B., Lee, L. & Kaber, D. (2008, August). Service robot anthropomorphism and
interface design for emotion in human-robot interaction. In 2008 IEEE international
conference on automation science and engineering (pp. 674–679). IEEE. Marriott Key
Bridge Arlington, VA, USA: IEEE. (Cit. on p. 170).
Zipf, G. K. (2012, June 6). Human behavior and the principle of least effort. First published
in 1949. Martino Fine Books. (Cit. on p. 103).
Złotowski, J., Strasser, E. & Bartneck, C. (2014). Dimensions of anthropomorphism: From
humanness to humanlikeness. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM/IEEE international
conference on human-robot interaction - HRI ’14 (pp. 66–73). ACM. Bielefeld, Ger-
many: ACM Press. (Cit. on p. 145).
Zuckerman, M., DeFrank, R. S., Hall, J. A., Larrance, D. T. & Rosenthal, R. (1979, July). Facial
and vocal cues of deception and honesty. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
15(4), 378–396. (Cit. on pp. 38, 75, 99).
Zuckerman, M. & Driver, R. E. (1989). What sounds beautiful is good: The vocal attract-
iveness stereotype. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 13(2), 67–82. (Cit. on pp. 28,
30).
Zuckerman, M. & Miyake, K. (1993). The attractive voice: What makes it so? Journal of
Nonverbal Behavior, 17 (2), 119–135. (Cit. on pp. 29, 101).
240
Bound copies of published papers
The next pages show copies of the following published materials:
Torre, I., Goslin, J. & White, L. (2015a). Investing in accents: How does experience mediate
trust attributions to different voices? In Proceedings of the 18th International Congress
of Phonetic Sciences (ICPhS 2015). Glasgow, U. K..
Torre, I. & Loesche, F. (2016, December). Overcoming impasses in conversations: A creative
business. Creativity: Theories – Research – Applications, 3(2).
Torre, I., White, L. & Goslin, J. (2016, May). Behavioural mediation of prosodic cues to implicit
judgements of trustworthiness. In Proceedings of the eighth International Conference
on Speech Prosody 2016. Boston, MA, USA: ISCA.
241
Investing in accents: How does experience mediate  
trust attributions to different voices? 
 
Ilaria Torre, Jeremy Goslin, Laurence White 
 
School of Psychology, Plymouth University 
ilaria.torre@plymouth.ac.uk; jeremy.goslin@plymouth.ac.uk; laurence.white@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Speakers’ accents have been claimed to influence 
initial judgements of personality traits, such as 
trustworthiness. We examined how personal 
experience with specific accents may serve to 
modify initial trust attributions, using an iterated 
trust game in which participants make investments 
with virtual players. The virtual player’s accent was 
either Liverpool English or Standard Southern 
British English (SSBE), and they systematically 
returned investments either generously or meanly. 
When the virtual player was generous, participants 
consistently invested more with the SSBE-accented 
player throughout the game. When the virtual player 
was mean, participants initially invested more with 
SSBE, but after a few rounds the pattern reversed, 
and they subsequently invested more with the 
Liverpool-accented player, even though the pattern 
of investment returns between accents was the same. 
This interaction suggests that initial voice-based 
personality attributions may mediate the 
interpretation of a speaker’s subsequent behaviour. 
 
Keywords: English accents, game theory. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We make initial judgements about personality based 
on very limited evidence, such as seeing a face for 
100ms, or hearing the word “hello” [20, 13]. Many 
physical and behavioural characteristics (e.g., facial 
appearance and expression, dress, voice quality, 
accent) contribute to the formation of these 
impressions. It is still unclear, however, what 
specific vocal characteristics contribute to 
attributions of personality traits. Indeed – 
considering specifically trustworthiness – existing 
research is somewhat contradictory about the 
acoustic characteristics that give rise to trust 
judgments. For example, in a mock election 
scenario, male and female participants typically 
voted for candidates with lower-pitched voice [18]. 
Supporting this, higher pitch early in interactions 
predicts lower trust levels [8]. This effect diminishes 
over time, however [8], and smiling (which tends to 
shorten the vocal tract and raise pitch [17]) can be 
perceived in the voice and is likely to increase 
trust [8]. Furthermore, although gender strongly 
impacts on overall pitch level, neither gender 
consistently evokes higher trust judgments (e.g. [3, 
5, 14, 16]).  
Accent differences can also suggest personality 
stereotypes even to non-native speakers [11, 1], and 
native accents may be perceived as more trustworthy 
than non-native accents [12]. Accents, though, are 
often intrinsically related to geographic regions 
(with the exception of accents associated with social 
class, such as Standard Southern British English – 
SSBE), and stereotypes based on general socio-
economic perceptions of particular regions may 
impact on personality attributions. Some studies 
have shown that standard accents such as SSBE are 
rated as more pleasant and attractive than, for 
example, city accents such as Liverpool or 
Birmingham [2, 7, 9]. People may not actually be 
very effective at localising accents however [1], and 
it is possible that some vocal characteristics of 
accents may mediate trust judgements independent 
of regional stereotypes. Furthermore, most research 
on accent attributions focuses on immediate 
impressions, without taking into account how the 
attribution might evolve over time according to the 
speaker’s behaviour. We tried to explore the 
dynamic impact of voice on trust attributions with a 
novel experimental design based on game theory. 
We used speakers of two British accents – SSBE and 
Liverpool – which have been suggested to evoke 
contrasting trust attributions [2, 9], in an experiment 
where participants have to make monetary 
investments with virtual players. 
2. METHOD 
We used an iterated trust game – “the investment 
game” – to test how voice-based trust attributions 
change with experience.  
2.1. The investment game 
Based in game theory [15], some studies have 
employed a game scenario requiring simulated 
monetary investments to investigate trust attributions 
to a range of characteristics, including gender [3, 4, 
6], race and emotion [19], and facial 
expressions [10]. To our knowledge, however, such 
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games have never been applied to study trust 
attributions to different voices. We used an iterated 
investment game to test the hypothesis that the 
initial trust attribution to two accents (SSBE and 
Liverpool English) changes over time, according to 
the way the accented virtual player behaves.	  	  
2.1.1. Participants 
There were 44 native English participants 
(35 females, 9 males) aged 18-45 (mean 22.05). 
They were university undergraduate students who 
received course credit for participation. Self-reports 
on participants’ geographical origins were: 
southwest England (n = 31), southeast England 
(n = 9), Midlands (n = 2), Scotland (n = 1) and 
Wales (n = 1). 
2.1.2. Stimuli  
The utterances used in the game and the subsequent 
questionnaire were recorded in a sound-attenuated 
booth. We recorded seven male native British 
English speakers, from Liverpool, Edinburgh, 
Birmingham, south London, Huddersfield and 
Bournemouth, plus an SSBE speaker, and five male 
second language (L2) English speakers, from 
Germany (Saxony), France (Normandy), Italy 
(Tuscany), Greece (Macedonia) and India (National 
Capital Region). Each speaker read two blocks of 
20 sentences (one for each round of the game, 
described below), all approximately the same length 
(mean number of syllables per sentence 16.6, 
SD 1.08). Apart from the first utterance of each 
block, which served for the virtual player to 
introduce himself, all other utterances were about 
strategies to follow in the game, e.g.: “I’m going to 
return more money now, if you invest more as well”; 
“Remember, there is potential for earning, if we both 
trust each other”; “The goal of the game is to earn as 
much money as possible”. The SSBE and Liverpool 
utterances were used in the game, while the others 
were used in the questionnaire completed at the end. 
The recorded utterances were amplitude-normalized, 
and a noise-removal filter was applied. 
2.1.3. Procedure  
Participants were told that the goal of the game was 
to earn as much money as possible, and that mutual 
co-operation with the other (virtual) player would 
lead to greater profit. They were informed that they 
could not verbally interact with the other player, but 
that they would hear an utterance spoken by him at 
the beginning of each round. The first player (the 
participant) started with a notional sum of £8 at the 
beginning of each of the 20 rounds. He/she then 
decided whether to invest all, part, or none of it with 
a virtual player, who then received three times the 
invested amount. The latter was programmed to 
have one of two behaviours, either returning 120% 
to 240% of the invested money to the participant 
(generous condition) or 0% to 120% (mean 
condition). Thus, in the generous condition, if the 
participants invested some of the money they were 
given, they would end the round with more money 
than they started with. The virtual player’s 
utterances within each game were always in the 
same (SSBE or Liverpool) accent. Altogether, there 
were four accent-return pairings (Liverpool-
generous, Liverpool-mean, SSBE-generous, SSBE-
mean). Each participant engaged in two games, one 
for each accent, and one for each behaviour 
(generous/mean), with a different set of 20 sentences 
heard for each version of the game. Each round of 
the game proceeded as follows: participants heard 
the utterance from the virtual player; they indicated 
how much of their £8 they wished to invest (by 
pressing a digit key); they saw a summary screen 
with all the “monetary” transactions to and from the 
virtual player that had happened during the round, 
including the return on their investment. 
2.2. Questionnaire 
2.2.1. Procedure 
After the participants finished the two games, they 
completed a questionnaire, during which they heard 
two utterances from each of the 12 speakers (see 
2.1.2) in random order, and were asked to rate the 
speaker’s voice on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very 
untrustworthy, 7 = very trustworthy). 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Investment game 
The overall investment pattern was dictated by the 
virtual player’s behaviour, with participants 
investing consistently more with the generous 
virtual player (Fig. 1), regardless of his accent (Fig. 
2). A paired t-test confirmed that investments in the 
generous condition were higher than in the mean 
condition (t(879) = 32.82, p < 0.001). There was no 
difference in the overall investments made according 
to the accent of the virtual player (t(879) = -0.42, 
p = 0.68).  
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Figure 1: Mean investments in the generous and 
mean conditions. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean investments in the SSBE and 
Liverpool accent conditions. 
 
 
A linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data, 
with investment as dependent variable, accent, 
return behaviour and game turn order as independent 
variables, and participants as a random factor. The 
model showed a main effect of the return condition 
(χ²(1) = 983.36, p < 0.001), no effect for accent 
(χ²(1) = 0.48, p = 0.49), a significant interaction 
between accent and return condition (χ²(1) = 7.38, 
p = 0.007), a main effect of game turn 
(χ²(1) = 65.45, p < 0.001) and a significant three-
way interaction (χ²(1) = 12.39, p < 0.001).  
Given the interactions, we then considered the 
two return behaviour conditions separately. In the 
generous condition (Fig. 3), there was a main effect 
of accent (χ²(1) = 4.93, p = 0.026), with higher 
investment to SSBE, a main effect of game turn 
(χ²(1) = 151.77, p < 0.001), with an overall increase 
in investment as the game proceeded, but no 
significant interaction (χ²(1) = 1.11, p = 0.29). For 
the mean condition (Fig. 4), the model showed a 
main effect of accent (χ²(1) = 4.94, p = 0.026), with 
higher overall investment for Liverpool, no effect of 
game turn (χ²(1) = 1.81, p = 0.18), and a significant 
interaction of accent and game turn (χ²(1) = 36.44, 
p < 0.001). 
Thus, differences between the responses to the 
accents emerge when considering the two behaviour 
conditions separately. When the virtual player was 
generous, participants consistently invested more 
with the SSBE-accented player throughout the game 
(Fig. 3), supporting findings of relative 
trustworthiness of SSBE [2, 9]. When the virtual 
player was mean, participants initially invested more 
with SSBE, but after three rounds the pattern 
reversed, and they subsequently invested more with 
the Liverpool-accented player (Fig. 4), even though 
the pattern of investment return between accents was 
the same. 
 
Figure 3: Mean investments to SSBE and 
Liverpool accents in the generous condition. 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean investments to SSBE and 
Liverpool accents in the mean condition. 
 
Using an implicit test of trustworthiness, these 
preliminary results (based on a single-speaker per 
accent) support preconceptions that accent-
personality stereotypes exist.  When the virtual 
player was behaving generously, participants 
apparently trusted the SSBE accent more. However, 
when the virtual player consistently returned little of 
the invested money, participants invested less in the 
SSBE-accented player. This suggests that speakers 
judged initially more reliable may be more severely 
discredited if their behaviour is at odds with first 
impressions. 
3.2. Trustworthiness questionnaire 
Fig. 5 shows the mean trustworthiness ratings of the 
12 sampled speakers. The pattern of ratings differed 
somewhat from previous trust attributions to accents 
of English (e.g. [2, 9]), where, for example, 
Birmingham accents scored relatively low and 
Yorkshire accents scored much higher. In this 
preliminary study, however, there was only a single 
speaker representing each region, and idiolectal 
characteristics clearly affected ratings in addition to 
any regional associations.  
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Figure 5: Mean trustworthiness ratings of 
12 English speakers. 
 
 
The ratings for the SSBE and Liverpool voices are 
likely to be influenced by participants’ foregoing 
experiences in the investment game. Fig. 6 shows 
the trustworthiness ratings of SSBE and Liverpool, 
grouped by the two return conditions. Ratings in the 
Liverpool-generous were higher than in the 
Liverpool-mean condition (t(42) = 2.51, p < 0.05), 
whilst the difference between the SSBE-generous 
and SSBE-mean condition approached significance 
(t(40) = 1.87, p = 0.07). Thus, it appears that overall 
the explicit trust ratings are in line with participants’ 
investment behaviour. 
 
Figure 6: Boxplot showing the trustworthiness ratings 
of SSBE and Liverpool in the two behaviour 
conditions. 
 
 
It is worth noting that, of the 44 participants in 
the experiment, only four correctly identified the 
provenance of the Liverpool accent. Thus, social 
stereotypes may play a minor role in trust 
attributions in this study compared to idiolectal 
characteristics.  
4. CONCLUSION 
In the generous condition, there was higher  
investment with the SSBE speaker, somewhat 
reinforcing previous findings regarding accent-trust 
attributions. More interestingly, the accent of the 
speaker strongly affected how participants reacted to 
negative behaviour on the part of the virtual player. 
The speaker with the non-regional (standard) accent 
initially attracted higher investment, but showed a 
greater drop in investment than the regional speaker 
once the negative pattern of returns became evident. 
This preliminary result intriguingly indicates that 
socially “prestigious” accents may incur a more 
negative response to perceived unjust behaviour. 
      Data on accent attributions gathered with 
traditional sociolinguistic methods, such as 
questionnaires, only provide subjective, static 
measures. The novel methodology used in this study 
provides an implicit measure of trust; furthermore, it 
allows us to study how trust attributions change over 
time. Thus, it is particularly useful for studying the 
effect of observed behaviour on implicit personality 
attributions. However, the game data so far uses 
only two voices, and further studies will need to 
expand the range of voices to test how general is the 
observed contrast in investment between accents in 
the negative behaviour scenario. For example, it 
would be interesting to see whether other relatively 
“prestigious” accents incur similar investment 
penalties once initial stereotypes are undermined by 
behaviour. We also need to determine the degree to 
which trust attributions are due to individual 
differences in voice quality and prosody. The 
present study is part of a broader research 
programme investigating voice characteristics that 
influence trust attributions. 
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The ability to communicate complex meanings is a specific 
human ability which plays a crucial role in social interactions. 
A habitual example of these interactions is conversation. 
However, we observe that spontaneous conversation often 
hits an impasse when none of the interlocutors immediately 
produces a follow-up utterance. The existence of impasses in 
conversations, and the way that interlocutors overcome them 
provide evidence for our argument that conversation is a se-
quence of creative problem solving. In this work we use tech-
niques from Conversation Analysis (CA) on publicly available 
databases of naturally-occurring speech and we suggest 
a framework to understand how impasses are reached and 
overcome. As a result, we hope to reveal yet another in-
stance of the bond between language and creativity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we discuss conversations between humans and explore the possibility 
of interpreting them as continuous creative problem solving, where the problem is repre-
sented by the common phenomenon of impasse. 
Conversation 
While scholars have not reached an agreement on a formal definition of conversation,  
it is at least possible to isolate the phenomenon according to the elements associated 
with it. A conversation is often referred to as a meaningful verbal communication between 
at least two participants (Donaldson, 1979), who cooperatively construct an interaction 
(Clark, 1996; Warren, 2006). Ritualized exchanges as well as interactions between obvi-
ous status differences are often excluded from the definitions (Donaldson, 1979; War-
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ren, 2006). In this sense, interactions such as greetings, lectures, or orders are not usual-
ly considered conversations. Conversation generally serves the purpose of creating and 
maintaining social relationships (Donaldson, 1979; Kaplan, 1997; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jef-
ferson, 1974). Its social and collaborative nature can also be evinced by one of its most 
prominent and necessary features, turn-taking. If interlocutors were not able to follow the 
implicit rules of turn-taking, it would not be a conversation, but rather a chaotic ensemble 
of sounds. Even though the content of a conversation might not be an information ex-
change, the fact that each utterance is an action which implies something is a well-known 
theory in Philosophy of Language (Austin, 1975; Grice, 1957, 1975; Searle, 1969). From 
this point of view, we can say that conversations are meaningful because, even though 
they might not convey any new information to the interlocutors, they mean something for all 
of them, and they can be the means by which a change in the environment takes place 
(e.g. someone says “I’m cold” followed by another person closing the window). Another ele-
ment associated with conversation and that distinguishes it, for example, from written com-
munication is improvisation: interlocutors in a conversation do not know in advance what 
others or themselves will say in the next turns, so they need to be able to - as Donaldson 
puts it - creatively adapt to it (Donaldson, 1979; Halliday, 1994; McCarthy, 2001). Thus, fol-
lowing the summary in Jordan et al. (2009), we can conclude that conversation is made up 
of three main components: social collaboration, meaningfulness and improvisation. 
Problem Solving 
Problem solving can be seen as a way of reaching a goal. A problem can be well-defined, 
i.e. having an expected solution, a clear goal, and a defined path on how to reach it. 
Lacking any of these elements makes it ill-defined. However, the boundary between 
these types of problem does not seem to be easily distinguishable (Reed, 2015; Si-
mon, 1973). Creative problem solving adds a notion of creativity to it: Runco & Jaeger 
emphasize that a creative solution has to meet the minimal requirement of being novel 
work that is accepted as tenable or useful or satisfying by a group in time, as initially put 
forward by Stein (Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Stein, 1953). Often a third attribute of surprise is 
considered to be compulsory (Boden, 2004). These three attributes have different names 
in the creativity and creative problem solving literature, either using synonyms or similar 
but not equal terms. In social situations additional elements are frequently mentioned as 
identifiers of creativity - such as expression - while usefulness might be referred to as so-
cial appreciation as a result of social evaluation (Fischer, Giaccardi, Eden, Sugimoto, 
& Ye, 2005). Taking the personal-psychological creativity of the individual into account 
(see Boden, 2004), a distinction between convergent and divergent thinking, following 
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Guilford, is helpful: convergent tasks have one possible solution while divergent thinking 
might arrive at several correct solutions (Guilford, 1967). Both processes have been 
linked to problem solving, for example as a search within a problem space (e.g. Newell 
& Simon, 1972), or as a divergent production of potential solutions (Gilhooly, Fioratou, 
Anthony, & Wynn, 2007). 
Conversation as Creative Problem Solving 
In the rest of the section we explore similarities between conversation and creative prob-
lem solving. As we have seen, conversation includes elements of social collaboration, 
meaningfulness, and improvisation, while creative problem solving in a social situation 
can be described as a novel, expressive, and useful way of reaching a goal. In problem 
solving this goal does not have to be tangible, e.g. for ill-defined problems. Just as in 
Fischer et al.’s (2005) description of social creativity people need to express their ideas, 
interlocutors articulate their utterances in a conversation - they express them. Similarly, 
the other attributes mentioned above show a large potential overlap between conversa-
tion and creative problem solving: meaningfulness, as described by Jordan et al. (2009), 
shows some similarity to the idea of usefulness. Improvisation, either as an acquired skill 
or a constrained combinatorial creation, includes subjective novelty in this context. Since 
conversations usually do not aim at a clearly defined goal, and since their structure is al-
so not defined, they show similarities to ill-defined problems. Similarly, Demuth and 
Glaveanu (2016) argue that spontaneity and creativity contribute to the construction of 
utterances based on predictions of what the other person might say in the future; in this 
sense, conversation can also be understood as a problem finding approach in an ill-
defined environment. 
The link between creativity and conversation can be observed on a more granular 
level as well. For example, Kaufman and Beghetto (2013) distinguish between subjective 
self-discovery (mini-C), everyday creativity (little-c), and geniuses (big-C). Between and 
within each of these groups different tasks might require various time spans to be solved. 
Similarly, a longer conversation can consist of smaller parts, each of which can be dedi-
cated to a certain topic or carry a distinguishable meaning. Each of these sub-parts 
shows the same previously highlighted characteristics of the whole conversation:  
it is a social collaboration, which includes novelty and improvisation, and it is useful by 
being meaningful for the participants. As these sub-parts sequentially follow one another, 
eventually either another sub-part is initiated or the whole conversation is terminated after 
the end of a sub-part. We should mention that we are not considering the ability to create 
new linguistic symbols, which is another instance of creativity in language, but we only 
focus on the process of overcoming impasses. 
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Impasse 
Creative problem solving, or more generally creativity, is often described using a sequen-
tial model similar to the famous one proposed in Wallas (1926). He suggested that crea-
tive problem solving can be understood as a sequence of phases which he named prepa-
ration, incubation, illumination, and verification. A following phase can only start if the pre-
vious one is completed. Even though the number and nature of these sequential steps 
has been the subject of debate for the past 90 years, the idea of using sequential or com-
ponential models has proven to be a valid way of describing the creative process in indi-
vidual as well as social contexts (also see Amabile, 1983). Howard, Culley, & Dekon-
inck (2007) compare 42 models, more than 20 of which present a sequence of phases 
similar to those previously mentioned. A situation within this sequence, where one does 
not know how to proceed, is referred to as an impasse (Cranford & Moss, 2012). An im-
passe is therefore, at least from an external point of view, accompanied by the passing of 
time, without any advancements in the process, or, to use terms that are found in conver-
sation studies, a gap or lapse (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). Consequently, all 
the sequential models mentioned by Howard, Culley, and Dekoninck (2007) include 
a concept similar to that of an impasse. 
Framework 
In this section we want to offer a more detailed speculation on what might happen during 
a conversation regarding impasses, but reduce our explanation to the elements of a con-
versation necessary to follow this article. Since elements of our model relate to Conversa-
tion Analysis (CA) as well as creative problem solving, we avoid technical terms in order 
not to confuse them. In spoken communication silences are intentionally used as a rhe-
torical instrument and to prevent or even provoke turn-taking, but they also occur un-
planned by the interlocutors. In this paper we focus on the latter case and refer to these 
occurrences as impasses. 
To start with some examples: during a conversation, a difficult and open-ended 
question is posed, but no-one has an answer to it, or a topic in a conversation has been 
exhausted. In both cases, the interlocutors might have difficulties finding the next mean-
ingful and non-repetitive thing to say. If one of them starts a follow-up topic early enough, 
the others might still have experienced the impasse, even though it might have gone un-
noticed by an external listener. On the other hand, if none of the speakers is able to pro-
ceed, this impasse produces an unnaturally long silence ­ what Sacks, Schegloff, and 
Jefferson (1974) call a lapse. We argue that these pauses can be observed by an outside 
listener, especially since Stivers et al. (2009) have shown universal patterns in response 
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latency, i.e. silences, across languages and cultures. From a probabilistic point of view, 
the observable impasses are more likely to happen with a low number of interlocutors, 
with the additional benefit of having a simpler overall communication structure. 
To illustrate the context of an impasse happening within a 2-interlocutor conversa-
tion, we refer to Figure 1.  
 
 Figure 1 Impasses in conversations 
All the square boxes represent time-based events that can be observed from an out-
side perspective. One of them represents an impasse, as we hypothesize that solving it 
takes considerable time that can be observed as an increased response latency by an 
outside observer. The passing time is emphasized in our figure by the time triggered tran-
sitions to one of the decisions, represented by diamond shapes (e.g. B). These decisions, 
on the other hand, happen quickly between interlocutors (e.g. A and B), or internally to 
one speaker (C to E) - too fast to be identified by outside observers. Notice that, as ritual-
ized communication is excluded from our analysis, following the definitions described in 
the Introduction, elements such as greetings and closing remarks are not included in the 
diagram. Step A represents the moment when either Speaker 1 or Speaker 2 is starting 
to talk. For an extensive discussion on this step and the processes involved, we refer to 
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974), Selting (1996), and Stivers et al. (2009). For our 
model it is sufficient to have a step A which results in one speaker starting to talk. Once 
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this decision is made, the active speaker talks for a certain amount of time, checking for 
cues of being interrupted by the other speaker at B. This can happen very quickly, as 
shown by Chambliss and Feeny (1992), and Cummins, Li, and Wang (2013). If the 
speaker understands that he / she is being interrupted, the turn is either taken by the oth-
er speaker or the same speaker continues at A. In the latter case and if the topic is not 
yet depleted and can be continued (C), the conversation is continued at A. If the topic 
cannot be continued at C and one of the speakers has a new topic ready, the conversa-
tion continues from D to A. The conversation also continues in the case of one of the 
speakers deciding to revisit a previous topic at E. If this is not the case either, the conver-
sation does not progress and arrives at an impasse. During the impasse a speaker might 
re-evaluate the possibility of either continuing the current topic at C, starting a new one 
at D, or going back to a previous topic at E. Participants might iterate through these pos-
sibilities for some time before one of them is able to start talking again at A. If the step 
from C to D is iterative and stays within the semantically constrained problem space, 
these loops are similar to the search described in Newell and Simon (1972). 
A large semantic step or conceptual leap in finding a new topic could be described 
as a restructuring process and could therefore be identified as an insight (Beeftink, Van 
Eerde, & Rutte, 2008; Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2014; Salvi, Bricolo, Kounios, Bowden, 
& Beeman, 2016). While the order and the number of iterations of these steps can differ 
between individuals and between impasses in the same conversation, this model as-
sumes that both interlocutors will try to overcome the impasse. However, in other cases 
the impasses can also mean the end of the conversation, with the interlocutors switching 
to a ritualized closing remark from step A, C, D, or E. 
If conversation is a continuous stream of problem solving, steps C, D and E repre-
sent the ill-defined problem of either continuing with the current topic, choosing a new 
one, or going back to a previous one. In our framework these steps are also processed 
sequentially, even though the exact order might be different for each problem. In terms of 
novelty and usefulness, it could be argued that each meaningful unit produced within a 
topic is non-repetitive. Step D is even more convincing in this regard, since the next 
speaker is starting a new topic, which is novel by definition - at least on the level of sub-
jective self-discovery. If this topic is appreciated by both speakers, who as a result keep 
the conversation going, it is useful as well and can therefore be considered creative. 
In the following section we will introduce the data that we have used to study im-
passes and to validate our framework. 
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METHOD 
Recorded telephone conversations offer the advantage of reducing the influence of body 
language and para-linguistic information in the conversation, as the interlocutors have to 
express all the information they want to convey via the audio channel only. Plus, the num-
ber of interlocutors is limited to two people in classic phone calls. According to our work-
ing hypothesis, this increases the chance of observing an impasse. 
For these reasons, we analysed some phone calls in the CallHome database, 
a publicly available corpus of telephone conversations between speakers of American 
English (Canavan, Graff, & Zipperlen, 1997; MacWhinney, 2007). It was developed by the 
Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC) in support of the project Large Vocabulary Conversa-
tional Speech Recognition (LVCSR) and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. 
The database consists of 120 unscripted telephone conversations up to 30 minutes in 
length. The calls were recorded in the 1990s, and in exchange for their participation the 
speakers received free international phone calls for up to 30 minutes. All the calls originat-
ed from North America and most of them were directed to a person, usually a friend or rel-
ative, located abroad. The corpus is available at http://www.talkbank.org/CABank/. 
We used methods from Conversation Analysis (CA) to study how impasses are 
solved in spontaneous conversations. Intertwined with Pragmatics, Linguistics and Soci-
ology, CA studies the dynamics of conversation, and tries to explain verbal and nonverbal 
interactions on the basis of the interlocutors’ intentions (Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 2007). 
For example, a much discussed topic in CA is the study of turn-taking, i.e. the implicit 
rules according to which it is appropriate (or not) for an interlocutor to start a new turn 
(Lerner, 2004; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Stivers et al., 2009). In our model this 
is partially coded in step A. While an in-depth analysis of conversation dynamics is not 
required for the current work, we still borrow some techniques and conventions from CA - 
e.g. for transcribing speech - as a useful set of tools described in Jefferson (2004). 
For our analysis we randomly selected 13 out of the 120 available phone calls, with 
a total length of 245 minutes. In one of these conversations the phone was handed over 
to a third speaker. We treated this as a separate conversation, which brought the total 
number of analysed conversations to 14. Two independent raters listened to the phone 
conversations. They were instructed to identify impasses (stalemates) in the conversation 
based on [their] subjective rating. In addition, they were asked to assign each part of the 
conversation to either one of the general domains study, work, or personal as well as 
identify[ing] meaningful units and write down the general topic. This scoring technique is 
very similar to the one used for divergent thinking tasks, as described in Wallach and 
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Kogan (1965) and Silvia et al. (2008). A change of topic was expected to coincide with an 
impasse, if interlocutors followed the steps D and E in our model. In addition, we asked 
our raters to mark speech interruptions and overlaps, i.e. when one speaker started talk-
ing in the middle of the other person’s turn or when both speakers started speaking at the 
same time after a pause. These overlaps were intended to help us to identify interruptions 
in step B in our model. 
Below we report the transcriptions of three instances of impasses found in the cor-
pus. Following some standard CA conventions, the number in brackets represents si-
lence time (in seconds) and transcriptions enclosed within square brackets indicate over-
lapping speech. A colon indicates a prolonged segment in speech while transcriptions 
such as tch, mm, hhh, indicate, respectively, a click of the mouth, an assertive vocaliza-
tion, and an out-breath. Finally, the left arrow symbols highlight where in the extract our 
phenomenon of interest, the impasse, is happening. The transcriptions aim at represent-
ing what was actually said, without any attempt at interpreting the utterance or correcting 
grammatical mistakes that might have been made by the speakers. 
All the following examples show that the conversation has supposedly passed the 
sequential stages at B and E and is now in a situation where both interlocutors are expe-
riencing an impasse at the same time. All three cases result in an unnatural interruption 
of the conversational flow which was identified by the raters as an impasse. 
In the first example two friends, who also work in the same sector, are talking about 
a conference happening in Seattle later in the year, and are discussing whether they will 
be attending it and in particular the route the flight is going to follow: 
 Conversation Analysis 1: CallHome 4112 Conference in Seattle 
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1. S2: That’d be-’f course Chicago wouldn’ t be: (0.5) .hhh too bad either cos 
2. it’s (0.4) er: 
3. S1: Polar Air (?) 
4. S2:(0.4) Yeah (0.3) so it’d be it would be a direct flight 
5. S1: mmh   ← 
6. (1.8)    ← 
7. S1: mh[h   ]   ← 
8. S2:      [but]   ← 
9. (1.8)    ← 
10. S1: well   ← 
11. (0.6)    ← 
12. S2: We’re- hhh. we’re g-going home for Christmas 
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After a rather long hesitation, made of silences and filled pauses marked as the phenom-
enon of interest in lines 4 to 10, speaker 2, who also happens to be the last speaker be-
fore the impasse, resolves it by completely changing the topic from the conference to the 
Christmas holidays. This corresponds to the impasse being resolved in step D which in 
this case also means a change in the domain of the conversation, from work to personal. 
In an example from another phone call, two people are talking about how one of 
them got an evening job in addition to her studies: 
 Conversation Analysis 2: CallHome 638 New job 
While speaker 2 was the last speaker before the impasse marked in lines 4 to 6, the im-
passe is resolved by speaker 1. Again, both the topic and the domain are changed, but in 
addition to the previous example an overlap A between the two speakers occurred (see 
lines 2 and 3) after which speaker 2 continued to talk as decided in A, but then none of 
them managed to produce a sentence to continue the topic in C. 
Their joint impasse finally seems to be resolved by starting a new topic in D. In this 
final example, two people are talking about holidays around the 4
th 
July: 
Conversation Analysis 3: CallHome 4092 Paid holiday time 
Creativity. Theories – Research – Applications 3(2) 2016 
1. S2: And then I can work (.) like (0.4) evenins during school 
2. S1: (0.3) A [ha           ] 
3. S2:           [I don’t (.) ] have to work in the day 
4. (1.8)     ← 
5. S1: tch oh very good  ← 
6. (1.0)     ← 
7. S1: And how’s Lee Roy? 
1. S2: Do you have to work tomorrow? 
2. S1: (0.3) Yes 
3. S2: (0.3) Did you have hols yesterday? 
4. S1: (0.4) Yes 
5. S2: (0.3) Oh that’s good 
6. S1: (0.3) But and it was paid too 
7. S2: (0.4) Ohh: is it paid today? 
8. S1: (0.1) No 
9. S2: (0.4) Oh  ← 
10. (1.6)    ← 
11. S1: but er:   ← 
12. (0.7)    ← 
13. S1: Yeah (0.4) So the gym’s going well 
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In this case, the impasse is resolved by speaker 1, who was also the last one contributing 
to the topic in line 8. Once again the impasse is overcome by a change in domain, from 
work to personal, but in this case speaker 1 revisits a topic mentioned earlier in the con-
versation. This would correspond to step E in Figure 1. 
Apart from qualitative data, we extracted some quantitative data relative to the 
speech signal using the software for phonetic analysis Praat (Boersma & Ween-
ink, 2010). We recorded the total duration of the conversation, the duration of the individ-
ual impasses, the identifier of the speaker before and after the impasse, and the time dis-
tance between the impasse and the first preceding or following interruption. We also cal-
culated the phonation time of each interlocutor, i.e. the period of time they are speaking 
without pauses, and the number of syllables. This was obtained counting the nucleus of 
a syllable by finding voiced peaks in energy surrounded by dips, as described in de Jong 
and Wempe (2009). Given that each speaker was recorded on a separate audio channel, 
there is a noticeable difference between the combined phonation time and the sum of the 
individual times with an overlap of up to 24% of the combined phonation time. The phona-
tion time was used to identify a dominant speaker within each conversational pair, i.e. the 
interlocutor who had the longest phonation time. We also calculated the articulation rate, 
i.e. the quotient of syllable count over phonation time, which is a measure of how fast 
a speaker talks (see Jacewicz, Fox, O’Neill, & Salmons, 2009). 
RESULTS 
Following the instructions identify impasses (stalemates) in the conversation based on 
your subjective rating, rater A identified 99 and rater B 118 impasses in the 
14 conversations. After their individual assessments the raters were asked to revisit each 
of the identified impasses to find a shared agreement on its existence and length.  
As a result, the raters mutually agreed on a total of 110 impasses - on average about 
8 per conversation and one every 2 minutes. 
All of these identified impasses are accompanied by silence in the conversation, 
even though the instructions did not explicitly mention this increase in response latency. 
This observation strengthens the implied overlap between the term impasse, which 
is commonly used in creativity research, and gaps (silences that can be followed by 
a change of turn) as described in CA (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). 
We also observed nonverbal vocalizations such as mhh, and interjections such as 
“well” and “yeah” quite frequently during these impasses, as demonstrated in examples 
for CallHome 4112 and 4092. This is also consistent with previous findings such as in 
Park (2010), where the adverb anyway is identified as an attempt to move past a conver-
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sational impasse and is often preceded or followed by similar vocalizations. More gener-
ally this relates to the role of environmental cues to overcome impasses (e.g. Moss, Ko-
tovsky, & Cagan, 2011). 
The median length of the 110 identified impasses is m = 3.4 s with a minimum 
length of 1.0 s. In the cases where the interlocutors switched to a completely new topic 
after the impasse, the median length of the impasses is m = 3.5 s; when they resumed 
a topic that had appeared previously in the conversation, the impasse length is m = 3.9 s. 
In 80 out of the 110 identified impasses (72.7%) the topic changed after the im-
passe, while in the remaining 30 impasses the interlocutors continued with the same topic 
as before. While continuing on the same topic does not meet the definition of novel and 
useful for creative problem solving, the repetitive generation of the same solution can still 
be perceived as an impasse, as coded by Fleck and Weisberg (2013). Out of the 
80 impasses that were followed by a change of topic, 62 (77.5%, 56.4% of all impasses) 
started a topic novel within the conversation, whereas 18 impasses (22.4%, 16.4% over-
all) went back to a topic that had been discussed before. While these 62 changes of topic 
meet the novelty constraint of a creative solution, revisiting a previous topic can also be 
interpreted as the repetition of a previous solution (see Fleck & Weisberg, 2013). 
Looking at the 62 conversations that started a novel topic, 36 of them (58.1%, 
32.7% overall) were resolved by the dominant speaker of that conversation, 22 by the 
non-dominant speaker (35.5%, 20.0% overall), and 4 ended in overlapping speech (6.5%, 
3.6% overall). Interestingly, in all these overlaps it was the non-dominant speaker who 
continued talking afterwards. This is also represented by the fact that the dominant 
speaker was the last speaker before the impasse in 37 cases (59.7%, 33.6% overall), 
while, in the remaining 25 cases (40.3%, 22.7% overall), it was the non-dominant speak-
er. The association between dominance and impasse solving could be related to fluency, 
which has been shown to be a confounding factor of creativity (Hocevar, 1979; Silvia et 
al., 2008). However, the fact that dominant speakers spend more time talking means that 
they have a higher probability of starting a sentence after a gap. 
For the 18 impasses that were resolved by revisiting a previously discussed topic, 
only in 7 cases (38.9%, 6.3% overall) the dominant speaker was talking before, as op-
posed to the non-dominant speaker, who spoke in 11 cases (61.1%, 10.0% overall). Fi-
nally, 11 of these 18 impasses (61.1%, 10.0% overall) were resolved by the dominant 
speaker, 6 by the non-dominant one (33.4%, 5.4% overall), and 1 (5.6%, 0.9% overall) 
with an overlap - which was won by the dominant speaker. 
In total, 54.5% of the occurrences had a dominant speaker right before the impasse 
started, and 58.8% were overcome by a dominant speaker. 
Creativity. Theories – Research – Applications 3(2) 2016 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/26/17 9:01 PM
Publication in Creativity — Theories – Research – Applications (3)2 2016
257
  
 
255 
DISCUSSION 
Given the simple instruction of identifying impasses in the conversation corpus, both 
raters were able to identify a similar number which shows a shared understanding of the 
task. There was a high overlap between their ratings and they eventually agreed on 
110 impasses over 245 minutes of phone calls - which on average translates to about 
one impasse every two minutes. This confirms our starting argument that the phenome-
non which the raters identified as impasses is not only happening inside a conversation, 
but can also be identified by an observer from the outside. The fact that all the events 
marked as impasses had an increased response latency additionally supports the idea 
that the problem solving process can be described using a sequential model (Amabile, 
1983; Wallas, 1926). At the same time, this finding ties the observed phenomenon 
of a gap or lapse in conversation (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974) to that of impasse 
in problem solving (Öllinger, Jones, & Kloblich, 2014; Weisberg, 2015). 
Interestingly there was no impasse with a pause of less than 1 second marked by 
our raters. While the conversations might have had instances of impasses shorter than 
this, the raters did not identify them. Also, since pauses, nonverbal vocalizations, and in-
terjections are sometimes used as rhetorical figures of speech, our raters might have 
identified them as such instead of impasses. 
Looking at the length of pauses it is worth noting that impasses followed by a new 
topic are shorter than the ones where the speakers went back to a previous topic. This 
suggests that during an impasse speakers might look for a solution in the same order 
across individuals, potentially even in the same order as depicted in Figure 1: first 
step D and then E. Also, the distribution of impasses that were resolved by a new topic 
(62), continued on the current one (30), and went back to a previous one (18) supports the 
idea of a distinct sequence of steps to solve the problem. In this case the continuation on 
the same topic comes before the revisiting of a previous one which might imply, at least 
for the case of an impasse, that the order of steps changes from D, C, and E. We did not 
explore this in more detail as the exact order of steps is not relevant for our argument. 
The dominant speakers who are considered to be more active and who spend more 
time talking, are also more likely to be talking before or after an impasse occurs, thus 
suggesting that dominant speakers might be more involved in initiating and solving im-
passes than non-dominant speakers. Again, this supports the correlation between higher 
fluency and originality in problem solving literature (e.g. Silvia et al., 2008). Interestingly 
this is not the case for the speakers talking before an impasse which will be resolved with 
a revisited topic. But this trend might simply be due to random noise in our small sample 
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size. Another explanation could be rooted in individual differences in articulation rate: 
spending more time talking does not necessarily mean that a speaker will be perceived 
as more active, since she / he might just be speaking more slowly. The mean articulation 
rate across all the individual speakers in our sample was A = 4.47 
syllables
/s. While the 
small sample size does not allow any conclusion based on quantitative analysis for the 
current paper, it might prove useful to observe the following trend in a future study: non-
dominant speakers seem to be talking more often before impasses that are solved with-
out starting a novel topic. This trend is consistent with the idea that speakers with a low 
fluency fail to create original sentences which will then lead to the observed impasses. 
CONCLUSION 
We are aware that our results can only be understood as a theoretical exploration since 
observational studies require a large data set to produce reliable quantitative results. In-
stead, we use the transcriptions and ratings to maintain the possibility that the observed 
trends can be interpreted as our framework suggests and as is shown in Figure 1.  
Our framework is consistent with and supports sequential models of creative problem 
solving, from social creativity, to neuroimaging studies, and behavioural as well as theo-
retical work (as a representative sample of work, see Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2006; 
Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Wallas, 1926; Weisberg, 2015). For future work we suggest us-
ing a larger sample size which would allow, in a quantitative approach, to draw statistical 
inference and to apply logistic regression techniques to predict, for example, speaker 
dominance before and after the impasse from the other available factors (topic, domain, 
duration, articulation rate, etc.). 
Sometimes an impasse within a situation might be provoked intentionally by one of 
the speakers, for example to signal fatigue or to test the other participants’ interest in the 
current topic. Therefore, a future study could be based on qualitative methods to revisit 
subjective ethnography and compare collected reports with silently delayed responses 
and occurrences of non-verbal vocalizations during the impasses. 
The preliminary results presented in this paper provide evidence that impasses 
in conversation exist and are perceivable by external listeners. The impasses analysed 
in our corpus support the hypothesis that impasses in conversation are resolved by 
a continuous problem solving sequence of search steps in the solution spaces (new topic, 
previous topic, etc.). They also provide evidence for the conceptual switching hypothesis. 
These two models are also described as business-as-usual and the insight-sequence 
(Newell & Simon, 1972; Ohlsson, 2011). Our framework is neutral regarding which of 
these models should be used to describe conversations, and it also conforms with the in-
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tegrated theory proposed in Weisberg (2015). Our suggested framework helps to under-
stand an ongoing conversation as a sequence of time-based events, intertwined with po-
tentially quick, implicit, and distinct steps. 
From our reading of the literature as well as the trends observed in this study, we 
conclude that conversation can be seen as continuous series of creative problem solving. 
As far as we are aware, this is the first study that links spoken language and creativity 
through the phenomenon of impasses. 
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Abstract
Prosodic information is known to play a role in personality at-
tributions, such as judgements of trustworthiness. Research so
far has focused on assessing the determinants of such attribu-
tions in static contexts, very often in the form of questionnaires,
and not much is known about their dynamics, in particular, how
direct experience of behaviour over time influences the interpre-
tation of vocal characteristics. We used the investment game, an
innovative methodology adapted from game theory studies, to
assess how trust attributions – to virtual players acting more or
less cooperatively – are affected by the prosodic characteristics
of speakers of a range of British English accents. Regression
analysis shows that speaker accent, mean pitch, and articula-
tion rate all influence participants investment decisions, our im-
plicit measure of trust. Furthermore, participants interpretations
of these prosodic characteristics interact with how the virtual
players behave over time. Our findings are discussed with ref-
erence to “Size/Frequency Code“ and “Effort Code“ accounts
of prosodic universals.
Index Terms: game theory, trust, accent, mean pitch, articula-
tion rate
1. Introduction
We make personality inferences spontaneously [1, 2, 3], and
evidence suggests that the voice of a person just encountered
affects the judgements formed almost immediately in the mind
of a listener [4]. Here we consider the role of voice charac-
teristics, and prosody in particular, with respect to attributions
of trustworthiness, for which there are limited and inconsis-
tent data. In an interview scenario, where participants had to
rate the perceived trustworthiness of embodied conversational
agents, high f0 early in the interaction predicted low trustwor-
thiness attributions [5]. This finding was consistent with an ear-
lier study based on questionnaire responses, where participants
rated speakers with high f0 as “less truthful” [6]. The same
study also found that speakers with slow rate of speech were
rated as “less truthful” and “more passive” [6]. On the other
hand, smiling when speaking (which tends to raise f0 [7]) was
found to boost trustworthiness judgements [5]. Finally, accents
have long be linked to trustworthiness attributions [8, 9, 10] and
were recently shown to affect implicit judgements of trustwor-
thiness, with standard accents being associated with higher trust
levels than regional accents [11].
Studies researching specifically the effect of voice charac-
teristics on trustworthiness are scarce, but inferences can be
drawn from the literature on the role of voice in deception and in
attributions of personality more in general, e.g., the “Big Five”
traits [12]. Findings are not wholly consistent, however. Con-
cerning pitch, for example, participants in one deception study
consistently raised their f0 when lying [13], while participants
in another study perceived a lower pitch in the deceptive mes-
sages they heard [14]. A further study failed to find any acous-
tic differences – including in f0 – in the production of deceptive
and truthful messages [15]. From a slightly different perspec-
tive, two studies found that actors generally had a lower f0 and
slower speech rate when acting sarcastic voices than when they
were acting sincere voices [16, 17]. Similarly, sincerity in a syn-
thetic voice was associated with greater pitch range and faster
articulation rate [18]; slow speech rate, by contrast, was associ-
ated with less competence [19]. Finally, higher f0 was associ-
ated with higher agreeableness, which also relates indirectly to
trust [20].
We are still far from consensus regarding the direction of as-
sociation between prosodic features – in particular, speech rate
and f0 – and trustworthiness. Methodological differences may
account, at least in part, for observed discrepancies between
studies. Trustworthiness is a complex and dynamic social attri-
bution, difficult to capture fully through explicit questionnaire
rating, the predominant method used so far.
We present a study designed to calibrate listeners’ dynam-
ically responsive trust attributions to voice characteristics, with
a game theory methodology that produces implicit measures of
trustworthiness. While questionnaires might give rise to essen-
tially attitudinal responses – e.g. based on social stereotypes
linked to accents instead of voice characteristics per se – the
investment game allows us to study the impact of voice char-
acteristics on trustworthiness without participants realising that
this is the focus of the experiment. To our knowledge, no other
study has used such an implicit measure to assess the effect
of prosody on trust attributions. Our method has the further
advantage of taking into account the development of personal-
ity attributions with experience: the participants’ learning about
the other player’s behaviour simulates (although in a somewhat
contrived manner) the dynamics of personality judgements in
real life situations.
2. Method
2.1. The investment game
We used an iterated trust game – “the investment game” – to
test how voice-based trust attributions change with experience.
Based in game theory [21], it involves making simulated mon-
etary investments to other players, who decide whether to re-
ciprocate the investment or not. The money invested, the de-
pendent variable, can therefore be used as the implicit measure
of trust. Experiments using trust games have been carried out to
investigate trust attributions to a range of characteristics, includ-
ing gender [22, 23], race, emotion and reputation [24, 25] and
facial expressions [26]. This paper presents a follow-up experi-
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ment to [11], in which participants made monetary investments
with virtual players associated with different behaviours and ac-
cents.
2.2. Participants
Participants were 83 native British English speakers (52 fe-
males, 32 males) aged 18-67 (median = 21, SD = 11). They
were university undergraduate students who received course
credit for participation or members of the public who received
monetary compensation. Self-reports on participants’ geo-
graphical origins were: southwest England (n = 44), southeast
England (n = 20), Midlands (n = 7), Wales (n = 5), northwest
England (n = 3), East Anglia (n = 2) and northeast England (n
= 1) . One English-speaking subject from Canada was elimi-
nated from the data-set, as we needed the participants to have
had some contact with a wide range of British English accents.
2.3. Stimuli
The utterances used in the experiment were recorded in a sound-
attenuated booth. Research is inconclusive regarding which
gender elicits the highest trustworthiness judgement [27], and
we eliminated this factor from our experimental design, record-
ing twelve female native British English speakers in their twen-
ties. Three speakers had a Plymouth accent, three a Birmigham
accent, three a London accent and three spoke standard south-
ern British English (SSBE). Each speaker read four blocks of
20 sentences (one for each round of the game), all approx-
imately the same length (mean number of syllables per sen-
tence 16.95, SD 1.08). Apart from the first utterance of each
block, which served for the virtual player to introduce herself,
all other utterances were about strategies to follow in the game,
e.g.: “I’m going to return more money now, if you invest more
as well”; “The goal of the game is to earn as much money as
possible”. A noise-removal filter was applied to the recorded
utterances, which were then amplitude normalised.
2.4. Procedure
In the investment game, one player has a sum of virtual money
which can be invested, in whole or in part, with another player
in the hope of receiving an improved return. The amount
of money invested is taken as an implicit measure of trust
(e.g. [25, 26]). In our version of the game, the participant
started with a notional sum of 8 at the beginning of each of the
20 rounds of the game. Each round began with a prompt utter-
ance from the virtual player (see above), and then the participan
decided whether to invest all, part, or none of it with the vir-
tual player, who received three times the invested amount. The
virtual player was programmed to have one of two behaviours,
either returning 120% to 240% of the invested money to the par-
ticipant (Generous condition) or 0% to 120% (Mean condition),
for every round.
Each participant played the investment game four times –
twice in the generous condition and twice in the mean condi-
tion - with a different virtual player each time. Each virtual
player in these four games was associated with a different ac-
cent, from one of the 12 pre-recorded voices. The order of be-
haviours and accents was counterbalanced across participants.
The 20 utterances were always in the same position within a
block, with random association of utterances to block. Each
participant therefore heard all 80 of the prompt sentences, read
by four speakers with different accents, across the four game
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Figure 1: Mean investments to the four target accents, in the
two behaviour conditions
blocks. Within an accent, speakers were randomly assigned to
participants and behaviours in a counterbalanced fashion.
2.5. Prosodic measures
Segmentation and labelling of the individual sound files was
done with the MAUS General Web service [28]. The transcrip-
tions thus obtained were then used to extract prosodic mea-
sures in Praat [29] and MATLAB, specifically, mean pitch, pitch
range, voice quality and articulation rate. Mean pitch was calcu-
lated as the mean f0 value for each vowel, then averaged across
individual utterances. Pitch range, in order to eliminate poten-
tial outliers, was calculated as the difference between the 10th
and the 90th percentiles of the mean f0 value for each vowel,
as in [30], then averaged across individual utterances. Finally,
we used H1-H2 – the difference between the first and second
harmonic – as a measure of voice quality, as in [31, 32]. This
was calculated using VoiceSauce [33].
3. Results
To determine the effects of game behaviour and vocal charac-
teristics on investments, a mixed-effects regression linear model
was fitted to the data using forward stepwise selection, selecting
each successive predictor according to the lowest AIC (Akaike
Information Criterion [34]). Investment was the dependent vari-
able, behaviour, accent, game turn (i.e. ordinal numbers of the
rounds within each game), pitch range, f0, articulation rate and
H1-H2 were predictors, and subject was a random factor.
3.1. Effect of game behaviour
The virtual player’s behaviour explained the biggest portion of
the variance (χ2(4) = 4269.1, p < 0.001). This was expected,
since participants learn very quickly to invest higher amounts
of money with Generous virtual players than with Mean vir-
tual players. We also found a main effect of game turn (χ2(5)
= 96.02, p < 0.001) and a significant interaction between be-
haviour and game turn (χ2(6) = 191.88, p < 0.001): as pre-
viously noted, investments increase in the Generous condition
and decrease in the Mean condition as the game progresses.
3.2. Effect of accent
We found an effect of accent, χ2(9) = 30.59, p < 0.001. Post-
hoc pairwise comparisons show that average investments to
SSBE speakers were higher than the investments to Plymouth
(p = 0.005), London (p = 0.022) and Birmingham (p < 0.002)
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Figure 2: Scatterplot of mean f0 and articulation rate (AR) against investment in the Generous behaviour condition (top) and Mean
behaviour condition (bottom)
speakers, with no other pairs showing significant differences.
There was also an interaction between accent and behaviour,
χ2(12) = 13.63, p = 0.003. Figure 1 shows investment according
to accent and behaviour. Pairwise comparisons showed that the
investments in the Generous condition were significantly higher
with SSBE speakers than with speakers from Plymouth (p =
0.04) and London (p = 0.014), and that investments to Birming-
ham speakers were significantly higher than investments to Lon-
don (p = 0.017) and Birmingham speakers (p = 0.041). By con-
trast, in the Mean condition, investments to SSBE, Plymouth
and London speakers were all higher than the investments to
Birmingham speakers (p < 0.001, p = 0.017, p = 0.004 respec-
tively), and investments to SSBE speakers were also higher than
investments to Plymouth speakers (p = 0.025).
3.3. Effect of prosody
The regression model showed an effect of f0 (χ2(13) = 5.86, p =
0.015), while articulation rate approached significance (χ2(15)
= 3.46, p = 0.063). Overall, as shown in Figure 2 , higher pitch
and faster articulation rate were associated with higher invest-
ments. As we interpret the participants’ monetary investments
in the game as an implicit measure of trust, these results are
largely consistent with previous findings (e.g. [5]). There were
no effects of pitch range and H1-H2 on investments.
We found an interaction between f0 and game turn (χ2(14)
= 12.69, p < 0.001), with higher f0 more strongly associated
with higher investment earlier in the game. There was an in-
teraction between f0 and articulation rate (χ2(16) = 5.38, p =
0.02), with greater investment for high f0 at fast rate. There was
an interaction between articulation rate and behaviour (χ2(17)
= 4.58, p = 0.032), with the effect of faster rate on boosting
investment being somewhat greater in the Mean condition (Fig-
ure 2). We discuss the interpretation of these effects of prosody
on trustworthiness below.
4. General Discussion
As previously found, the investment game allows us to as-
sess the effect of voices on implicit trust judgements. Stan-
dard southern British English attracted higher overall invest-
ment than the other British English accents, but – in accordance
with our earlier work [11] – there were differential effects of vir-
tual player accents according to their behaviour. In particular,
the Birmingham accent attracted relatively high investment in
the Generous condition, but the lowest investment in the Mean
condition. We are still exploring the underlying reasons for
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this contrast, which may relate to social stereotypes, individual
voice quality or a combination of the two.
Two prosodic features previously associated with trust –
high pitch and fast articulation rate – influenced our partici-
pants’ monetary investments. This is consistent with some, but
not all previous studies on attributions of trustworthiness and
associated characteristics [5, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20], although
the methodology we employed to establish an implicit measure
of trust is radically different.
The greater trustworthiness of voices with higher pitch may
be related to the “Size/Frequency Code” theory [35], based on
higher f0 being generally associated with a smaller larynx and
therefore smaller body size. As a consequence, we tend to as-
sociate lower f0 with dominance and assertiveness, and higher
f0 with friendliness and cooperativeness [36, 37]. In a type of
interaction where trust is required, listeners might be more in-
clined to attribute trustworthiness to a speaker who is perceived
as friendly rather than dominating. We note that this interpre-
tation can only be applied to female speakers on the basis of
our methodology; it remains to be seen if higher f0 also ac-
cords with trustworthiness in male speakers. Furthermore, the
relationship between f0 and trust attributions is manifestly not
likely to be linear through the range of possible values, partially
evidenced in our study by how f0 effects on investment interact
with game turn and articulation rate.
The “Effort Code” account [38] may help to explain the as-
sociation we found between faster articulation rate and higher
trustworthiness attributions. Speaking faster can be seen as a
corollary of greater conversational effort and hence more en-
gagement in the interaction; manifestly, perceived engagement
is likely be seen as a sign of trustworthiness. As with f0, there
must be limits to any trust-boosting effects of rate however, and
we found differential effect of rate according to whether the vir-
tual player was behaving generously or meanly. It may be con-
sidered whether a faster rate impacts on participants’ sense of
response urgency and therefore on investment decisions. Previ-
ous studies have shown that, under conditions of time pressure,
a faster rate in spoken prompts may encourage quicker respond-
ing [39, 40], although such pressure was not explicitly present in
our context. In addition, a fast speech rate of a synthesized voice
did not influence the persuasiveness of a commercial message
[41]. Naturally, given the complex interactions that emerged
among speech rate, accent and our other variables of interest,
future studies tailored to unravel them are needed.
There are likely to be voice characteristics contributing to
trustworthiness attributions that have not been considered in this
study. Furthermore, the effect of the listener’s personality and
their context-driven expectations should also be examined in a
comprehensive account. However, our key findings with respect
to prosody concur with most of the foregoing literature: higher
f0 and faster rate are associated with higher speaker trustwor-
thiness. Given that we have used an implicit measure with no
explicit reference to speaker voice in the experimental proce-
dure, we can be confident that the findings reflect genuine par-
alinguistic effects rather than stereotype-based attributions.
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